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ABSTRACT 
 
Maarja Soo: The effect of market-based policies on academic research performance:  
evidence from Australia 1992-2004 
(under the direction of David D. Dill) 
 
As many other advanced countries, Australia has substantially reformed its research policies 
in the last two decades. In order to encourage efficiency and performance in the higher education 
sector, the Australian government has introduced various policy instruments that stimulate 
competition and establish market incentives in the sector. The effect of such market-based policy 
instruments on research performance is the subject of this dissertation.  The dissertation focuses on 
three interrelated questions.  
The first empirical analysis examines the effect of market-based policies on the structure of 
the academic research market.  A theory that higher education is a winner-take-all market has 
triggered a concern that market mechanisms may lead to the concentration and stratification of the 
higher education market. The analysis develops a convergence model for the Australian research 
market and observes that the gap in research performance between universities declines over time. 
Furthermore, the new policy incentives have encouraged universities not only to improve their 
research inputs but also to maximize the productivity of these inputs.  
 As a response to government research policies, universities have developed various research 
management practices in order to improve research performance. The second analysis examines the 
effect of seven management practices on institutional research performance over time. The results 
indicate that research management practices indeed have a positive effect on research performance.  
The most consistent effect is demonstrated by practices that target individual schools and faculties.   
iv 
 
The third part uses the Data Envelopment Analysis in order to examine the productivity and 
efficiency change in the sector more broadly.  
The dissertation concludes that market-based policies have had a considerable effect on 
Australian universities. Universities all across the sector improved their research performance, even 
though the invigorating effect of the market-mechanisms seems to fade over time. The government 
policies have also encouraged universities to implement internal research management practices and 
the effect of these practices outlives the immediate post-reform responses. Although the market-based 
policies may also have unintended effects, the reform in Australia seems to have achieved its primary 
goal: to provide incentives for productivity improvement in the higher education sector.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Introduction to the study   
Only in the last two or three decades has academic research policy become one of the 
main issues of policy agenda in all advanced economies. Traditionally, research tended to be 
outside of governments’ direct interest and active steering, unless perhaps related to national 
defense, however, new expectations from the ‘knowledge based economy’ have put the sector in 
the forefront.  Knowledge is now widely recognized as the “engine of economic growth and 
social development” (OECD 1996, World Bank 2000, World Bank 2002).  Research capacity, i.e. 
capacity to generate new knowledge and to transfer that knowledge to the economy, is perceived 
as vital capital for a country. Therefore most national governments as well as some supranational 
entities now develop strategies to actively advance this capacity.  In the European Union the 
emphasis on knowledge for economic success is clearly presented in the Lisbon Strategy 
(European Commission 2000), which sets a goal to make the EU “the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010”. This strategy has significant effects on national 
policies related to innovation, science and research in all European countries.  In Australia,  
Backing Australia’s Ability, a major policy package produced by the government in 2001, was 
inspired by the “recognition that success in the 21st century will depend predominantly on the 
innovative capacity of nations, their industries and their research and educational structures” and 
that “more needs to be done in response to an increasingly competitive world environment” 
(Howard 2001). 
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The new emphasis on research and development has affected academic research in many 
ways.   The traditional notion of research has been replaced by the “Mode 2” research that is 
oriented towards application and crosses disciplinary boundaries (Gibbons 1994). Knowledge 
production is also now seen as cooperation between various actors, most importantly a “triple 
helix” of universities, industry and government (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997). Universities 
face a pressure to engage in research relevant to industry, form industry-university partnerships, 
and commercialize their research outcomes. Not only has the nature of academic research 
changed over the years, but also government policy approaches to funding university research 
have significantly altered during this time. Universities as main knowledge producers have been 
raised to public scrutiny and made publicly accountable for their activities. Concerns over the 
increasing costs of research in universities and the “value for money” have been raised in many 
countries in the last two decades (Noll 1998, OECD 1987).  
The funding system of public research has been significantly reformed in many European 
countries and Australia in the 1990s. The traditional dual model of research funding – a 
combination of general institutional funding and targeted research funding (grants and contracts) 
– has been replaced by a more dynamic, market-based mechanism. The United Kingdom and 
Australia are two early examples of countries that introduced a “commercial” approach to 
government allocation of funding. Universities were not seen any longer as public institutions 
funded by the government, but instead the government became the “buyer” of academic services 
(Geuna and Martin 2003). As a result of this change, a higher proportion of research funding was 
distributed in the form of research grants and contracts, at the expense of institutional block 
grants, and the government started to monitor overall research performance in the institution and 
link performance to resource allocation. The government policy has thus created a research 
market where universities compete with each other for financial resources and are forced to 
demonstrate performance results for their survival.  These trends significantly transform the 
3 
environment and incentive structure for universities: universities must seek external funding, be 
responsive to economic and societal demands, and be profit-minded in their management. 
While the UK and Australia have been the earliest and most pronounced in their reforms, 
these developments are now rapidly diffusing. In the last two decades governments in many 
countries have implemented performance indicators to monitor academic research activities, 
established regular research evaluations, and conducted audit reviews (OECD 1997). 
Governments have also started to use active policy instruments to maximize research 
productivity, such as performance-based funding schemes.  In most countries, the share of 
institutional grants has declined and the share of direct government funds to contracts and 
research projects has increased (Geuna 2001).   
The expectations of the change have been manifold: to strengthen the accountability for 
public funds; to provide incentives for universities to foster government objectives (e.g. quality, 
concentration, cost-efficiency), and to encourage universities to attract more funding from 
external sources. The aim of this dissertation is to analyze empirically the effect of such market-
based research policies on actual research performance. The dissertation focuses entirely on 
public academic research, i.e. on research that is conducted in universities. While the attention of 
recent policy discussions tends to be dominated by the commercialization value of research, 
effective policies towards (basic) academic research are equally important. Academic research is 
a critical input to industrial R&D and the various outputs of public research, such as published 
papers and reports, and public conferences and informal information exchanges, have contributed 
directly to starting new, and finishing existing, industrial R&D projects (Cohen et al 2002). The 
effectiveness of academic research policy is thus also important for the commercialization goal. 
Public policies that overemphasize knowledge commercialization, university-industry 
partnerships and “usefulness” of research my even harm the overall goal they are trying to 
achieve. Dosi et al (2005) examine the “European paradox” – that research results are not 
effectively converted into wealth-generating innovations – and conclude that the primary source 
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of the problem is not university-industry cooperation but the quality of (academic) research 
(together with the industrial structure of European economies). The EU policy in this area that 
attempts to overcome the problem by encouraging university-industry cooperation and “useful” 
research, at the expense of basic research, is in this light strongly misplaced.    
This analysis hopes to contribute to the theoretical understanding of how market-based 
policy instruments work in the academic research sector as well as provide advice on effective 
research policies for the future.   
Motivation and policy relevance  
This study is motivated by its potential policy relevance as well as its theoretical 
contribution.  From a practical perspective, solid evidence about the effect of market-based 
policies on the higher education sector would contribute to informed policy making. The market-
based policies are not only increasingly copied and adopted in advanced countries but also 
recommended to less developed countries (e.g. de Ferranti et al 2003). Literature describing such 
policies and their effect on university governance structures and internal research management 
practices is rapidly growing (Connell 2004, Marginson and Considine 2000).  Yet empirical 
evidence of the effect of such policies on actual research performance is scarce. There is a lot of 
evidence from other sectors, both private and public, that management practices are often 
overenthusiastically adopted due to fad and fashion, or ideology and belief (Staw and Epstein 
2000). Birnbaum’s (2000) specific analysis of academic management fads in the US context 
demonstrates that universities are equally susceptible to new management practices considered 
more modern and efficient, even though their actual effect on outcomes may be questionable.  In 
light of recent calls for “evidence-based management” and “evidence-based policy” (Pfeffer and 
Sutton 2006, Heinrich 2007), empirical evidence of the effect of research policies on research 
performance is much needed. This study hopes to contribute to this body of evidence. The 
policies have been in place now for more than a decade and some insights on the short-term and 
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long-terms effects could be developed.   Better knowledge about the impact of the policies may 
suggest new ideas for improved research policies, advise policy makers who plan to implement 
market-based instruments in academic research policies, and hopefully lead to more informed 
policies in the future.   
At the theoretical level, the effect of market-based incentives is an interesting study 
object because of the nature of academic organizations.  The reforms have had a significant 
impact on the entire higher education system in many countries, the United Kingdom and 
Australia among them. The effect of these policies is not necessarily self-evident from a 
theoretical perspective. Universities embody most of the organizational characteristics that are 
associated with the failure of external incentives: multiple goals and principals, strongly 
developed professional values, long term career concerns, and difficulties with measuring 
outcomes (Dixit 2002). Moreover, academic organizations have a peculiar organizational 
structure. Universities are known to be “organized anarchies” (Cohen and March 1974) and 
“loosely coupled systems” (Weick 1976). In such an organization individual units in the 
organization preserve their own independence and separateness, which can function as an 
effective buffer to any reforms in the organization.  The incentives for the institution as a whole 
or practices implemented at the central administration level of the organization may easily remain 
unattached to the technical core (i.e. education and research units) in the organization. Yet the 
basic academic units constitute the level where professional values are to a large extent shaped 
and transmitted (Trow 1976; Becher and Trowler 2001), and this most directly influences the 
behavior of individual academics.  Birnbaum (2000:137), studying management fads in American 
universities, also hypothesizes that it is possible to “publicly” adopt management practices in 
universities without actually affecting the technical core because of the dual authority structure of 
administrators and academics.  Indeed, not all higher education systems have proven as 
responsive to performance-based reforms in higher education.  Many states in the US have 
implemented performance-based funding or budgeting mechanisms, but with questionable 
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success. While extensive research by Joseph Burke has indicated only a very limited impact of 
performance-based funding in the US context (Burke and Minassians 2002), initiatives in Europe 
and Australia seem to have demonstrated a more substantial impact. An effective policy must 
thus overcome two “principal-agent” hurdles in the higher education sector: first, it must create 
incentives that make universities behave in the best public interest, and secondly, it must ensure 
that the incentives will be transmitted from the central administration at a university down to 
academic units.    
This study explores the effect of market-based research policies in the empirical 
framework of Australia. Australia serves as a good example for several reasons.   Australia is well 
known for its clear-cut reforms in the sector. The key characteristics of their reforms are quite 
similar to developments elsewhere: increased financial contribution from students, enhanced 
national and international competition both for students and for research income, greater 
accountability of government funding, greater deregulation within the higher education sector, 
and diversification of the funding base (Wood and Meek 2002). Higher education reforms in 
Australia have been highly visible in Australia as well as in the international higher education 
community. Moreover, Australia started with reforms relatively early, at the end of 1980s, which 
provides a sufficient time trend to observe actual changes. Compared to other countries, public 
fiscal support for the universities fell relatively rapidly in Australia throughout the reform period 
(Marginson and Considine 2000). Conclusions from Australia cannot be generalized for other 
higher education systems without further reflection and adjustments.  However, considering the 
similar nature of academic organizations, the conclusions about general effects and time trends in 
Australia provide important insights not only for Australian research policy but also for other 
higher education systems. Exploring the impact of market-based policy instruments in Australia 
will contribute to the empirical evidence-base that could be useful in designing more effective 
market-based instruments in other countries. 
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Research objectives    
While the reforms are triggered by the belief that financial performance incentives and 
competition between universities contribute to performance, efficiency and productivity in 
academic research, the evidence needed to reject or support this claim is scarce. This study seeks 
an answer to three interrelated questions:   
 
i. Do market-based research policies lead to unequally distributed research performance 
and exacerbate the gap between research-intensive and less research-oriented 
universities? 
ii. Do internal research management practices, which universities develop as a response 
to the market-based government policies, have an effect on research performance in 
the university, regardless of the peculiar characteristics of an academic organization?  
iii. Can we conclude that market-based research policies increase overall market 
performance of the higher education system and that actual productivity of the 
system has improved?   
 
The same issue inspires each question: does the competitive research environment lead to 
better research performance? Performance is analyzed at two levels, the organizational level (i.e. 
universities) and the market level (i.e. academic research system). At the organizational level we 
will explore whether the new incentives make an organization adjust its internal policies in an 
effective way.  At the market level we will see how the policy affects the structure of the research 
market and whether it leads to the better performance of the entire market. These three questions 
are approached in a larger context of the structure-conduct-performance framework. The first 
question addresses the issue of whether competitive research environment affects the structure of 
the higher education market; the second question examines the conduct of universities in a 
changed environment, and the third question analyzes the overall performance of the system.  
8 
 Structure of the dissertation 
The three research questions are studied respectively in three empirical chapters. Chapter 
4 explores the extent to which market-based research policy leads to research concentration and 
stratification between universities, or, on the contrary, potentially leads towards higher diffusion 
of research activities across the sector. The argument is developed based on a theoretical 
discussion of winner-take-all markets.  Chapter 5 analyzes internal research management 
practices in universities and explores their effectiveness with respect to research performance. 
Chapter 6 takes a bigger perspective and examines whether the policy reform has helped the 
higher education sector to perform better; i.e. whether more research and educational outputs are 
produced with given inputs. Chapter 7 summarizes and synthesizes the results of the empirical 
papers.  
The conceptual framework in Chapter 2 presents the general perspective that is a 
foundation for all three studies and that connects the studies. In this perspective universities are 
seen as economic agents and changes in the research market are approached from the viewpoint 
of industrial economics. The chapter also reviews existing literature on the determinants of 
research performance, which serves as a basis for developing models and identifying control 
variables in later chapters. Chapter 3 discusses issues related to measuring research performance 
and describes the nature and sources of the data that are used for the empirical analyses.  
The next section provides an overview of the main changes in Australian research policy 
that have reshaped research environments for Australian universities and presents a general 
picture of market-based reforms in the Australian research system.    
Institutional background of the Australian research system 
Australia currently has 37 public universities, two private universities (Bond University 
and Notre Dame University) and a few specialized private and public institutions. The higher 
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education sector is the dominant performer in basic and applied research in Australia. In 2004-5, 
62 per cent of basic research in Australia was performed in universities, 17 per cent in the federal 
government sector (which is mostly the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization – CSIRO), almost 10 per cent by industry, and the remaining 10 per cent by state 
governments and private non-profit organizations (DEST 2006). This dissertation focuses only on 
academic research, i.e. research conducted in the higher education sector.   
Responsibilities for the higher education sector are divided between the Commonwealth 
government at the federal level and eight states and territories at the local level. According to the 
constitution, education is one of the sectors over which states have legal authority. Consequently 
higher education institutions are within the jurisdiction of the states, but financial responsibility 
for the sector lies with the Commonwealth. The division of authority between the two levels has 
fluctuated over time and occasionally caused some tension. The role of the Commonwealth 
government increased considerably in the middle of the 1970s when the government abolished 
tuition fees and accepted full responsibility for providing capital funds to universities (Meek 
2002). This meant that the Commonwealth government was responsible for almost all financial 
resources of universities.  With this step the Commonwealth government became the main player 
in regulating the higher education sector. Although states still own universities’ land and capital 
assets, regulate the use of degree and university titles, and until recently accredited university 
courses, it is mostly the Commonwealth policies that shape the fundamental direction of the 
higher education sector (Meek 2003). In very recent years, the ministers of education have 
proposed to take full financial and legislative control over the higher education sector. 
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Academic research policy: towards competition and performance 
The Australian higher education sector has experienced several substantial policy 
changes since World War II1, but reforms that triggered the current processes started at the end of 
the 1980s. As in most other countries, the higher education sector started to expand rapidly in the 
mid-1980s, which imposed additional burdens on public funds. Increasing costs in higher 
education brought up questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of the system (see Meek 
2002).  But reforms were not driven only by external factors. The ideas of New Public 
Management had made a strong entrance into the Australian public sector (Kettl 2000) and these 
ideas also diffused into the higher education sector (Harman 2001a). As elsewhere in the public 
sector, a call was made for greater efficiency and accountability, and the assumption that 
competition is the primary guarantee of quality, productivity, and ‘customer’ satisfaction was also 
introduced into higher education. The changes affected equally the education side and the 
research side in universities. While the reforms went through different cycles, the general 
direction of the reforms is towards increased competition between universities, i.e. competition 
for financial resources, for students, for prestige, and eventually for research talent.  
Market reforms started in 1987/88 when John Dawkins, the Minister for Employment, 
Education and Training in the labor government issued the Green Paper (Higher Education: a 
policy discussion paper) and White Paper (Higher Education: policy statement). These plans 
introduced several major changes to the structure and management of the sector.  The higher 
education sector in that time consisted of two types of institutions: Universities and vocationally 
oriented Colleges of Advanced Education (CAE). The reform of 1987/88 replaced the binary 
system with a unified system. After a series of amalgamations of old institutions and 
establishment of new institutions, by 1994 the sector consisted of 36 universities instead of the 
                                                     
1 See Marginson and Considine (2000) for  an excellent summary on these changes. 
2 Davies et al (2005) give an excellent overview of different theoretical perspectives on studying 
the topic of incentives and performance in the case of health care system, very similar to that of higher 
11 
more than 70 higher education institutions of earlier times. Unlike previously, all higher 
institutions were now expected to be research active and all universities, both new and old, were 
expected to contribute more to economic growth.   
The 1988 reform also directly addressed research management issues. The White paper 
suggested that greater competition and selectivity in research were needed if funding were to be 
fully effective.  The goals of competition and selectivity were achieved with several policy 
instruments. Some of the institutional research funding was reallocated to the Australian Research 
Council (ARC) for competitive grant allocations. This included two grant schemes: ARC Large 
Grant scheme was a competitive research grant scheme and ARC Small Grant scheme allocated 
money to universities based on their success with Large Grants.  
Elements of competition were also introduced to institutional research funding.  In 1990 
the government introduced a plan whereby 6 per cent of the total operating grant to universities 
was distributed based on research performance, while the rest was allocated on the basis of 
student load. The performance-based component – Research Quantum – was expected to function 
as “the general “fabric” which underpins the research base; it should support and develop the 
general research capacity of an institution” (in Harman 2000:117).  Research Quantum was 
derived from a Composite Index, the components of which varied somewhat in the first years, but 
stabilized according to the following proportions: 80 per cent of the Quantum is dependent on 
success in attracting external funding, most importantly competitive research grants from the 
Australian Research Council; 10 per cent comes from publications count, and 10 per cent from 
successfully completed advanced degrees.  The Research Quantum constitutes only between 1 
and 10 per cent of universities’ total operating budget but it has a strong effect in conveying the 
message of research performance and competition.  In addition, Research Infrastructure Block 
Grants (RIBG) serves as additional funding meant to support research that was allocated to 
universities based on their success with attracting external funding.  
12 
Besides the changes that linked research funding with research performance, the 
government encouraged strategic planning in research management and also promoted 
competitive practices at the institutional level. Universities were required to design research 
management plans and specify principles as to how internal research funding would be 
competitively allocated to academic staff. Management in higher education institutions was 
directly a part of government reforms from early on. The 1988 policy statement by Minister 
Dawkins addressed the issues of institutional management, pointing out that “while the 
Commonwealth has no role in dictating management structures to institutions … it will assist 
institutions in undertaking reviews of their internal management structures” and among other 
goals “help institutions to achieve strong managerial modes of operations” (Dawkins 1987:103).   
The reforms in the higher education sector did not end with the 1987-88 cycle. 
Competition for resources was further sharpened with a new coalition government in 1996.  The 
government intended to cut costs in the higher education sector. As a result operating grants to 
universities were reduced by 5 per cent over the next three years and no financial supplements 
were to be allocated for academic salary increases. This put universities under serious budget 
constraints; it made government resources even more valuable and made universities search more 
actively for external funding sources.  
The year 1999 introduced another step in making the research environment more 
competitive. The new liberal coalition government issued the discussion paper New Knowledge, 
New Opportunities and subsequent policy statement Knowledge and Innovation, which suggested 
further steps toward make funding for research and research training more competitive. The 
Australian Research Council (ARC) was significantly reformed and gained independence and 
authority for distributing research funding.  The ARC subsumed almost all the public research 
funding, including funding for doctoral education, and led to what has been called the “fully 
performance-based funding approach in research and research training” (Meek and Hayden 
2005). Research student places were from now on also distributed based on performance. 
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Funding for research training is based on a formula that consists of the number of research 
students completing their degree (50 per cent), research income (40 per cent) and a publications 
measure (10 per cent). Universities were now also required to submit Research and Research 
Training Management Plans (RRTMP) to the DEST and thereby report annually on their research 
activities, research strengths, graduate outcomes and other aspects of their research activities.  As 
a result of the policy changes, not only has the funding formula changed but institutions have 
been forced to revise their internal practices by identifying research priorities, concentrating on 
certain research areas, and developing a set of performance indicators and information systems 
(Wood and Meek 2002).   
Research funding is channeled to universities now via two main streams.  The 
Institutional Grants Scheme (IGS) supports the general research and research training activities 
and combines the former RQ and ARC Small Grant funding. Its allocation principles are similar 
to the former RQ scheme:  success in attracting research funding (60 per cent), success in 
attracting research students (30 per cent) and quality and output of research publications (10 per 
cent).  The second stream of funding is channeled to universities via ARC competitive grants. 
While these schemes constitute the great majority of research funding, there are also some other 
sources. The Government has recognized that not all universities are capable of competing for 
research funding on equal ground and established a Regional Protection Fund. The share of this 
funding source is however a marginal 0.1 per cent of total research funding (AVCC University 
Funding and Expenditure).  Although research is primarily funded and steered at the federal 
level, states have become more involved in recent years.  Many individual states have developed 
and implemented innovation strategies that usually also include a reference to university research. 
Innovation – Queensland’s Future, for example, encourages university-industry cooperation in 
Queensland and BioFirst is a five year strategy for creating a cluster of excellence in 
biotechnology in New South Wales.  Similar initiatives have been created by many other states.  
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Empirical analysis in this dissertation ends with the year 2003, but reforms in research 
policy continue and many new developments are currently taking place. In 2004, within the 
framework of the Backing Australia’s Ability document, the Australian government proposed a 
new Research Quality Framework (RQF). This framework is designed after the UK Research 
Assessment Exercise, which is based on regular peer evaluation of individual subjects in 
universities. The RQF aims to measure more accurately the quality and impact of publicly funded 
research.  While promoting universities to define the areas of concentration, the government has 
defined its own, national research priorities. In early 2002, government allocated a large 
proportion (33 per cent) of ARC funding to the priority fields: nano- and biomaterials, 
genome/phenome research, complex/intelligent systems, and photon science and technology. In 
May 2002 a review of national research priorities for publicly funded research was undertaken 
and identified broader priority areas for Australian research, such as environmentally sustainable 
Australia, promoting and maintaining good health, frontier technologies for building and 
transforming Australian industries, and safeguarding Australia.  
There is a whole range of additional policies and instruments to strengthen university-
industry cooperation and knowledge commercialization. For example, The Chance to Change  
proposes various changes to increase scientific capacity in Australia and encourage 
commercialization; Backing Australia’s Ability encourages commercialization and research in 
industry; and the Cooperative Research Center (CRC) scheme supports university-industry 
partnerships. This dissertation focuses on academic research broadly and across disciplines - the 
policies that narrowly target knowledge commercialization are beyond the scope of this study.   
Although this study focuses on research performance, rather than on higher education, 
research and education are deeply interlinked in universities, and major reforms related to 
education are likely to also affect research. Most importantly, student fees have become an 
important revenue source for universities. The 1987/88 reforms introduced a tuition fee for all 
students, known as the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). The HECS initiative also 
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enabled universities to enroll fee-paying overseas students, which became an important income 
for universities and initiated a strong competition for international students. Increase in 
international student enrollment has been remarkable over the last years and exceeded 25 per cent 
of all students in 2005 (DEST 2007:3.1.10). In 1994 the option of fee-paying enrollment was 
expanded also to domestic students, but only to a limited extent. In 1998, the restrictions were 
further relaxed and universities were allowed to enroll up to 25 per cent of domestic 
undergraduate students on a full fee-paying basis. In fact, less than one per cent of domestic 
undergraduate students used the option of fee-paying enrollment (Meek and Hayden 2005).  With 
the new millennium the process continued in a similar direction: student contribution in the 
HECS scheme was increased and the restriction on the number of full-fee paying students was 
relaxed.  
Fee-paying students have become an important revenue source for universities. As a 
result, universities are actively engaged in attracting international students and marketing their 
institution. Competition for students also affects research activities in the university. University 
ranking is one point where competition for students and research activities intersect. International 
university rankings are a highly visible and relevant information source for international students 
when choosing a university (Marginson 2007). Such rankings, e.g. Shanghai Jiao Tong or Times 
Higher university ranking, are driven by research performance measures. Research reputation is 
thus an important capital in Australian universities as a mean to be competitive in the student 
market and consequently to ensure necessary financial resources.   
The Australian higher education sector has gone through a wave of policy reforms and 
changes over the last two decades. These reforms have been cumulative and have pushed 
Australian universities consistently towards a competitive environment. The “market-based 
higher education reforms” in the title of the dissertation refers to the aggregate set of policies that 
have created an environment where universities must compete with each other for a large part of 
their financial resources: they must compete for individual research grants, institutional research 
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allocation, external funding, and fee-paying students. The term “performance-based funding” is a 
more commonly used term in the higher education literature and refers to many similar processes 
(Herbst 2007, Massy 2003, Jongbloed and Vossensteyn 2001, Orr et al 2007). The difference 
between “performance-based” and “market-based” government reforms is in the accent and the 
scope of the reform. Performance-based funding refers to a resource allocation mechanism that 
funds universities based on their achievements, rather than on last year’s budget, negotiations and 
contracts, or inputs.  This practice is associated with performance measurement, performance 
indicators, and formula based funding. There are performance-based funding elements in the 
Australian higher education system. The 1988 White Paper directly expressed the intention to 
introduce a funding system that “responds to performance” and “takes into account a range of 
output, quality and performance measures”.  Performance-based funding elements in the 
Australian context include, for example, Research Quantum funding or funds that were linked to 
the Quality Assurance exercises in 1993-1995 (Anderson et al 1997). The goal of such funding 
systems is usually accountability, efficiency and performance improvement.  Competition 
between universities can be a result of performance based funding, as Orr et al (2007) argue in the 
context of Germany, but it is usually not the primary goal of performance-based funding. The 
“market-based reforms” are a broader set of policies. The term attempts to cover all the policies 
and initiatives that directly trigger but also indirectly intensify competition between universities. 
It includes performance-based research funding, reorientation towards competitive research 
grants, quality assessment exercises, budget cuts that pressed universities to seek external funding 
sources and intensified competition for fee-paying domestic and international students.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to test whether Australian policies in the last two 
decades have been able to create an incentive structure that indeed improves and maximizes 
research performance.  
17 
Changes in the academic research system: funds and performance   
The change towards competition for financial resources, both in teaching and research, 
has unfolded gradually since the end of 1980s. While the last section described policy change 
over the 1992-2004 period, this section points out main trends in research funding and research 
performance over the period. 
Universities now face a more diverse funding system than in the beginning of the 1990s. 
Commonwealth government grants, HECS, fees and charges, investment income, state 
government allocations, and donations and bequests are the main revenue sources in universities. 
In the last two decades the share of Government grants has declined, mostly as the share of fees 
and charges has increased. Student fees, especially international student fees, constitute now a 
significant part of universities’ budgets (see Figure 1.1). The private income sources have thus 
become considerably more important funding sources. Universities have become dependent on 
private markets, fee-paying students and contract research, in order to secure their financial 
resources. 
Figure 1.1. A contribution from domestic students, international students, and other services to universities’ 
total operational revenue, 1992-2004.  
 
Data source: Finance (1992-2004): Selected Higher Education Statistics, DEST. 
Also research funding has become more diverse over time. The public sector is still the 
main provider for academic research. In 2004, 44 per cent of universities’ research budgets came 
from national competitive grants, 18 per cent from other public sector funding sources, 31 per 
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cent from private sources (including contract research, donations etc), and 8 per cent from funds 
to Cooperative Research Centers (CRC), a form of university-industry partnerships (DEST 
Finance Collection). These shares exclude the money that government pays for staff salaries, 
which cover teaching time but also some research time.  This would increase the government 
share in research expenditure.   
Most government research funding is now allocated based on some performance or 
competitive measure. Table 1-1illustrates the distribution of Commonwealth research funding. 
The biggest proportion is distributed through ARC and NHMRC on a competitive basis.  The 
Research Training Scheme and Institutional Grants Scheme and RIBG are based on research 
performance.  The regional protection program and some other programs are based on criteria 
other than research performance. 
The effect of the pressure to perform can be noticed also in performance outcomes. Over 
the last decade the number of publications has consistently increased in Australia. The fact that 
policy reforms have had at least some effect on research behavior can be illustrated with a simple 
scatter plot of published articles. Figure 1.2 presents the total number of publications for each 
university over the 1980-2005 period as listed in the Thomson-ISI (Institute for Scientific 
Information) database. The results show no statistically significant change in publication activity 
from 1981 until 1991 but a considerable increase in publication numbers over the 1991-2004 
period. This result suggests that the reforms that started at the end of 1980s had an effect on 
research performance. Moreover, this trend does not characterize other research organizations, 
such as CSIRO, government agencies, and hospitals (Butler 2001). The trend is thus unique to 
universities and cannot be assigned to some factor common to research environment more 
generally.   
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Figure 1.2. ISI total publication count for each Australian university, 1981-2004  
 
Data source: ISI database.  Note: Data for colleges and universities that later merged are treated together, based on the 
AVCC guidelines (see AVCC 2004). 
Australia performs quite well when compared to other countries. In the early 1990s there 
was quite a concern about Australian research performance. The 1993 report A Crisis for 
Australian Science? revealed that the Australian share in total world publications (and especially 
citations) declined during the 1980s (Butler 2001). Since the 1990s the share of publications (and 
citations) has risen consistently. This trend is also characteristic of many other OECD countries, 
and occurs primarily at the expense of the share of the publications by US academics, yet the 
trend in Australia is steeper than in other countries. 
Butler (2001) examines thoroughly Australian research performance in comparison to 
other countries. Her analysis shows that the Australian share of world citations is somewhat lower 
(2.0 per cent) than the share of publications (2.2 per cent). This result raises a concern that 
perhaps the increase in publication numbers has happened at the expense of their impact (Butler 
2001: 12). Detailed citation analysis shows that Australian academics publish in lower impact 
journals. Yet in absolute terms the number of citations has kept pace with publication numbers.  
There are some concerns that the publication numbers may be inflated and do not reflect 
changes in actual research performance. First, as mentioned above, the higher number of 
publications may be achieved by lowering the quality of the publications. Second, the importance 
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of publishing in ISI-cited journals may be higher in the 1990s due to evaluation policies. The 
DEST collects information on and rewards universities for all types of publications: all refereed 
journals, book chapters, conference proceedings, etc. The status of ISI cited publications is 
however easier to establish and makes it a more attractive publication (Butler 2003). The increase 
in publication numbers may thus not be attributable to more research but to changed publishing 
preferences. The increase in the number of articles has been indeed most consistent over the 
years, compared to books, book chapters, conference papers and other publication forms (see 
Abbott and Doucouliagos 2004), indicating that preferences in terms of where to publish research 
results may indeed be shifting in Australia.  
The issue of measuring research output and limitations of bibliometric measures in th 
context of this study will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. The next chapter attempts to 
establish a conceptual link between market-based research policies and research performance in 
universities.   
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TABLES  
Table 1-1 Commonwealth research funding to universities according to scheme, 2004 
Funding scheme  ($'m) % 
Research Training Scheme 541 32,2 
Institutional Grants Scheme 285 16,9 
Research Infrastructure Block Grants 160 9.5 
Regional Protection Scheme 6 0.4 
ARC & NHMRC Grants 619 36,8 
Other Research Programs 66 3.9 
Total Research Funding 1,677 100 
Source: AVCC. 
  
CHAPTER TWO 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
General conceptual framework 
The response of (semi-)public organizations to the incentives of a competitive 
environment is a multi-faceted issue that can be effectively analyzed from different theoretical 
perspectives: the perspectives of governance, economics, organizational studies, public 
management, organizational psychology, etc.2 This dissertation approaches universities from an 
economic point of view. Universities are often seen as “organized anarchies” (Cohen and March 
1974) rather than as the rational goal-oriented agents that an economic perspective would assume. 
Yet the economic perspective is most aligned with the ideas behind the higher education policies, 
i.e. that universities respond rationally to new incentive structures and competitive environments. 
Moreover, the more competitive environment itself may force universities to behave more like 
economic agents because in order to survive they need to adapt to market principles. Research on 
universities’ behavior from an economic perspective is more developed in the US (and to a lesser 
extent in the UK) where indeed universities have been functioning in a more market-like 
environment. The economic approach to universities’ behavior may have a higher explanatory 
power in Australia now than before.   
The economic perspective in this dissertation covers two levels of analysis: micro level 
(individual universities) and macro level (academic research industry). At the micro level, we will 
assume that universities function as economic organizations, characterized by a specific 
                                                     
2 Davies et al (2005) give an excellent overview of different theoretical perspectives on studying 
the topic of incentives and performance in the case of health care system, very similar to that of higher 
education system. 
23 
production process and a unique objective function. While the micro perspective helps to 
conceptualize universities’ behavior, it sees universities as relatively atomistic and detached from 
their environment. Another explanatory layer is therefore needed that helps to analyze system-
level performance in the academic research sector and to conceptualize the relationship between 
environmental conditions (including public policies) and changes in the sector. The field of 
Industrial Organization (IO), which focuses primarily on the performance of the entire sector   
rather than individual organizations in the sector, provides an instrumental framework for such 
macro level analysis. The main emphasis of the IO framework is interaction between sector-
specific market conditions, public policies, and the behavior of individual organizations. The 
academic research sector can be approached as an economic sector where universities compete 
for market share and conceivably for market power. Public policies (e.g. resource allocation 
principles) affect the way the research market organizes itself, how universities behave in the 
environment, and finally how the entire sector performs.   
Universities as economic organizations  
When approaching a university as an economic organization, i.e. as any other firm, two 
aspects must be defined: the university’s production process and the overall objective of the 
university.   
Production process is an activity that transforms inputs into final outputs; that is, it 
converts raw materials, employee’s work, and technology into final products. Such production 
process can also be developed for producing educational services (Hanushek 1987, Cohn and 
Geske 1990) and for modeling universities’ activities (Cohn and Geske 1990, Hopkins 1990). 
Universities produce multiple products, such as undergraduate education, graduate education, 
basic and applied research, consultancy, transferring knowledge to society, etc.  In order to do so, 
universities use multiple inputs, such as academic staff, administrative staff, infrastructure etc. 
The exact formulation of the production process is quite complex because universities produce 
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multiple outputs and inputs, many of them intangible. Hopkins (1990) summarizes inputs and 
outputs of higher education (Table 2-1).  The question of production process concerns the optimal 
choice of output and input mix, including issues like teaching-research interaction (joint 
production function) and optimal size and breadth of the institution (economies of scale and 
scope). 
The other crucial element when modeling universities as economic enterprises is the 
objective function, i.e. what universities try to achieve when choosing an optimal input and 
output mix. Private firms are modeled as profit-maximizers but universities are overwhelmingly 
either public or nonprofit organizations and the assumption of profit-maximization does not hold. 
On a very general level, the social purpose of universities is not contested. It has to do with 
educating citizenry, preparing an educated work force, and creating, storing and transferring 
knowledge. However, even though universities are at the service of society and are to a large 
extent funded by the public it does not mean that the general expectations of universities guide 
everyday decisions in a specific university. The literature suggests a few different objective 
functions that steer universities’ behavior. Garvin (1980) argues that universities try to maximize 
prestige. Hoxby (1997) models universities behavior assuming that universities try to maximize 
their endowment. The literature review by James (1990) suggests multiple specific objectives: the 
university maximizes an objective function that depends positively on research, student quantity 
and quality, and small class size. The underlying meta-objective for these objectives is twofold: 
prestige and the satisfaction of academic staff. Prestige is valuable for several reasons:  it 
provides professional fulfillment for faculty and administrators, it enhances the value of the 
degree and therefore improves application and acceptance rates, and it improves prospects for 
gifts and sponsored research support (Massy 1996). 
 
 
25 
An economic approach to universities is clearly a simplification and can be challenged on 
many grounds. Universities not only strictly maximize prestige, but also have a broader range of 
goals. Moreover, there may be no single objective for the entire institution. Groups within an 
institution may work toward different and sometimes conflicting goals. Faculties are often more 
interested in strengthening the prestige of their departments than the institution as whole (Massy 
1996). This makes a single objective function an unrealistic assumption. Although these are 
legitimate concerns, they are not uniquely characteristic of the higher education sector but are 
rather a matter of degree. Also, traditional firms have goals other than profit maximization, such 
as maximizing market share or revenue. Also, in the case of traditional firms, different 
organizational levels and people within the organization have individual objective functions that 
are not completely aligned with those of the assumed organizational objective function. This 
conflict is the subject of the principal-agent literature in private firms (Eisenhardt 1989). In the 
case of universities the organizational structure, goal ambiguity and un-measurable outcomes may 
exacerbate some of the problems, but they do not make the model inapplicable.  Moreover, many 
of the unique characteristics of university governance have themselves been subject to change. 
The collegial nature of university governance is substituted with a more managerial type of 
governance, a process that makes the organizational objective function a more plausible 
assumption.   
Higher education sector as an industry 
The economic perspective helps to conceptualize general behavioral principles of 
individual universities at the micro level. This perspective is however limited in its approach and 
does not incorporate environmental conditions and unique characteristics of the higher education 
sector, the interaction between universities, and the performance of the sector as a whole. The 
Industrial Economics (IO) perspective helps to build a link between different environmental 
characteristics, universities’ behavior, and the general performance of the higher education 
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market. This perspective recognizes that even though we assume the same kind of profit-
maximizing behavior from organizations in all economic sectors, in reality sectors differ in their 
structure and performance. Some sectors are highly concentrated (even monopolistic) and others 
highly dispersed and competitive. It is therefore not only the individual behavior of universities, 
but also unique characteristics of the higher education sector and public policies that affect the 
structure and performance of the sector.  
The basic logic of the IO is summarized on Figure 2.1, as conceived by Mason (1939) 
and Bain (1956). The IO model links together market structure, conduct of individual firms, and 
performance of the industry. How the industry performs in terms of economic efficiency or 
progress depends on the decisions that firms make with respect to pricing, investments, 
innovation, etc. For example, a monopolistic firm has an opportunity to set prices above the 
competitive price levels and thereby make the market perform inefficiently from the welfare 
maximization point of view. The conduct of individual firms is thus dependent on the structure of 
the market and the extent to which some actors have higher market power. Market structure, on 
the other hand, is a function of market conditions that are unique to the industry; such as access to 
input markets, substitutability of the product, technology etc.  Public policies intervene in this 
cycle mostly on two levels – on the level of market structure and on the level of firms’ conduct. 
For example, policies related to accreditation, licensing or antitrust affect the market structure; 
price controls, subsidies, and information provision directly affect the conduct. In the case of 
higher education, public policies have a strong effect also on market conditions. Government is 
the main “customer” for academic research and to a large extent also teaching (via regulated 
enrollment and subsidies) and thereby affects demand conditions. Government policies may have 
a strong effect also on supply conditions – for example government may have a role in planning 
and preparing academic staff for future generations or it may centrally regulate salary and work 
conditions. 
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Figure 2.1.  The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm 
 
Source:  adapted from Scherer and Ross (1990), based on Mason (1939). 
The central concern of the IO framework is related to the negative effect of market 
concentration and restricted competition on the performance of the sector, that is, the effect of 
monopolistic price discrimination, merges and acquisitions, and exit and entry barriers on the 
efficiency of the market. This will be the guiding logic in this study as well. We will first analyze 
whether the policies that promote competition have contributed to the concentration of the 
academic research market and, secondly, whether the market is now performing more efficiently. 
The higher education market has many peculiarities: entry, exit, and voluntary merges are rare, 
the market structure itself is often regulated by government policies, customers are inputs, and 
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prices of the outputs are non-existent. Therefore the notions “market structure”, “conduct” and 
“performance” need to be redefined and elaborated for the higher education sector.   
The structure of the higher education market  
Traditionally the structure of the market is captured by the number of providers, relative 
revenue shares and relative number of employees – all of which aim to indicate the relative 
market power of individual actors. By these standards, the structure of the higher education 
market is static to a significant extent.  The number of universities does not change much because 
entry and exit in the sector is very limited, and relative revenue and the number of academic and 
administrative staff are quite stable.  Although new, private providers have emerged and are 
encouraged in Australia, the entry barriers are still quite high. However, changes in market 
concentration and market power can still be analyzed when the concepts are adjusted to the 
specific nature of the higher education sector.  As discussed above, universities are not traditional 
profit-maximizers, but rather prestige-maximizers. Market power is thus not derived so much 
from size, profit and revenue, but from prestige. Marginson (2001), for example, points out that 
the market power of elite universities is quite high in Australia.  In this case traditional measures 
of market concentration that are related to relative size do not reflect market power in the higher 
education sector; instead relative prestige may be conceptualized to reflect the concentration of 
the market.   
The higher education sector has some unique characteristics that shape the structure of 
the market and affect the strategic choices of universities. Two of the most important and 
interrelated characteristics are informational problems and the winner-take-all nature of the 
market. Lack of information about educational quality makes students (and employers) use the 
prestige of universities and their selectivity as a quality measure (Dill and Soo 2004; Dill 2003). 
This has a significant effect on universities’ behavior – universities have an incentive to invest in 
prestige as a goal of its own, even if this does not contribute to the quality of service (Brewer, et 
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al. 2002). This behavior may increase the costs in the industry and distort the market (Massy 
2003, Ehrenberg 2000), thus potentially hurting the overall efficiency of the system. Secondly, 
several researchers have proposed the idea that higher education is a winner-take-all market – a 
market where small differences in performance translate into extremely large differences in 
reward and where success breeds success and failure breeds failure (Frank 2001, Winston 2000, 
Marginson 2001, Marginson 2004).  Successful universities attract more and more resources – 
research funding and fee-paying students – that can be reinvested in order to attract even more 
resources. Successful universities can thus invest in strengthening their market position. As a 
result, universities may diversify increasingly in their relative performances. This diversification 
is reflected for instance in large differences in per student spending across universities (Frank 
2001).  
 The higher education market can simultaneously move towards greater quality 
differences and greater homogeneity in the nature of institutions.  Bessant (1996) points out that 
in Australia the intense competition for research funds put pressure on all institutions to increase 
their research output; this is an attempt to achieve international recognition and build their status 
in Australia.  If student demand is primarily a function of institutional prestige and status, as is 
argued by many higher education researchers in the US (Trow 1984, Winston 1994), then 
universities have an incentive to imitate universities that possess these qualities. The “status 
market” produces homogeneity among universities. Because status is primarily determined by the 
credentials of faculty and by research activities, universities increasingly tend to prioritize 
research. Consequently universities become increasingly similar: they expectations research 
interest and qualifications from their academic staff; they invest into research infrastructure; they 
favor research activities over teaching. Moreover, the strong research orientation will be passed 
on to the new generation of academics who will continue the “academic drift” (Fairweather  
2000). The conflict between increasing performance differences and increasing homogenization 
has started to become more apparent also in Australia (see Meek 2000).   
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The conduct of universities 
The decisions that individual universities make determine the performance of the 
academic research sector as a whole. Most importantly, university decisions on technical 
efficiency – such as decisions on input allocation, scale and scope – contribute to performance. 
The extent to which competition between universities contributes to technical efficiency is an 
ambiguous issue and will be discussed in the next session.  
Next to the technical efficiency issue, competition also affects X-efficiency, i.e. the 
assumption that universities maximize the output and/or minimize costs with any given resource 
allocation (Frantz 1988). X-inefficiency arises from an agency type of a problem, when the 
“owners” and managers diverge in their objectives and managers deviate from the overall 
objective of the cost-minimization.  X-inefficiency is a potential problem both in the private and 
public sector, but the public sector is more vulnerable to the X-inefficiency for several reasons. 
Public sector organizations are not subject to competitive mechanisms; information is often 
incomplete, they do not have necessary flexibility to choose resources, and the principal may be 
more disengaged from monitoring the outputs (Weimer and Vining 1999, Dixit 2002, Vining and 
Weimer 1990). These issues also characterize the university sector. Universities in a non-
competitive environment thus are not subject to the ultimate market test and they are not driven 
out of the market in the event they fail to perform efficiently. Organizations in a non-competitive 
environment therefore also face weaker incentives to perform efficiency and to be innovative in 
their production and management.  It is also difficult to adequately measure and price the outputs 
of universities, which makes it difficult to observe whether a university is actually performing 
efficiently or not. Managerial incentives are an important factor in influencing the extent to which 
universities attempt to achieve their efficiency (Ferris 1991). The effort and motivation of the 
government, which determines the university budgets and oversees the operations of a university, 
affect the ability of the managers to deviate from the efficiency goal.   
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Introducing more “market” into a higher education system may thus alleviate some of the 
factors that make X-inefficiency highly likely, even though it does not address all the issues. 
Competitive environment strengthens the incentives to perform well as it is necessary for 
securing the resources of a university. The competition also strengthens the incentives to be 
innovative, to introduce managerial practices that improve the performance in the organization, 
and to seek better ways to develop organizational strengths. Furthermore, as the policies are 
associated with a closer monitoring and performance evaluation by the government, the 
“principal” has become more involved in observing the “agent’s” activities. The extent to which 
the outputs and costs are indeed observable and comparable is still an unaddressed issue. 
However, performance reviews have attempted to make the outputs more observable and better 
monitored. 
The principal-agent dilemma is not only limited to the relationship between the 
government and university as a whole, but is also extended to the internal relationships in the 
university. The efficiency gain in the university is thus dependent on the ability of the 
government to align its interests with those of the university managers, as well as on the ability of 
university managers to align their interests with those of the deans and academic personnel. 
Without external incentives, internal management practices are likely to ignore efficiency issues 
in the university as a whole (Massy 1996, Johnes 1999).   
The discussion on appropriate policy mechanisms for delivering public services is part of 
a larger discussion on market failures and government failures. Public services are provided 
outside of the market structure usually due to some market failure: information asymmetry, 
externalities, market power, or public good. Due to these failures, markets cannot ensure the 
efficiency in production and distribution. However, as Wolf (1993) points out, such market 
failures does not automatically mean that government provision is more efficiency. Government 
provision has its own “failures”. The most efficiency mode of provision is thus a result of 
weighing (or balancing) market failures and government failures. In the 1980s and 1990s 
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governments attempted to address the issues of government failure by introducing some market-
like elements in the provision of public services (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).  The “quasi-
market” reforms in the UK and also in Australia are a direct example of government attempts not 
to be both a provider and funder of public services but instead purchase public services from 
private, public and non-governmental organizations that compete with each other (Le Grand 
1991). The term ”quasi-market” refers to the unique nature of such an exchange.  On the one 
hand it is a market because competition replaces a monopolistic state provider. On the other hand 
it is quasi-market because of the peculiarities in both the demand and supply side: the providers 
are usually not normal profit-maximizers and consumers do not necessarily express their 
preference with money, often delegating the decision making to intermediary bodies or managers 
(Le Grand 1991).      
The extent to which, and if at all, such quasi-market incentives enable increasing 
performance depends on various factors. Quasi-markets may even increase costs in various ways 
(Le Grand 1991). There are costs related to setting up the infrastructure, signing contracts, 
monitoring and enforcing the contracts. Competing organizations also use their resources on 
advertising and other ways of increasing their market share that do not add directly to the quality 
of the output. Quasi-markets also increase labor costs that otherwise may have been suppressed 
by the government using its monopolistic position. Moreover, in the sectors where the quality of 
the product is often hard to measure and demonstrate, organizations may choose to invest in 
inputs that symbolize performance, rather than actually make a real impact on performance, such 
as hiring “star scientists”. Often the costs also go up due to short-term political pressures. In order 
to gain support for the changes by providers, the government increases salaries or provides extra 
resources to the sector.  Moreover, the argument of self-selection has been used to justify the role 
of the non-profit sector. Non-profits are seen as less costly in terms of transaction costs of 
monitoring because they have no incentives to sacrifice quality for the purpose of profit. 
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Introducing competition and profit-assumption may shake the underlying incentives of non-profit 
providers. 
Performance of the higher education market 
The relationship between competition and performance in the higher education sector is 
quite controversial. Traditional IO framework would assume a negative relationship between 
market concentration and performance of the system. The stronger the competitive mechanisms 
in a market, and the lower the individual market power of any single actor, the better the sector is 
equipped to function efficiently without market distortions. The belief that competition between 
universities would contribute to efficiency in the sector has also directly guided the policy 
reforms in Australia. However, several researchers have articulated concerns that market 
competition may have a negative effect on the efficiency of the sector. The “pursuit of prestige” 
may increase the costs of universities to provide educational services, redirect attention from 
teaching to research, encourage investments that do not contribute to the quality of universities’ 
services and engage universities in a wasteful “arm’s race” (Brewer et al. 2002,   Massy 2003, 
Ehrengerg 2000). The relationship between market competition, concentration and performance 
in the higher education is therefore an interesting policy issue. A competitive environment in the 
higher education sector may lead to a greater concentration because of the winner-take-all 
mechanism and informational problems. The competitive environment may trigger processes that 
actually do not increase efficiency in the sector, but on the contrary encourage wasteful use of 
resources.   
The relationship between concentration and performance can be more complex in other 
industries as well. Demsetz (1973) argues that de-concentration or anti-merger policies may in 
certain circumstances have a negative effect on efficiency.  If concentration has happened 
because of the superior efficiency of these firms then concentration contributes to overall 
performance. In the case of the Australian higher education market, it is important to ask if 
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competition between universities, and potential concentration of resources, has increased 
performance because resources are concentrated in better performing universities, or whether 
concentration of resources leads to wasteful use of resources. Johnes (1997) finds a positive effect 
of scale and scope in the British higher education system and he argues from the IO perspective 
that concentration would contribute to the performance of the system. The logic of industrial 
organization is implicitly applied also in the analysis of universities’ behavior in Hoxby (1997), 
Noll’s (1998) analysis of research universities, and Feller’s (1996) analysis of research markets.    
This conceptual approach will frame the analysis of the Australian higher education 
sector over the 1992-2003 period and helps to formulate hypotheses about the changes in the 
sector. Three interrelated aspects will be examined in the dissertation, which will be studied 
individually in the three chapters below. First, to what extent and for what reason has market 
concentration changed in Australian higher education? Secondly, to what extent have universities 
revised their organizational practices and has this affected their individual productivity?  Thirdly, 
to what extent has the higher education market increased its performance?  As previously 
discussed, these three questions will be explored through an analysis of research performance in 
the Australian university sector.  A more specific line of argumentation will be developed in the 
empirical chapters. 
Literature review: determinants of academic research performance 
The usage of terms ‘performance’ and ‘productivity’ requires some clarification for 
further discussion. In the last section we used the term ‘performance’ in the sense of market 
performance, i.e. as an indicator of economic efficiency and we understood it in the perspective 
of social welfare. Productivity in economic terms means the ratio of outputs to inputs. When 
talking about change in the universities’ productivity (especially in Chapter 6) we indeed mean 
the extent to which a university is able to maximize its teaching and research outputs with a given 
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input mix. With performance we mean market level efficiency and with productivity an 
organization level efficiency.  However, the terms “research performance” and “research 
productivity” are used in a narrower sense, consistent with colloquial use rather than economic 
theory. ‘Research performance’ of a university means the quantity and quality of universities 
research output, i.e. how well the university performs in the area of research. At the individual 
level it is more common to talk about ‘productivity’; i.e. a productive researcher is the one who is 
actively engaged in research (both in the quantitative and qualitative sense). Although the 
colloquial use and economic terminology of “productivity” and “performance” may intersect 
occasionally, the context should be sufficient to avoid a major misunderstanding.  
A long tradition of research has attempted to identify the factors that contribute to 
research performance.  The topic has been approached from different levels: some studies analyze 
research productivity of individual researchers, others study the performance of laboratories and 
institutes, and the third group analyzes the performance of entire universities. The level of 
analysis is an important issue. The factors that contribute to research performance of universities 
are not necessarily the same that would make an individual academic staff member perform 
better. Individual level studies and aggregate organizational studies, however, are complementary 
and inform each other.   
Level of analysis  
Earlier studies that attempt to identify factors that contribute positively to research output 
focus mostly on the lowest level of analysis: the individual staff members.  Individual research 
productivity has been demonstrated to be a function of a number of personal and organizational 
characteristics (see overviews Fox 1985, Creswell 1986, Tien and Blackburn 1996, Harris and 
Kaine 1994, Stephan 1996). This research demonstrates consistently the effect of age (Diamond 
1986; Levin and Stephan 1991), gender (see Ward and Grant 1996), academic position (Fox 
1992, Clark and Lewis 1985), and academic origins (Williamson and Cable 2003). Merton (1968) 
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suggests that individual research productivity has a dynamic trend: there is a positive feedback 
effect over the career and future productivity is strongly influenced by previous productivity (see 
David 1994 for an application). Individual research productivity is not only a function of personal 
characteristics and qualifications, but also of the research environment. Future research 
productivity is strongly influenced by the academic affiliation of the researcher (Long et al 1998, 
Creswell 1986) and funding opportunities in the research unit (Crow and Bozeman 1987). 
Individual productivity is thus a function of both individual characteristics and organizational 
factors.   
Next to the individual level analysis, organizational level analysis could give valuable 
insights on the nature of research productivity and suggest what instruments and tactics could be 
used to improve research performance in an organization (Stephan 1996, Dasgupta and David 
1994).  The unit of analysis in these studies is a laboratory or research group, where the 
interaction between individual researchers is most active and the potential spillover and 
interaction effects are the strongest (Carayol and Matt 2004, Crow and Bozeman 1987). The 
studies identify the effect of size, promotion principles and a combination of different types of 
academic staff.   
University level research performance has increased in visibility and political importance; 
and university administrators are looking for ways to promote research performance in their 
institution. Therefore the interest in institutional level determinants of research performance has 
risen. Only a few attempts have been made to explicitly model the determinants of research 
output at the institutional level. Abbott and Doucouliagos (2004) and Adams and Clemmons 
(2006) are grounded in the framework of educational production function and specify the effect 
of various inputs on research outcomes. Abbott and Doucouliagos (1999) look at the academic 
and non-academic staff, the research income, the number of undergraduate and graduate students, 
the disciplinary mix, and university type in Australian universities. Johnes (1988) limits the study 
to only economics departments and tests the effect of the number of staff, student-staff ratio, age 
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of university staff, and the library stock in the UK economics departments. Dundar and Lewis 
(1998) concentrate on the effect of the size of the organization, the stock of the library, graduate 
students, and senior faculty.  
Individual, organizational and institutional level studies to a large extent give consistent 
results and point to the same contributors. In some cases, however, the effect can be quite 
different at the aggregate level and individual level. Therefore the interpretation of results also 
has to stay to the right level. If certain aggregated staff characteristics demonstrate an important 
effect on research productivity in the organization then the effect cannot be interpreted at the 
individual level.  For example, the negative relationship between average age of staff and 
research productivity has been demonstrated at the organizational level. This does not necessarily 
mean that younger researchers are more productive. Bonaccorsi and Daraio (2002) argue that the 
negative relationship is an indicator of the quality of the organization: institutions of higher 
prestige and research performance have more resources available for young researcher positions. 
Carayol and Matt (2004) interpret the effect of the average age to be an indicator of the optimal 
combination of staff in a research organization. Similarly, the effect of the proportion of senior 
staff in the university, for example, is not only related to the productivity of the senior staff, but 
also to a potential spillover effect on other staff.   
Next to the issue of ecological fallacy, heterogeneity bias in interpreting results is another 
serious concern. Universities are different not only by their observable characteristics like staff 
qualifications and other inputs, but also by many underlying non-observable characteristics, such 
as prestige or research culture.  These unobserved characteristics are likely to drive the input 
factors as well as research productivity. An observed relationship may thus be heavily biased.  
For example, the number of PhD students demonstrates a very strong and consistent effect on 
research productivity (Abbott and Doucouliagos 2004, Dundar and Lewis 1998). It is unlikely 
that PhD students, either as authors of research articles or as research support, have such a strong 
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effect on publication outcomes; rather universities that have many doctoral students tend to also 
be research intensive universities.  
Determinants of institutional research performance  
In order to build an explanatory framework for the next chapters, in this section we will 
generalize existing research in the area and identify factors that are likely to influence research 
performance at the university level. We will approach universities as economic agents and 
analyze research performance as a universities’ “production process”. Research “production” 
requires various inputs, but is also influenced by organizational level policies and environmental 
characteristics.   
Research inputs  
Staff characteristics are important determinants of research productivity. Staff 
qualification, age and seniority are important determinants of individual level productivity 
(Creswell 1986, Levin and Stephan 1991, Clark and Lewis 1985). In the institutional level studies 
again average staff characteristics are the most studied factors and the best predictors of research 
performance.  The studies consistently demonstrate a statistically significant effect in terms of the 
proportion of staff with PhD degrees, average age, and percentage of senior academic staff 
(Abbott and Doucouliagos 2004, Dundar and Lewis 1998, Ramsden 1999).    
The effect of the size of the research organization has received much attention, but the 
results are still not conclusive. A number of studies demonstrate a positive effect of department 
size on research productivity (e.g. Johnson et al 1995, Jordan et al 1988, 1989). Bigger 
departments may provide more opportunities for collaborative research and thus create a synergy 
between researchers (Kyvik 1995). Crewe (1988) suggests that the positive relationship between 
the size and productivity is instead explained by the fact that bigger departments have better 
facilities and resources for research. There are also studies that demonstrate that department size 
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has no effect. (Martin and Skea 1992, Kyvik 1995).  The effect of size may also be different 
across countries. Positive size effect is primarily found in the US, where departments (and 
especially research institutes) function in a more competitive environment and the size of the unit 
itself is a function of its performance. The positive relationship between size and performance 
may thus be explained in the opposite direction: units that perform well may be able to secure 
necessary resources and grow in size. 
 Work organization is one aspect that influences research behavior.  Teaching and 
research compete for faculty members’ time and teaching load is expected to be negatively 
associated with research productivity. Empirical evidence about the relationship between research 
and undergraduate teaching is ambiguous. A meta-analysis by Hattie and Marsh (1996) 
demonstrates no systematic relationship between research and teaching while some studies 
demonstrate a negative relationship (e.g. Fox 1992), and some studies argue that the relationship 
varies across disciplines (e.g. Stevens 2001).   
Research is not only dependent on human resources but also on financial resources and 
infrastructure. Johnes (1988) and Dundar and Lewis (1998) study the effect of library 
expenditures as a proxy for research infrastructure and observe a positive relationship. Adams 
(2006) demonstrates that research funding has a strong positive effect on research performance 
and observes that government research funding has a more positive effect than industrial funding 
on research output.   
Organizational factors 
The studies that approach research performance from a standpoint of production function 
tend to focus narrowly on the quantity and quality of input factors: such as student-staff ratio, 
percentage of full professors, teaching-only staff etc. The effect of organizational practices or 
managerial strategies on research performance is considerably less examined quantitatively.    
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A supportive research environment is one important factor for research performance. The 
supportive research environment has many dimensions. Organizational culture that values 
research increases individual research productivity (Long and McGinnis 1981, Allison and Long 
1990). A supportive research environment also has to do with resources: opportunities for 
research funding in the institution, good research facilities and infrastructure have a positive 
effect on performance (Stahler and Tasch 1994). Also, organizational policies that emphasize the 
importance of research in the university enhance research productivity. Deans and department 
heads setting research as a high priority has been identified as an important contributor to 
research performance (Stahler and Tasch 1994).  
Organizational structure has a significant effect on research performance. Several 
scholars have pointed out the importance of research centers for research productivity. Geiger 
(1990) argues that American universities have gained considerably from setting up research 
centers and institutes in parallel to the traditional department structure. He points out that such 
structure is effective because of the “capacity to add, expand or terminate ‘organized research 
units’ in a highly flexible manner”. Feller (1996) points out another valuable aspect of organized 
research units: cross-disciplinary research institutes facilitate researchers’ ability to get around 
bureaucratic procedures and decision-making systems in order to secure resources.   
Research activity can also be boosted with strategic decisions if universities make a 
strategic decision to focus on growth areas, such as health sciences and engineering, for example 
(Stahler and Tasch 1994). The effect of organizational research management practices, such as 
remuneration, promotion, and tenure policies, on research performance has not been empirically 
studied in quantitative analyses.   
Bland and Ruffin (1992) review academic literature on research productivity and 
summarize that an effective research environment is described by the following characteristics: 
clear goals that serve a coordinating function, research emphasis, distinctive culture, positive 
group climate, assertive participative governance, decentralized organization, frequent 
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communications, accessible human resources, sufficient size, age and diversity of the research 
group, appropriate rewards, concentration on recruitment and selection, and leadership with 
research expertise and skills. 
 
The base model in subsequent chapters is developed considering the body of empirical 
literature. The set of control variables includes the following variables: staff age, seniority, and 
qualifications; teaching load, and disciplinary mix. From the commonly used variables the model 
excludes two: research infrastructure costs (such as library expenses) and PhD students. Both are 
omitted because of their potential reverse causality with respect to research performance. 
Universities with strong research orientation and performance are likely to invest a lot into 
research infrastructure and recruit a high number of PhD students. These variables are thus likely 
to have a strong positive association with research performance, but the associations should not 
be interpreted as causal.   
The effect of organizational management practices on research performance are analyzed 
in depth in Chapter 5 and will be described in greater detail in that chapter. In the next chapter we 
will turn to a more technical aspect of research performance, namely how to measure research 
performance. 
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TABLES  
Table 2-1 Identification of inputs and outputs of Higher Education 
 Tangible Intangible 
Inputs New student matriculating Quality and diversity of matriculating students 
 Faculty time and effort Quality of effort put forth by faculty 
 Student time and effort Quality of effort put forth by students 
 Staff time and effort Quality of effort put forth by staff 
 Buildings and equipment Quality, age and style of buildings; age and quality of equipment 
 Library holdings and acquisitions Quality of library holdings and acquisitions 
  Endowment assets  
Outputs Student enrollment in courses Quality of education obtained 
 Degrees awarded Quality of education obtained 
 Research awards, articles and citations  Quality of research performed   
 Services to the general public Quality of services rendered 
  Goodwill 
  Reputation 
Source: Hopkins (1990).  
  
CHAPTER THREE 
3. MEASUREMENT ISSUES AND DATA 
The empirical chapters in this dissertation use the same sample and the same base data. 
Two of the three empirical chapters use also the same dependent variable – research performance. 
This chapter describes the sample and provides descriptive information on the data. More detailed 
descriptive statistics on the dependent variable and its variance across universities and over time 
is provided in the end of this chapter. We will start however with a more general discussion on 
measuring research performance. 
Measuring research performance 
Measuring research performance is a challenging task because the measure should ideally 
capture the true contribution of research to advancing knowledge and understanding, as well as its 
potential social value. While such a measure does not exist, different performance indicators have 
been invented to capture some of the dimensions that are valued in research. Quantification of 
research performance is an issue not only by which researchers can study research performance 
but it has also received much attention from policymakers (in the UK and Australia) who attempt 
to monitor research activities or use the information for performance-based funding models. 
Many analyses of research performance are initiated by government agencies.  
Research income and bibliometric measures are the two most commonly used proxies for 
research output. Studies that are interested in the commercialization aspect of research also use 
measures such as registered patents, licenses and income from patents. Peer review is another 
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option for performance measurement in research. In the UK the results of the Research 
Assessment Exercise, a peer-review-based assessment of subjects, are used. All these measures 
have their strengths, but none of them is able to entirely capture the contribution of any research 
activity – in its quantity, quality and scientific and social impact.  
The measure of external research funding, primarily competitive grants from Research 
Councils and/or industry, is one of the most commonly used measures (Worthington & Lee 2005, 
Avkiran 2001; Abbott & Doucouliagos 2003, Flegg et al. 2004). The measure has several 
conceptual and practical advantages. Most external grants are very competitive, especially the 
ones from research councils, and based on rigorous peer review. The measure thus reflects not 
only the quantity but also the quality of research undertaken. The measure can be justified further 
as an indicator of the true ‘market value’ of research, i.e. it demonstrates the monetary value that 
the market is willing to pay for the research. Moreover, research income is a timely measure. 
While the number of publications reflects already completed research and indicates past research 
activities with considerable time lag, research income refers to ongoing research. Koshal and 
Koshal (1999) also demonstrate empirically that research grant funding is highly correlated with 
other research output measures. Since it is often a more easily accessible measure than other 
output measures, it is an attractive measure also from the practical perspective.   
Research income has significant weaknesses as well. Research funding is a measure of 
input, rather than a measure of output. This is a serious conceptual problem especially in analysis 
that approaches research as a production process through which inputs are transformed into 
outputs.  Research income would thus enter on both sides of the equation – as an input as well as 
the output. The measure also does not take into account cross-disciplinary differences. Some 
disciplines require fewer financial resources for research (e.g. humanities) and distribution of 
funding across disciplines may be a strategic decision et al. Carrington 2004). Moreover, some 
types of research require less funding. For example theoretical and abstract research is often not 
as expensive as experimental as applied research, yet it is often associated with the greatest 
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prestige (Cave et al 1991). In the context of this study the most serous weakness of the income 
measure is its unsuitability for a time-series study. In the case of Australia, the main source of 
external research income originates from the Australian Research Council. The total budget of the 
Council is however determined each year by a political decision (and historical continuity) rather 
than by changes in the quality of research. Therefore fluctuations (or stability) in the total budget 
cannot be assigned to changes in total research performance. Research income therefore may be 
an effective measure for comparing research output between universities, but cannot be 
effectively used for comparisons over time.  The research income has thus many strengths and 
weaknesses.  In this study the measure will be used, but only as a secondary measure for the 
purpose of sensitivity analysis. We will use the research income measure in order to check 
whether estimation results are robust to the choice of the dependent variable.   
Some studies on research behavior in Australia use Research Quantum allocation as a 
measure of research performance (e.g. Ramsden 1999). Research Quantum is measured in dollars 
and reflects relative performance in terms of external grants, publications, and research students. 
Research Quantum has the same problem for comparisons over time as the external funding 
measure above. The total allocation of the funds from the Government to the sector is fixed and 
then distributed between universities based on their relative performance. While cross-university 
differences reflect performance differences across universities, variation in Research Quantum on 
the time dimension does not reflect actual performance variation over time. Research Quantum is 
thus a relative, but not an absolute measure.  
Bibliometric measures are an equally common performance indicator, used in research as 
well as by policymakers. The most commonly used bibliometric measure is the number of 
publications in peer-reviewed journals, which can be used either at the individual, departmental 
or institutional level. Research productivity and publication productivity are not strictly identical, 
but one (publication) is an indicator of the other (research) and many consider them to be the 
best-established measure of research productivity (Fox 1992).  The bibliometric measure has a 
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number of limitations. The main problems of the publication count are as follows (Cave et al 
1991, Geuna 1999, Adams et al 1998, Johnes and Taylor 1990).  
Biblometric measures ignore the differences in publication behavior across disciplines. 
The bibliometric measure usually counts only publications in the peer-reviewed journals. While 
in some disciplines this is indeed the primary way of publishing the results, in others (in arts and 
humanities) it is also common to publish books and book chapters. Moreover, scholarly 
production in arts and humanities has been found to be a lengthier process than in other fields 
(Adams et al 1998).  As a result the publications are fewer in number, lengthier and more time 
consuming.  A bibliometric measure thus discriminates against the disciplines with alternative 
publication behavior.    
The problem that there are publications other than peer-reviewed journals can be fixed 
with self-reported publication measures.  Abbott and Doucouliagos (2004) use publication index, 
which is one component in calculating the Research Quantum. Unlike Research Quantum this 
measure does not aggregate multiple highly correlated measures and reflects true differences over 
the years. The publication index is based on self-reported publication counts and the index 
assigns a weight to different kinds of publications (books, journal articles, conference papers, 
reports, etc). Although it may seem like an attractive measure, it has been rejected in this study 
because of its questionable reliability. DEETYA ordered a publication audit from KPMG in 1996 
and 1997, which found a high level of error in presenting results – 59 per cent in the 1996 audit 
and 34 per cent in 1997 audit (Harman 2000). 
The main weakness of the publication count is that it concentrates on quantity and 
ignores the quality of the research. The measure has some quality aspect incorporated into it 
because journal articles go through a peer review process (Warning 2004). Other than the 
minimum threshold that a publication has to pass, the publication count does not differentiate 
between ground breaking and relatively modest research. The quality dimension can be 
incorporated with the count of citations. Citations are an indicator of the impact of the research. 
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The rationale behind the measure has been explained with the analog of market signaling (Laband 
1985, Cave et al 1991): during research, relevant research is surveyed and articles that improve 
the understanding of the subject matter are chosen for citation. The more citations an article 
accumulates, the more impact it has had on advancing understanding. Quality by this definition 
means the extent to which the research is used. Citation counts have also several weaknesses: the 
problem of self-citation, indicating controversy rather than furthering understanding, circular 
citation, etc.   In spite of the weaknesses, the citation count has become a commonly used 
measure of research quality and will be used also in this dissertation.  
The most commonly used database for the number of publications and citations is 
Thomson Science (formerly known as Institute for Scientific Information – ISI) citation database. 
Although it is the most comprehensive database it does not include all peer-reviewed journals. 
Much Australian research is published in journals that are not cited in the database (Butler 2001). 
This is a problem when comparing Australian research with research in other countries. If this 
omission is consistent and random in the entire sample of Australian universities then it is not 
necessarily a serious problem in this study. It may be however the case that some disciplines (like 
sciences) are more internationally oriented and cited in the database while others (social sciences) 
are more embedded in the local tradition and published in national journals that are not included 
in the databases. In this case the profile of universities may distort the citation count. 
In some areas research publications may not be the only major output of research, but the 
impact of the research may be in the form of patents, copyrights and licenses. Patents are ignored 
in this research because such data is not available at the university level. The number of patents is 
a significant impact indicator only in a very limited number of disciplines and it should not bias 
the university level aggregation significantly. It is also unclear if patenting is a substitute of a 
complement to the process of fundamental research (Agrawal and Henderson 2002). This 
dissertation deals with the academic research in a comprehensive university. Patents and licensing 
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apply only to a small part of research in universities and should be better studied separately. The 
topic of research commercialization is therefore to a large extent ignored in this dissertation.   
Sample 
The sample that is used in the empirical studies in the dissertation consists of 36 
universities. Australia has 39 comprehensive universities, of which 37 are public and 2 are private 
universities. The private universities (Bond University and Notre Dame University) are excluded 
from the sample because they are not required to submit data to the Department of Education 
according to the same standards as public universities and many crucial statistics are therefore 
missing. These two universities are very small in terms of research output and consume only 0.02 
per cent of national competitive grants (AVCC 2006). One public university, University of 
Sunshine Coast, is excluded from the sample because it was established only in 1996 and this not 
only makes the time-series incomplete, but the data on early years is volatile and does not fairly 
represent the relationship between inputs and outputs. In the case of Charles Sturt University the 
time-series starts in 1994. In addition to the comprehensive public universities, there are also 
specialized universities, such as Australian Maritime College; Australian Film, Television and 
Radio School; Australian Defense Force Academy and a few others. These institutions are 
excluded because of their unique mission and limited research activities. 
For Charles Sturt University the time-series starts in 1994. Southern Cross University and 
Ballarat University were also formally established after the beginning of the time-series, in 1993, 
but they were created as a result of merges and the pre-merge data can be used for earlier years. 
Australian National University (ANU) is a special case in the Australian higher education 
landscape. It was established as a research university and instruction was limited only to post-
graduate education, but now ANU also provides undergraduate education. The university still has 
a very strong research focus and the university has a unique organizational structure. Parallel to 
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traditional schools/colleges exists the Institute of Advanced Studies that specializes in research 
and supervision. Traditionally a different model funds ANU than the other Australian 
universities. Despite its specificity ANU remains in the sample. The output mix of ANU is 
similar to that of other universities, even though individual outputs may be represented in 
somewhat different proportions. There is thus no conceptual need to exclude the university from 
the sample. However, the peculiar output mix may considerably influence the results of empirical 
analysis, especially considering that the small sample size makes results vulnerable to any 
potential outlier. Therefore the robustness of the results was tested, and since the results did not 
change considerably if ANU was included or excluded, ANU stayed in the sample. 
This dissertation uses a 12-year panel of university-level data. The starting point is 1992 
because by then the unification of the system had been to a large extent completed and the system 
had stabilized. The panel stops with the year 2003 because of data availability reasons. 
Dependent variable: ISI publication and citation data 
Information on publications is extracted from three major Institute for Scientific 
Information (ISI) Indices (now known as Thomson Scientific): Science Citation Index, Social 
Science Citation Index, and Arts and Humanities Citation Index. This source maintains the most 
complete international data on research journal publications and their citations (Adams 2006) and 
is widely used in similar studies. Of course not all publications are published in ISI-cited journals. 
Especially in the humanities and social sciences, a lot of research is published in book chapters 
and books as well as in journals that are not included in the ISI system. Differences in university-
level aggregation of publications may therefore also reflect differences in the subject mix of 
universities.  
In this study the number of publications is counted as a simple aggregate for each 
university without correcting for co-authored papers. This means that when a paper has several 
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authors from the same university it counts as one publication, but if a paper has multiple authors 
from two or more universities, the paper counts as one publication for each university that is 
represented in the authors’ list. The total number of publications may be thus somewhat inflated. 
The publication count is not corrected for the length of the paper or the type of the paper. Another 
issue for publication counts is time lag. Publications do not reflect current research performance 
because the research already has been completed by the time the paper gets published. To correct 
some of this time bias, the publication count is included with a one-year time lag. This means that 
the last year for which the number of publications is extracted from the ISI database is 2004, but 
this number is assumed to represent research performance in 2003. 
Since the dependent variable is research output per academic staff member, as explained 
earlier, we divide the total number of publications per university by the full-time-equivalent 
academic staff numbers. As shown in Table 3-1, the number of publications has consistently 
increased over years in Australian universities. Both the minimum and maximum values have 
consistently increased along with the mean value.  
The measure of citation numbers has additional complications. The lagged nature of 
citations makes citations analysis more difficult. Citations accumulate over time and therefore 
there is an unavoidable bias against more recent publication years. One way to correct for the bias 
is to extract only citations in the first 3 or 5 years (e.g. Butler 2001). These data however cannot 
be extracted from the ISI database without prohibitive manual work. An alternative manipulation 
technique is used in this dissertation. Analyzing the time distribution of citation numbers from 
100 publications in 1992, and in 1993, reveals quite a consistent pattern in how citations are 
distributed over time. The highest number of citations accumulates in the 3rd, 4th and 5th year (ca 
30 per cent) and after that citations decline gradually. Based on the quantitative analysis of the 
time distribution of citations, the actual citation numbers are thus multiplied with a coefficient 
that increases in time (see column 3 in Table 3-2). This transformation gives a measure of 
“expected citations” and is based on the assumption that early citations are an accurate predictor 
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for later citations. The assumption may be not completely accurate. It may be the case that the 
highly influential (i.e. the articles of the highest quality) collect relatively more citations in the 
future years: i.e. using the number of citations in the immediate years introduces a bias against 
good quality articles. However, the transformation is at least able to correct the main bias that is 
caused by the time factor. Alternatively, the problem may be dealt by inserting dummy variables 
for each year in models below. However, since we will model not only research performance but 
also growth in research performance, the growth measure would turn negative due to the time 
trend and the interpretation of results would be less intuitive. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
transformation and compares the distribution of actual citations and time-corrected “expected” 
citations.  
Figure 3.1 Actual and “expected” citations in Australian universities, 1992-2003 
a) Actual citations 
 
Data source: ISI database 
b) “Expected” citations 
 
Data Source: ISI database 
 
The expected citation numbers do not have as consistent and increasing trend as 
publication numbers. Mean citations per academic staff seem to increase until the year 2001 and 
then start to decline. The decline starts earlier in the maximum number of citations (1999) than in 
the minimum number of citations (2001). The last column in the table presents the ratio of 
citations to publications, indicating that the number of citations per publications has a negative 
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trend. The data thus seem to confirm the concern that even though publication output has 
increased over the years, the impact of each publication may have dropped.  
Explanatory variables   
Although the Australian government gathers higher education data regularly and in 
relatively great detail, no unified, comprehensive dataset exists. The dataset in this dissertation is 
compiled from different governmental and semi-governmental sources.  
The majority of data is aggregated from Higher Education Statistics Collection, managed 
by the Department of Education Science and Training (DEST) in the Australian government. 
These are publicly available data. The Collection consists of different sub-sets. Data on university 
staff are compiled in the Staff Collection; data on university revenues are retrieved from the 
Finance Collection and Research Collection, data on research funding comes from the AVCC; 
and data on students are retrieved from the Student Collection.  
Data on staff qualifications were not included in the Staff Collection before the year 
2000. In order to fill gaps in the time-series, equivalent data has been obtained from other 
sources. In 1992 a national survey, ‘Sources of Australian Academics’ Qualifications, 1992’, was 
conducted, and these data have been obtained from ASSDA (Australian Social Sciences Data 
Archive). A similar study was conducted in 1996 and university level results are published in 
Anderson et al. (1997). These additional sources do not fill all gaps. The time series thus misses a 
number of entries between 1992 and 1996 and between 1996 and 2000. It is assumed here that 
staff qualifications are a relatively stable measure, at least compared to number of publications, 
and therefore missing values are constructed as a linear change based on existing data in 
neighboring years. 
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In addition to these data that are common to all three empirical studies below, individual 
studies use also data unique to the studies. The description and sources of the additional data will 
be provided in the chapters respectively.  
 
In sum, empirical work that attempts to measure research productivity faces serious 
challenges in terms of measurement and data availability. While data is far from perfect on many 
grounds – both conceptual and technical – they enable an analysis that gives insights on the 
determinants and time-dynamics of the research performance.  After discussing the conceptual 
framework of the dissertation (Chapter 2) and measurement and data issues (Chapter 3) we are 
now ready to proceed with empirical studies. The next chapter examines research concentration in 
Australian universities, Chaper 5 explores the effect of management practices on research 
performance, and Chapter 6 studies the efficiency change in Australian universities.   
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TABLES 
Table 3-1 Summary statistics on the number of publications per FTE academic staff member in Australian 
universities, 1992-2003 
Year Obs Mean St. dev. Min Max 
1992 35 0.341 0.297 0.018 1.198 
1993 35 0.362 0.307 0.025 1.222 
1994 36 0.397 0.320 0.035 1.244 
195 36 0.433 0.336 0.041 1.318 
1996 36 0.460 0.347 0.049 1.428 
1997 36 0.493 0.358 0.058 1.461 
1998 36 0.524 0.372 0.064 1.560 
1999 36 0.554 0.387 0.077 1.628 
2000 36 0.642 0.417 0.094 1.674 
2001 36 0.688 0.436 0.107 1.742 
2002 36 0.689 0.443 0.107 1.644 
2003 36 0.704 0.445 0.109 1.709 
 
 
Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics on (expected) citation numbers per academic staff, 1992-2003 
Year Obs Coefficient Mean St. dev. Min Max Cit/public 
1992 35 1.00 4.849 4.792 0.050 20.104 14.221 
1993 35 1.003 5.379 5.257 0.082 21.960 14.860 
1994 36 1.03 5.917 5.640 0.130 24.131 14.905 
1995 36 1.10 6.393 5.897 0.139 25.710 14.764 
1996 36 1.19 6.763 6.300 0.162 29.359 14.703 
1997 36 1.28 7.146 6.302 0.176 29.664 14.496 
1998 36 1.41 7.555 6.536 0.236 31.303 14.417 
1999 36 1.57 7.969 6.379 0.300 27.713 14.385 
2000 36 1.78 9.199 6.914 0.490 27.374 14.329 
2001 36 2.09 9.292 7.201 0.564 27.327 13.506 
2002 36 2.59 8.814 7.246 0.527 31.119 12.792 
2003 36 3.50 8.471 7.221 0.414 30.656 12.033 
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Table 3-3. Descriptive statistics on explanatory variables and input-output measures 
Variables Explanation Mean St dev Min Max Source 
 PhD Share of academic staff with PhD degrees (%) 46.784 16.533 18.400 87.600 
1992 – ASSDA 
1996 – *  
2000-Staff 
Collection 
Age Average age of academic staff (8 age groups) 5.435 0.287 4.691 6.419 Staff Collection 
Senior staff  
Share of staff on Level D 
(=Associate professors) and 
Level E (=Professors) (%) 
14.250 4.149 4.115 30.582 Staff Collection 
Student/staff The ratio of FTE students to FTE academic staff  15.534 4.981 4.893 28.653 Staff Collection,  
Teaching only Share of FTE academic staff with teaching responsibilities only (%) 18.645 15.583 0.000 98.588 Staff Collection,   
MedSchool Binary variable if a university has a Medical faculty  0.280 0.449 0 1 Web research 
Campuses 
The number of independent and 
geographically separated 
campuses  
0.27 0.44 1 10 Andrews et al (1997) 
Revenue Total operational revenue (‘000 AUD real 2000 ) 247,238 166,384 42,398 834,960 Finance Collection 
Acad. staff Total FTE academic staff 912 585 155 2,560 Staff Collection 
Admin. staff  Total FTE administrative staff  1,152 736 160 3,063 Staff Collection 
Non-staff 
expenditures Total non-staff expenditures  89,512 69,621 10,667 412,530 Finance Collection 
Undergrads  Total FTE undergraduate student enrollment  11,877 6,086 2,102 29,930 
 CaPIoHEI** and 
Selected Higher 
Education Statistics 
Coursegrads Total FTE course-based graduate student enrollment 1,680 1,125 245 6,359 
CaPIoHEI and 
Selected Higher 
Education Statistics 
Researchgrads Total FTE research-based graduate student enrollment 744 663 9 2,942 
CaPIoHEI and 
Selected Higher 
Education Statistics 
Publications Total number of publications in the ISI database 590 706 7 3,212 ISI database 
Citations Total number of citations in the ISI database 8,655 11,441 18 53,334 ISI database 
Grants 
Commonwealth and state level 
competitive grant funding (real 
2000) 
11,500 15,300 104 77,600 AVCC 
Share Grants Share of commonwealth grant funding (%) 2.843 3.686 0.030 14.197 AVCC 
Note: N=430. Sources:  *=Anderson et al. (1997).**CaPIoHEI = Andrews et al 1998.   
  
CHAPTER FOUR  
4. POLICY ENVIRONMENT AND RESEARCH 
CONCENTRATION 
 Introduction 
In the last decade or two, many countries have implemented or enforced the performance-
based component in their research funding system. Research councils and science foundations 
distribute a larger share of research funding, based on peer review and competing project 
proposals. Not only project based grant money but also institutional research funding is 
increasingly performance-based. Research Assessment Exercise in the UK and Research 
Quantum in Australia are well-known examples where institutional research funding is linked to 
the evidenced research performance in the institution. Performance-based funding of research is 
expected to be beneficial for several reasons. Performance monitoring is expected to increase the 
accountability of higher education institutions; performance-based funding provides universities 
with incentives to improve their research performance; and performance-based research funding 
may channel scarce financial resources to those universities where the most can be produced with 
the resources.   
Changes in funding policy have raised the question of whether the new funding 
mechanism affects the structure of the higher education market. Is competition based research 
funding likely to concentrate research in fewer universities or perhaps, on the contrary, level the 
playing field? There seems to be a widely held hypothesis that performance-based funding is 
likely to “reinforce status quo”, “widen the gap between the haves and have-nots”  
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(Nadin 1997), increase the differences in research performance (Geuna 2001) and enforce the 
dominance of the top research universities (Ramsden 1999).  
The concern over increasing research concentration has received a lot of publicity in 
Australia and the magnitude of research concentration has been studied carefully. The 
government report The Concentration of Research in Australian Universities points out that eight 
universities produce 70 per cent of publications and consume 65 per cent of R&D resources 
(Bourke and Butler 1998). Garrett-Jones et al (2000) conclude from the 1995 data that research 
activities are highly concentrated in 14 to 16 universities. This is the case for most of the output 
and input measures: the number of publications, total research expenditures, total labor costs, etc. 
It is clear that research in Australia is not equally distributed between universities. Universities 
differ in their academic profile, student characteristics, staff qualifications and historical 
background. A four-cluster typology of universities, to a large extent based on research 
performance, is widely accepted in Australia (e.g. Ramsden 1999, Valadkhani and Worthington 
2006, Marginson 1997).  This evidence, however, does not answer the question of whether the 
research concentration has a static nature or is dynamic in time.   
Research concentration is an issue not only in Australia. Concerns over research 
concentration have been articulated also in the United States, for example, where the top 20 
universities accounted for 30 per cent of the total federal academic S&T funding in 2005 (NSF 
2008). The concentration however does not seem to expand over time. Geiger and Feller (1995) 
study the research market in the US and demonstrate that the 1980s was a decade in which almost 
all of the 200 leading research universities had an absolute increase in R&D expenditures, at the 
same time that relative shares became more equal. Ville et al (2005) study the distribution of 
research in Australian universities and conclude that inequality in research performance seems 
rather to decline in the last 10 years. 
Funding mechanisms clearly have an effect on the distribution of research output. Some 
funding instruments may directly attempt to balance the unequal research funding that necessarily 
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accompanies a competitive funding scheme, or a funding instrument may on the contrary enforce 
the concentration of funding. In the US, for example, National Science Foundation established the 
EPSCoR program in 1980 that specifically offers research funding  to states and territories that 
historically have received lesser amount of federal research and development funding. This 
program has been extended also to various government agencies that distribute research funding. 
“Earmarked” research funding in the US is another, indirect balancing mechanism. Earmarked 
funds are allocated by the Congress and President through the budgeting process. They are much 
criticized because of intransparency and lack of peer review, but on the other hand defended 
exactly on the grounds of more equitable distribution of funding. EPSCoR and earmarked funds 
have contributed to more equal distribution of research funding, although only to a modest extent 
(Payne 2006).  The UK on the other hand enforces the differences that emerge from the 
competitive grant system. Institutional research funding by the Higher Education Funding 
Council is allocated only to universities that score highly at the Research Assessment Exercise 
and other universities are deprived from such funding. Australian funding system also rather 
exacerbates existing gaps in research funding. Institutional research budget is linked to success in 
attracting competitive research grants. In 2001 the government established the Regional 
Protection Fund to support research in regional universities that are not able to compete for 
research funds on equal grounds. The scope of the fund is however quite small and is not likely to 
have a major impact on research distribution.   
The aim of this study is to provide more systematic analysis of the time trend in research 
concentration in Australian universities.  While research concentration has been a widely 
discussed topic, no formal methods have been applied for studying concentration in this field.    
The convergence trends are analyzed with informal descriptive methods such as visual graphs, 
share comparison, and deciles analysis (Geiger and Feller 1995). Ville et al (2005) use the GINI 
coefficient for research funding and research outputs.  While these tools provide important 
evidence and examples, they do not allow a more systematic analysis of the time trend in the 
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process. A more developed method would make the assumptions more explicit and the analysis 
more rigorous.  This study adapts formal convergence models in order to examine the time trend 
in the distribution of research. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 will develop 
theoretical links between policy environment and research concentration, including a brief 
summary of crucial policy changes in Australia. Sections 3 and 4 describe the model and data 
respectively. Section 5 presents the empirical results on convergence trends. 
Higher education policy and market structure 
Changes in Australian policy environment 
Two major reforms in Australian higher education are particularly relevant for analyzing 
potential research concentration: unification of the higher education market and increasingly 
competitive funding schemes. 
The reform of 1987/88 replaced the binary system of Universities and more vocationally 
oriented Colleges of Advanced Education (CAE) with a unified system. As a result of the reform, 
many CAEs merged with each other or with former universities and thus became larger and more 
traditional university-like institutions. All higher education institutions became identical not only 
in their legal status but also were all expected to be engaged in research.   
 
The Australian higher education system has moved towards more competitive funding 
schemes in gradual steps. In 1990 the government introduced a plan whereby 6 per cent of the 
total operating grant to universities was distributed based on research performance, while the rest 
was allocated on the basis of student load. The performance-based component – Research 
Quantum – was based on a formula that included success in attracting external funding (mostly 
competitive research grants from the Australian Research Council), the number of publications, 
and successfully completed research degrees. In 1996 the government indicated that operating 
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grants to universities would be reduced by 5 per cent over next three years and no financial 
supplements were allocated for academic salary increases. This put universities under serious 
budget constraints. Secondly, in 1999 the Australian Research Council was significantly reformed 
and gained independence and authority for distributing research funding. The Australian Research 
Council subsumed within its authority almost the entirety of public research funding, including 
funding for doctoral education. This led to what has been called the “fully performance-based 
funding approach in research and research training” (Meek and Hayden 2005).   
The competitive forces were further strengthened through changes in the student market. 
Australia introduced subsidized tuition fees for all students, but more importantly, allowed 
universities to enroll full-fee-paying students – both domestic and international.  Income from 
student fees became a significant revenue source for universities, and 1995 budget cuts made this 
source even more crucial. As a result, universities compete with one another fiercely, especially 
for international students.     
The relationship between the policy changes and the structure of the research market will 
be approached in the framework of industrial economics. 
Policy environment and market structure 
Industrial Economics (IE) literature helps to formulate a link between policy environment 
and research concentration. Market concentration is a well-studied topic in the IE literature 
because market concentration is expected to have a direct effect on market performance. In a 
highly concentrated market, a few firms (or one firm) dominate the market and eliminate the 
efficiency gains that are normally generated by free competition.  The relative growth of firms in 
terms of their size and market power is therefore carefully studied in the IE literature. The effect 
of public policies that may affect market structure – e.g. anti-trust policies, policies related to 
entry barriers, common market policies – are therefore also of great interest in this field.    
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The higher education sector can be interpreted as an industry where multiple universities 
compete for market share and potentially for market power. The higher education market has 
many peculiarities, however. The traditional view of market concentration in terms of the number 
of universities and their relative size (in terms of revenue or number of employees) is hardly 
reasonable in the case of universities.  The structure of the higher education market is quite static 
if analyzed according to traditional categories. The number of universities does not change much 
because entry and exit is very limited in the sector. Although a few new private providers have 
emerged and are encouraged in Australia, the entry costs are too high for significant mobility. 
Also the size of universities does not change much over time. However, the ideas of market 
concentration and market power are not alien to the sector, if adjusted to the peculiarities of the 
sector.  
Universities are not usually traditional profit-maximizers but rather prestige-maximizers, 
as argued by Garvin (1980). The physical size of a university is not a measure of market position, 
and may even be inversely related to the market position.  Universities are more likely to face a 
tradeoff between prestige and size. Many universities have an excess demand but they constrain 
their size in return for higher prestige and quality, which is generated by selectivity (Hoxby 
1997). Moreover, the size of a university is not an expression of market success, but of 
government money allocations. The major constraint on university size is the operational grant 
from the government that is based to a large extent on the historical trend in student numbers.  
The source of market power in this industry is thus not expressed in size, but in prestige. And as 
Marginson (2001) points out, the market power of elite universities can be very high.  
Traditional measures of market concentration – number of firms, revenue shares or client 
shares – cannot be used for measuring market power in the higher education sector. When market 
power is generated by prestige, market concentration must be defined through a prestige measure. 
Prestige in the sector is primarily driven by research excellence (Brewer et al., 2002).   While in 
the traditional industries firms’ size is measured according to the number of employees, sales, and 
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the value of assets, the ‘size’ of a university in the higher education market can be equivalently 
measured through research performance. The question of this study can thus be rephrased as: how 
does the change in competitive policy environment affect the distribution of research in the 
Australian higher education market? Is the performance-based competitive funding likely to 
increase or decrease the concentration of research among Australian universities? From a 
theoretical standpoint, an argument can be developed in either direction.   
The case for a decreasing concentration of research 
Australian universities clearly differ in their research performance. Significant 
performance differences are not characteristic only of the higher education sector. Industrial 
economists identify strategic groups: groups that are defined by the commonality of the strategies 
that firms follow in setting key decision variables, such as investment levels, R&D, etc (Caves 
and Porter 1977, Porter 1979, Oster 1982).  Caves and Porter (1977) developed the idea of 
mobility barriers that prevent firms from moving from one strategic group within an industry to 
another, which provides an explanation for intra-industry performance differences. In case of 
Australian universities the barriers can be geographical or based on reputation and status. 
Unification of the system may be interpreted as an attempt to break down the barriers that have 
protected different performance levels in the system. All universities are now exposed to the same 
environment and the same market conditions.   
Financial incentives have been the primary mechanism by which the government steers 
universities’ conduct. Research performance evaluation and Research Quantum increased the 
attention to research in the country. Research performance generates important financial benefits 
from the government but also makes the university more attractive to students and external 
partners.  University rankings, such as those provided by Shanghai Jiao Tong or the Times 
Higher Education Supplement, are based primarily on research performance. Since it is perceived 
that university rankings affect considerably the choice of international students, all universities 
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have now an incentive to improve their research performance. Research emphasis characterizes 
now all universities; teaching concentration is not sufficient even for universities that by their 
mission do not have high research ambitions. Expectations of academic staff have therefore also 
become more uniform throughout the entire system and research pressure is felt by all academics. 
Even though the government hinted that it has no intention of supporting 36 research-intensive 
universities (Meek and O’Neill 1996), it has not declared or proven through money allocations 
that the concentration of resources to fewer universities would be beneficial (unlike the RAE 
funding principles in the UK, for example). In later years the government strongly encouraged 
each university to concentrate on specific research areas, but no explicit plans were articulated for 
concentrating research in fewer universities. The market forces may be thus triggering a 
convergence in research behavior and research performance among universities.  
However, it would be an oversimplification to assume that the CAE sector had no 
research ambitions before the reform and that market unification introduced a fundamental 
change in aspirations and values. The idea of prestige was not alien to the sector before the 
reform.  A considerable ‘academic drift’ had been present as well within the CAE sector.  
Colleges increasingly upgraded diplomas for degrees; research qualifications and research 
experience became progressively more valued; and there was a continuous hierarchy of higher 
education institutions instead of discrete classification (Moses 2004).  Consequently the effect of 
the unification on the aspirations of former CAE’s should not be overstressed. Although 
unification certainly enforced research culture in the sector, the pressure to increase the academic 
status of institutions was there already before the unification.   
The case for an increasing concentration of research 
The unification lifted some of the “mobility barriers” that kept some institutions from 
research activites.  While the unification may have eliminated formal finance or status barriers for 
the CAE sector, those barriers may have protected the institutions from the market. Abolishing 
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the market barriers may leave former CAE sector universities more vulnerable because they are 
now competing with more established research universities on equal grounds. The CAE sector 
universities may find themselves in an impossible competition, considering the specific nature of 
the higher education market as a winner-take-all market.   
Frank and Cook (1995) describe certain markets as winner-take-all markets. These are 
markets where rewards are not given on the basis of absolute productivity but on the basis of 
relative performance against competitors. This type of market enforces relative advantage and 
increases inequality between actors.   Several researchers have argued that higher education is a 
winner-take-all market: a market where small differences in performance translate into extremely 
large differences in reward (Frank 2001, Winston 2000, Marginson 2001). Successful universities 
attract more and more resources and can further strengthen their market position. As a result, the 
research performance gap between universities is expected to increase in time. 
If higher education is a winner-take-all market then the competitive environment is likely 
to enforce the existing positions of universities and promote concentration of research. 
Universities that have a good research potential are able to attract more research funding, in the 
form of competitive grants from either government funds or external sources. They can then 
invest these resources into better research infrastructure, and use the resulting financial resources 
and prestige to attract the most qualified researchers and further financial resources. Prestige and 
better infrastructure will make the universities a more attractive partner for external partners (e.g. 
industry) and students, which will channel even more resources to these universities.  Research 
potential is thus cumulative and makes advanced universities to grow even faster. Geuna (2001: 
624-625) among others believes that concentration is an unintended inevitable consequence of 
performance based funding system in higher education. 
The cumulative rewards in science and research performance have been thoroughly 
studied and confirmed at the individual level (Allison et al 1982; Cole 1970). Merton (1968, 
1973) developed a well-known argument for cumulative effects in research output.  Since it is 
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difficult to predict the future productivity of scientific work, the scientific community is more 
likely to allocate resources to those scholars that have been successful in the past.  As a result, the 
gap between less able and more able researchers is likely to grow over time. Additionally, Merton 
pointed out that scientists with greater reputations would gain greater rewards for the same 
standard of research achieved by scientists with lesser reputations (defined as Matthew effect). 
Rosen (1981) explained cumulative effects in science from a different angle. He developed a 
theory of ‘superstars’, arguing that small differences in talent are translated into 
disproportionately greater market rewards and thereby exacerbate inequality in the final outcome. 
Visible not only at the individual level, such cumulative effects are also reflected at the aggregate 
university level, and similar mechanisms of cumulative advantage can be present at the 
institutional level.   
From a theoretical perspective, research can be seen as increasingly either concentrating 
or converging in Australian universities. We know that universities have improved their research 
productivity over the period of interest, at least if measured by the number of publications (as 
shown in Figure 1.2.). The question is whether the growth has been the same for all universities.  
Have the better performing universities been able to grow faster due to the cumulative effects in 
research and is the research market increasingly more concentrated? Or have lower performing 
universities been able to profit from their underused potential and demonstrate faster growth, 
which leads to convergence with better performing universities? A model for estimating the trend 
will be discussed next. 
Modeling concentration 
The process of cumulative effects has been modeled and estimated in different settings. 
For example, research in career development, income inequality and scientific productivity apply 
the pattern of cumulative effects at the individual level (see DiPrete and Eirich 2006 for an 
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overview). Industrial economics and development economics have developed the concentration 
and convergence models for macro level units – firms and countries. All the models have the 
same general logic and estimate the relationship between the growth rate of the variable of 
interest and the initial level of the variable.  
In industrial economics, market concentration is an important market characteristic and 
temporal trends in the concentration are therefore carefully studied. Many studies test Gibrat’s 
law of proportional effects (see Goddard et al 2002). Gibrat argued that if individual firm growth 
rates are independent of firm size then the market will nevertheless be increasingly concentrated 
and the distribution of firm size would be skewed (Sutton 1997). Some firms become large due to 
a random shock and are able to establish a dominant market position. A rich set of empirical 
research has followed to test Gibrat's assumption of the independence of the growth rate in 
relation to the firms’ size, and the evidence is leaning towards rejecting the assumption of 
independent growth rate (e.g. Liu et al 1999; Evans 1987; Dunne and Hughes 1994).  
Another stream of research that informs the model in this paper is growth economics. 
Neo-classical growth economics assumes that per capita income in the world converges over time 
(Solow 1956) and convergence models test the assumption and estimate the speed of the process 
(Baumol 1986; DeLong 1988; Barro 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Abramowitz 1986; 
Dollar and Wolff 1988). The convergence model is in general terms identical to the concentration 
model in the industrial economics literature, only assuming that the relationship between growth 
and the initial level of development is negative. The contribution of the convergence model in 
studying research outputs in Australian universities is the idea of ‘conditional’ convergence.  In 
the context of growth economics, convergence between countries may be not absolute, but 
conditional on technology and other structural country-specific factors. Similarly research output 
in universities may be converging (or concentrating) not absolutely, but conditionally, based on 
internal resources in a university.  
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Drawing from the two streams of research, a model of research concentration is 
developed.  The evidence supports the hypothesis of research concentration if strong research 
universities raise their research output faster than lower performing universities. If this is so then 
the gap between stronger and weaker universities grows in time. If, on the contrary, universities 
with initially low level of research productivity have a higher growth in research outputs, then we 
can expect that lower performing universities are catching up. The mathematical form of the 
relationship in the cross-sectional form is thus the following:   
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where ity  is the research output on a logarithmic scale of university i at time t. ity  is the growth 
rate of research performance. itu   is random disturbance characterized as E( itu )=0 and var( itu )=
2
it
  across i.  This specification assumes that the growth rate is not entirely explained by the 
initial level of research productivity, but must also take into account university characteristics. 
iX  is the vector of j characteristics of universities. (Theoretical justification for including 
university level characteristics and the set of variables included in X will be discussed below.) j  
and β represent parameters to be estimated. If β=0 then there is no relationship between 
universities’ research output and the growth in research output. If β>0 then it means that 
universities that perform well improve their performance faster. In both of these cases (i.e. β ≥0) 
the gap between universities is increasing in time and universities do not converge.  When β<0 
then universities of lower level research output improve faster. This is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for convergence.   
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Adopting from Geroski and Gugler (2004), the estimation model has the following 
conceptual foundation. If there is evidence of convergence (or concentration) among universities 
and all universities are indeed moving towards (or away from) a common ceiling of research 
output then the rate of growth depends on their distance from that ceiling. If y* represents the 
unobserved ceiling of the research productivity, 
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  is thus the parameter to be estimated and represents the speed with which universities 
approach the ceiling.  Relationship between the growth rate and the distance from the output 
ceiling is assumed to be exponential (  ) meaning that the further a university is from the 
capacity ceiling the faster it is approaching the ceiling.  
 The model cannot be directly estimated because the ceiling y* is not observable. If we 
assume that y* is the same for every university then it would transform the term into a constant 
and the model could be estimated as a direct relationship between the growth rate and 1ity . This 
would give an estimate for the absolute convergence (β-convergence), which is the first empirical 
estimation model in this study:  
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Since we will use a panel data set, the disturbance term ititit uu   1 , where it  is random 
noise and  allows for serial correlation.  In this model, negative β would be a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for convergence. Negative β may actually increase dispersion of units in the 
unlikely case that the growth rate of smaller units is excessively higher than that of larger units. In 
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such a case the smaller units grow so fast that they pass larger units and the gap between units 
may be bigger at the end of the period (Sala-i-Martin 1996).  
Regression to the mean is another and more serious concern in terms of why β coefficient 
alone is not an entirely reliable measure of convergence. Quah (1993) draws attention to a 
potential Galton’s fallacy in convergence models that interpret a negative relationship between 
growth rate and initial level of economic productivity as a sign of decreasing dispersion across 
economies. He shows that even if there is no change in the cross-section distribution of 
productivity across countries, the β may easily be negative. This can be explained with the 
‘regression to the mean’ argument. Exceptionally high measurements – due to random fluctuation 
in the sample or measurement error – in period t are likely to be followed by more moderate 
measurements in period t+1; and exceptionally low measurements are likely to be followed by 
higher measurements. There is thus some systematic mobility in the sample but the dispersion 
itself remains unchanged over time.  
This is the purpose of estimating σ-convergence in addition to β-convergence. 
Universities are converging in the sense of σ (sigma) if the dispersion in their research output 
tends to decrease over time.  For this test, we will calculate σ, which is the standard deviation of 
the (ln) research output, and analyze its time trend.  In order to make the measure unit-neutral, 
standard deviation is divided by the mean of research output. 
Model 1 assumed that the productivity ceiling y* is identical for all universities. This is 
however an unrealistic assumption because universities are endowed with a different set of 
resources which cannot be changed rapidly. All universities can still be assumed to increase their 
research productivity, which is constrained by the university level characteristics. The unobserved 
productivity ceiling y* can be thus defined through university characteristics that encourage or 
discourage research output:   
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where X is the vector of j observable exogenous factors that drive the individual y*.   
The factors that define research output in universities are derived from existing empirical 
literature that uses multivariate models and tries to identify the determinants of research 
productivity at the university level (Johnes 1988, Abbott and Doucouliagos 2004, Dundar and 
Lewis 1998, Adams and Clemmons 2006, Ramsden 1999).  These studies were discussed in 
Chapter 2. The set of variables is quite uniform across the studies and the models demonstrate 
quite high explanatory power. We will use this “conventional set” as input in the convergence 
model. Staff qualifications and characteristics clearly contribute to research productivity: 
measured by the share of academic staff with PhD degrees.  The proportion of senior staff in the 
university affects research performance not only because of their own productivity but also 
through a potential spillover effect on other staff. The average age of academic staff has been 
found to have consistently negative or quadratic effect on research performance (e.g. Stevens 
2001, Johnes 1988). This can be explained either directly by the diminishing productivity of older 
staff, or by the staff profile in research-intensive universities (Bonaccorsi and Daraio 2002). 
Teaching and research compete for faculty members’ time and teaching load is expected to be 
negatively associated with research productivity. Empirical evidence about the relationship 
between research and undergraduate teaching is however ambiguous (Hattie and Marsh 1996).  
Since different disciplines have different publishing behavior, the disciplinary mix in a university 
is likely to affect the total research output. The most conventional way to capture the effect of the 
disciplinary mix is to include a binary variable for the presence of a medical school in the 
university (e.g. Abbott and Doucouliagos 2004). 
The vector X includes thus the following variables: share of academic staff with PhD 
degrees, share of senior staff (full and associate professors), average age of staff, student-staff 
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ratio, proportion of academic staff with teaching only responsibilities, and the presence of the 
medical school.  
When constructing y* through the vector of X variables, the estimation model takes the 
following form:   
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where the vector jX  includes the identified university level variables. This is a conditional 
convergence model - universities are assumed to converge, but to an individual capacity ceiling 
as determined by their resources and structural characteristics.  
Model 2 is less restrictive because it allows university-specific capacity ceilings, but it 
still imposes the assumption that all universities have a homogeneous convergence rate  .  The 
rate may however be different for different universities. Some universities may be improving 
their research performance at a slower rate because of structural reasons. Australian quality audit 
reports from 1995 often pointed out the problem of unequal developments in multi-campus 
universities. Often universities had been able to improve their research infrastructure on the main 
campus but improvements lagged behind on other regional campuses (CQAHE 1995).  The 
convergence rate  in the theoretical model is consequently not identical for all universities but is 
a function of the structural characteristic (z). The model will be thus augmented for the following 
final model specification:  
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There is a conceptual difference between an x variable and z variable. If the number of 
campuses were considered as an x variable then we would assume that on average universities 
with more campuses have a lower research capacity ceiling y*, everything else being equal. When 
we consider the number of campuses as a z  variable then we assume that the number of campuses 
does not lower the expected research productivity in universities, but only the time needed to 
reach the productivity ceiling y*.  We hypothesize that universities that are divided into multiple 
campuses cannot implement internal research policies as quickly throughout the institution. 
Eventually the university will reach the ceiling of y* as predicted by X variables, only the 
trajectory is slower.  At the conceptual level we thus assume that the  itself is a function of the 
number of campuses (in the Theoretical model above). Under this assumption, an empirical 
estimation would include interaction terms with the constructed y* (i.e. X vector) and the initial 
performance.    
Measurement: time period and unit 
Growth period  
This study examines the changes during the decade from 1992-2002. What period to use 
for measuring growth rate is a question that arises particularly in the context of panel data. 
Measuring growth rates over the shortest periods possible would maximize the number of 
observations in the sample.  Yearly growth rates may, however, contain a lot of noise because of 
random fluctuation in research output from one year to another. Considering that there is often a 
time lag between when research is completed and when it is published, and that this lag varies, 
publications may happen to accumulate in a given year after a previous year of relatively low 
research output. While in the case of big universities with high publication numbers such 
fluctuation is not significant, in smaller universities with low levels of research performance these 
fluctuations are a more serious problem. One university demonstrated a near 100 per cent growth 
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in one year, followed by a severe decline the next year.  Comparing outputs from years that are 
further apart may therefore give more meaningful growth estimates. Goddard et al (2002) justify 
using yearly growth rates (of firm size) with the argument that aggregating data cannot possibly 
increase the amount of information in the dataset and is more likely to reduce available 
information for estimations. In order to alleviate the problem of random fluctuations in research 
outputs, a moving average smoothing technique has been applied in this paper: instead of using 
the nominal count of research output for each year, the average output of the year t, t-1 and t+1 is 
used. This technique will construct a series of data with a more consistent long-term time trend.  
Research output measure on the right hand side is kept in its original, t-1 form.  In this way we 
can also avoid the problem of linear dependency between the dependent and independent 
variable.     
Measurement unit 
The concentration can be estimated either in terms of total research performance or 
research performance per academic staff in a university. The choice between per capita or 
absolute measures comes from the theoretical assumptions – what is an accurate prestige 
estimator. University rankings (e.g. Shanghai Jiao Tong ranking of world universities), for 
example, count total research productivity, which would suggest total research output as a 
prestige measure. On the other hand, there is evidence that universities do not grow in size when 
they have the option, but instead increase their selectivity (e.g. Hoxby 1997). In this paper we will 
assume that selectivity is part of the prestige generating mechanism and therefore we will use per 
capita measures. Per capita measure of research performance is also perhaps more informative 
and intuitive.     
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Empirical results  
In this chapter the empirical results for the absolute, sigma-, and conditional convergence 
will be presented first with respect to the publication numbers. At the end of the chapter the same 
models will be run for the citation numbers in order to check the robustness of the results to the 
choice of the output measures and to test whether the convergence trends may be different with 
respect to the quantity and quality of research.    
Unconditional model 
Absolute convergence model estimates (Model 1) suggest clear convergence in 
publication numbers between universities (Table 4-1). The β-coefficient is clearly negative and 
statistically significant. This means that research productivity is growing significantly faster in 
lesser performing universities and this evidence suggests potential convergence across the sector. 
The first column in Table 4-1 presents the results from a pooled OLS estimation. There is 
likely to be a heteroscedasticity problem because universities with lower publication numbers 
have more fluctuation over years and the growth numbers are also more dispersed. The analysis 
of residuals indeed shows a minor correlation with the explanatory variable and therefore Huber 
corrected errors are presented. The speed of convergence is a considerable 6.4 per cent. There is 
also a significant stable growth in all universities at the average rate of 2 per cent.    
Since we are dealing with a panel dataset, one potential problem is error correlation over 
time periods. The random effect model is therefore estimated in parallel with the OLS. The 
Breusch-Pagan test finds only a very minor clustering effect for the observations over the years 
(Chi-square (1) 0.32) and the correction leaves the results basically unchanged.  Random effect 
model indicates expectedly that the model explains more effectively the variance in growth 
between universities than that within universities. This result encourages analyzing further the 
dynamics of the convergence trend over time.  The results of the random effect model suggest 
that the relationship between growth rate and the initial level of research performance is perhaps 
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not homogeneous throughout the time period. Table 4-2 presents the results of the growth 
regressions by years. The convergence speed declined from 9.4 per cent in 1992 to negative 2.4 
per cent in 2003. The coefficient is statistically significant and negative until the year 2000.  The 
relationship between the initial publication numbers and the growth is fading out gradually over 
the years, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. This indicates that universities with lower performance 
indeed grow faster, but only until the year 2000 and at the declining rate. Starting with the year 
2001 the relationship seems to disappear and there is some fluctuation between convergence and 
divergence.  
Figure 4.1 Beta coefficients (with standard errors), 
1992-2002 
Figure 4.2 Sigma-convergence, 1992-2002 
 
β-convergence is not a sufficient condition for convergence. Negative β-coefficients may 
indicate the regression to the mean rather than a systematic decrease in the variance. In order to 
check the concern of the regression to the mean, the change in the standard deviation of the 
research output across universities over years needs to be examined.  The analysis of standard 
deviation, i.e. σ-convergence, confirms the results of the β convergence (6th column in Table 4-2).  
The higher education market is consistently converging (σ drops from .871 to .634), with the 
exception of the year 2001. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the dispersion of publication numbers is 
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declining, but stabilizing at the year 2000. This means that Australian universities are indeed 
becoming more similar in their per capita publication numbers.   
The relationship between growth rate and the initial performance level thus demonstrates 
a significant convergence over the period. However the convergence trend is consistently slower 
every year and stops around the year 2000. This pattern suggests that as a result of the policy 
shock, lower performing universities increased their research performance faster than universities 
with higher research performance, but there seems to be a limit of how much these universities 
are able to reduce the gap. By 2000 the lower performing universities seem to have used all their 
growth potential and stabilized their research performance. This could be the case for several 
reasons. Lower performing universities may have upgraded their research infrastructure and thus 
gained research productivity, but they might not have been able to increase resources to the same 
level as research intensive universities. Alternatively, all universities reacted to the change in the 
policy environment similarly, i.e. by increasing their research productivity. It may be relatively 
easier to improve research performance at the lower end of the scale, and it gets more difficult 
when research performance increases. Because of this phenomenon, the growth speed may be 
equalizing in the sector. The conditional convergence model can therefore provide more evidence 
on relative growth in the sector.  
Conditional convergence and different convergence rates 
It is unrealistic to assume that all universities are approaching the same level of research 
performance, given that performance is influenced by the level of resources and other institutional 
characteristics. The conditional convergence model assumes that the growth speed is not 
determined by the absolute level of performance, but by the distance of the performance level 
from the capacity ceiling, as constrained by resources and other institutional characteristics. 
Conditional convergence model (Model 2) confirms the relationship between optimal 
research productivity and university characteristics (Table 4-3).  Considering individual capacity 
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ceilings, universities demonstrate even faster convergence speed: at the rate of 12.2 per cent 
compared to 6.4 per cent in the unconditional model. The Model 2 estimation shows that the 
growth is significantly associated with the university characteristics as well as the initial level of 
research output. Staff characteristics seem to have a significant effect on the maximum 
productivity ceiling: the share of senior staff (associate and senior professors), and the average 
age of the academic staff have a positive effect on the productivity ceiling. Also a medical school 
seems to raise the capacity limit. The student-staff ratio, the share of academic staff with only 
teaching responsibilities and the share of staff with the doctoral degree all have an expected sign 
but do not quite pass the 5% confidence level threshold.  
What this evidence shows is that universities seem to approach a long-run level of 
research productivity that is captured by the X variables, and the growth rate falls as the 
university approaches this long-run level. Not only lower performing universities improve their 
research performance faster, but the further a university is from its capacity ceiling the faster it 
improves its performance. Universities are thus not converging so much absolutely with each 
other but they are moving quickly towards their individual capacity ceiling.  The evidence seems 
to indicate that starting from the beginning of the 1990s universities started to maximize the 
potential of their existing resources.  
We also hypothesized that the speed of convergence can be influenced by structural 
factors such as the number of campuses. Model 3 tests the hypothesis that universities with 
multiple campuses have experienced a slower speed in converging to their optimal research 
productivity. Individual interaction terms are not only non significant, the F test of joint 
significance confirms that the number of campuses has a negligible effect on convergence speed 
(Table 4-3). The direction of the relationship is however the opposite of what was expected. 
Moreover, the sign of most interaction terms is negative, suggesting that multi-campus 
universities demonstrate faster growth rather than slower growth. The only interaction term that is 
statistically significant is the interaction with the student-staff ratio. When interpreted 
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individually, this indicates that multi-campus universities with high student-staff ratio have been 
able to improve their research performance the most.   
The analysis of publication numbers thus shows that universities are converging over the 
1992-2002 time-period, meaning that universities with lower research performance improved 
their performance faster than universities with good research performance. The convergence trend 
was particularly fast in the early period and faded away by the end of the period. The conditional 
convergence model indicates that universities quickly maximized their own capacity, as dictated 
by their internal inputs and characteristics, rather than heading towards a common productivity 
level. Universities seem to have reached their long-run productivity level by the end of the period. 
 Citation numbers: conditional and unconditional models 
Citation numbers and publication numbers can potentially give quite a different picture. It 
is possible that the number of publications has grown in lesser performing universities, but the 
publications would not be equal in quality to those of more research-intensive universities. Thus 
it could be the case that while universities are converging in terms of publication numbers, the 
gap in citation numbers would remain unchanged, or even grow.  
The empirical results of citation analysis seem to give quite a similar overall picture as 
the number of publications (Table 4-4). While both the OLS and RE results are presented, the 
coefficients of the two estimates are significantly different and random effect estimates should be 
preferred. Error correlation can be expected considering that the citation numbers have been 
multiplied with a constant to correct the time bias. Growth in citation numbers is significantly and 
negatively correlated with the initial number of citations, indicating convergence over time. The 
convergence speed of 7.5 per cent is even faster than in the case of publication numbers. This 
likely reflects the fact that citations themselves have a cumulative pattern and the gap in citation 
numbers was even larger in the beginning of the period than the gap in the publication numbers. 
The initial level of research output explains better the variance of growth rates between 
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universities rather than within a university.  In general, the model has a much lower explanatory 
power than the model of publication numbers.  
The time trend of the β-coefficients over the years is not as consistent as in the case of 
publication numbers (Table 4-5). The β-coefficient first decreases (1992-1994), then increases 
(1995-1996) and then again decreases and stabilizes in 1999. After the year 1999 the time trend 
will be flat.  σ shows however a more stable convergence trend. Standard deviation drops 
consistently until the year 2000, with the exception of the year 1995. After the year 2000 σ seems 
to start increasing again.  Compared to the number of publications, distribution of the number of 
citations is more diverse, indicating a bigger gap between universities. This is an expected result 
considering that citations have an exponential distribution pattern. 
Unlike in the case of publication numbers, the conditional convergence model does not 
add much explanatory power (Table 4-6) . University level characteristics fail to define the 
capacity limit in the citation output. Convergence speed is increased only marginally, from .075 
to .077. Citation numbers seem to be more resistant to changes in university resources. Student-
per-staff is a measure that seems to define the citation behavior in the university, suggesting that 
high student numbers reduce expected citation numbers.  Lower performing universities are 
increasing their research performance relatively faster, but the growth does not seem to be 
determined by the research characteristics of the university.  
In the Model 3 estimation, the interaction terms seem to replace the direct effect of the 
university characteristics. The addition however reduces the general convergence speed and 
rather again seems to suggest that more spread-out universities have improved their research 
performance to an even greater extent.   
The convergence model applied to the number of citations thus suggests the following: 
Australian universities increased their citation numbers over the time period and lower 
performing universities indeed grew faster than better performing universities. The growth 
pattern, however, does not seem to be explained by the gap between actual performance and 
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expected performance.  It can be argued that universities’ policies in terms of staff qualifications, 
senior staff, and research staff may increase publication numbers, but citation numbers are more 
resistant to quick changes. This may explain why these resources do not explain the growth 
pattern. The problem with this argument of course is that universities did increase their 
performance, but this seems to be independent of the universities’ resources. This is not meant to 
say that the university characteristics do not affect research performance if measured with 
citations. The regression of citations on the university characteristics confirms that all these 
variables are indeed significant for the performance (see the next chapter). Simply the gap 
between the expected performance and actual performance does not seem to affect the growth 
rate. Data problems perhaps should be kept in mind, too. While publication numbers are actual 
numbers, the citation numbers are constructed based on a historical pattern.     
Research funding: the conditional and unconditional model 
The final analysis focuses on convergence in research funding. Research funding is an 
alternative measure of research quality and another dimension in prestige, but in terms of research 
convergence it has significance of its own. The primary concern behind research concentration is 
concentration in resources, which subsequently leads to concentration in research output. As seen 
in the results (Table 4-7), the trend in research funding is very similar to the trend in publication 
numbers. Lower performing universities are moving closer also to better performing universities. 
So also in terms of research funding universities have become more similar and there are no signs 
of concentration. The convergence is the case in the absolute sense, but the catching-up is even 
faster in the conditional model. Controlling for university-specific characteristics, research 
funding has considerably increased in universities that had less funding in the starting point. 
Similarly to publication and citation numbers, the convergence trend stops in the year 2000 and 
shows a sign of a reverse trend (Table 4-8). It is still possible that after the initial 10-year stage of 
convergence the concentration mechanism starts to play a role.  
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Discussion 
This study shows that the policy reforms that started in the end of 1980s have had an 
important impact on research performance in Australian universities.  Universities have improved 
their research output over the years. There is also evidence of different growth rates in the sector.  
The concerns that a more competitive research environment has resulted in a greater gap between 
universities are not confirmed by this analysis. We found evidence of absolute convergence – i.e. 
universities have become more similar in their research productivity. Lower performing 
universities have been catching up to better performing universities.  
The analysis of publication numbers also shows that universities are not approaching a 
uniform level of research productivity, but they are approaching individual ceilings determined 
by their structural characteristics. The speed of adjustment is faster when individual capacity 
ceilings are taken into account.  Universities have thus rapidly maximized their research output 
according to the limits of their individual capacity and then the research performance stabilizes.  
This evidence is in line with research productivity trends in the UK – another country that 
implemented a large-scale performance reform in the end of 1980s. The researchers have 
suggested in the case of the UK that the performance reform in higher education has a one-time 
effect; the reform improves the system, but the improvement is not constant (Geuna and Martin 
2003). Evidence in Australia seems to confirm this idea. The performance reform has behaved 
like a one-time shock, increasing the productivity level in the system, but it is not a mechanism 
for constant improvement. Productivity increase may be technically easier to achieve at a 
relatively low starting point. This of course does not undermine the value of the performance 
reform since all the universities are now performing at a higher level.  It is also unlikely that the 
government can bring additional change by intensifying competitive pressures even further. As 
discussed in the introductory chapter, policy changes have been gradual, inserting more and more 
elements towards greater competition. Yet the trend in publication activities and publication 
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convergence seems to be quite consistent over the period.  The speed of the catching-up trend has 
consistently declined over time and finally seems to have reversed.  
We started the study with two hypotheses: the sector may experience convergence 
because of a homogenized research market or, alternatively, the sector may be concentrating due 
to the winner-take-all mechanism in the sector.  The evidence supports the idea of convergence, 
but it is conceivable that both hypotheses are correct.  Unification of the system was a structural 
change, which had a major impact on the market structure. This impact lasted for 10 years and 
faded away around 2000. It is conceivable that only now will the potential winner-take-all 
mechanism, which is more nuanced, demonstrate its effect. It will be interesting to see how the 
market behaves in the first decade of the new century, now that the decade of convergence seems 
to be over. The evidence shows that the dispersion has systematically declined, but the decline 
was completed by the year 2000.  In this decade we could expect the market to be either stable or 
concentrating. It is possible that the universities have achieved optimal long-run research 
performance and that the market has achieved optimal structure. But it is also conceivable that we 
will observe the forces that earlier were hidden by the effect of the structural reform.   
The idea of convergence and market structure in research performance adds interesting 
evidence in light of current discussions in the Australian higher education system.  A recent 
proposal suggests that the Australian higher education market should be more formally 
segmented: research intensive universities, regional universities, and teaching oriented 
universities should have a different treatment and funding formula from the government in order 
to best fulfill their function in the society (Meek et al 2008).  Strictly within the limit of this 
study, it could be an appropriate timing for this kind of market segmentation. Potential effects of 
the performance reforms have been utilized and by now exhausted.  The catching up effect has 
stopped and no further spontaneous integration of the market is likely.  Creating different 
strategic groups in the market may function as a protective framework against the potential 
winner-take-all mechanism.  
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While this paper cannot conclude that the gap between Australian universities is 
expanding, inequalities between universities may nevertheless be perceived as more severe.  
Research results are now more visible and easily comparable between universities, which makes 
performance gaps more obvious. The differences may have also become more real because 
performance differences are increasingly expressed in unequal financial rewards.  
Ten years has thus been a critical period in the Australian higher education market and 
the year 2000 completed one era. The stabilizing of the market structure in 1999/2000 should not 
be attributed to major policy changes or environmental changes, but to gradual fading of the long-
term performance improvement.  The next ten years is likely to reveal a very different dynamics.  
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TABLES  
Table 4-1 Absolute convergence in the number of publications 
 OLS RE 
 Coeff. St. err. Coeff. St. err. 
(ln)  publications -0.064***  0.006 -0.065*** 0.005 
Constant .02*** 0.005 0.02*** 0.007 
R-square 0.261 
 Within: 0.243 
Between: 0.664 
Overall: 0.261 
rho 0.009 
 
Note: Dependent variable: (ln) growth rate of publications. *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
Table 4-2. Absolute convergence in the number of publications by years 
 Β-coeff. St.err. Const R-sq. σ N 
1992  -0.094*** 0.024 -0.026 0.435 0.871 35 
1993 -0.081*** 0.011 0.055*** 0.496 0.848 35 
1994 -0.060*** 0.023 0.047** 0.229 0.804 36 
1995 -0.066*** 0.019 0.014*** 0.375 0.776 36 
1996 -0.066*** 0.025 0.027*** 0.238 0.754 36 
1997 -0.044*** 0.018 0.037** 0.203 0.725 36 
1998 -0.045*** 0.016 0.030*** 0.127 0.709 36 
1999 -0.065*** 0.018 0.122*** 0.247 0.698 36 
2000 -0.024* 0.013 0.061** 0.057 0.648 36 
2001 0.024** 0.012 0.007** 0.114 0.634 36 
2002 -0.012 0.013 0.019 0.024 0.641 36 
Note: Dependent variable: (ln) growth rate of pc publications. *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 4-3 Conditional convergence in the number of publications, OLS  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coeff St. err Coeff St. err Coeff. St. err 
 
(ln) pc publications 
-0.064***  0.006 -0.122*** 0.023 -0.095** 0.046 
 PhD   0.0012 0.0009 0.002 0.001 
Age   1.406*** 0.379 1.448*** 0.396 
Age squared   -0.131*** 0.033 -0.135*** 0.037 
Senior staff   0.003* 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Student/staff   -0.001 0.0017 0.003 0.003 
Teaching only   -0.0003 0.0006 0.001 0.001 
Med School   0.046*** 0.013 0.044** 0.022 
 Interactions w the number of campuses     
     PhD 
  
  -0.0002 0.0002 
 
 
  
     Age     0.008 0.008 
     Age squared     -0.009 0.001 
     Senior staff     0.001 0.0009 
     Student/staff      -0.0014* 0.0008 
     Teaching only     -0.0003 0.0002 
     (ln) pc 
publications 
    -0.006 0.008 
      Med School        -0.001  0.004 
       F test 
(interactions) 
       p values  
  
  
1.20 
0.30 
 
Constant .02*** 0.005 -3.87***  -4.07***  
No obs.   394  394  
R-square 0.261  0.344  0.351  
Note. Dependent variable: (ln) growth rate of publications. *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
86 
Table 4-4 Absolute convergence in the number of citations  
 OLS RE 
 Coeff. St. err. Coeff. St. err. 
(ln) citations -0.059 ***  0.008 -0.75*** 0.10 
Constant 0.166 *** 0.017 0.190*** 0.19 
 R-square 0.124 
 Within: 0.180  
Between: 0.260 
Overall: 0.124 
Rho: 0.09 
 
Note: Dependent variable: (ln) growth rate of citations. *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
Table 4-5 Absolute convergence in the number of citations by years  
 β -coeff. St.err. Const R-sq. σ N 
1992  -0.082*** 0.023 0.235 0.355 0.988 35 
1993 -0.067*** 0.013 0.251 0.392 0.977 35 
1994 -0.044** 0.017 0.176*** 0.156 0.953 36 
1995 -0.069** 0.027 0.191*** 0.247 0.922 36 
1996 -0.074** 0.030 0.218*** 0.192 0.931 36 
1997 -0.062*** 0.016 0.181*** 0.161 0.881 36 
1998 -0.030 0.020 0.120** 0.03 0.865 36 
1999 -0.066** 0.028 0.291*** 0.115 0.800 36 
2000 -0.030 0.038 -0.074 0.056 0.751 36 
2001 -0.002 0.031 -0.070 0.000 0.774 36 
2002 -0.029 0.018 -0.114*** 0.005 0.822 36 
Note:   Dependent variable: (ln) growth of citations *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 4-6 Conditional convergence in the number of citations, RE 
 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coeff St. err Coeff. St. err 
(ln) pc citations -0.077*** 0.018 -0.037 0.022 
PhD -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
Age 0.155 0.806 0.803 0.862 
Age squared -0.027*** 0.072 -0.08 0.077 
Seniority 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 
Student/staff -0.006*** 0.002 -0.002 0.005 
Teaching only -0.0001 0.0008 0.002 0.001 
Med School -0.025 0.035 -0.016 0.056 
 Interactions w campus       
    PhD   0.001** 0.0005 
     Age   -0.015 0.01 
     Age sq.   0.0006 0.001 
     Senior staff   -0.0005 0.001 
     Student/staff    -0.0006** 0.0003 
     Teaching only   -0.028*** 0.008 
     ln (citations)   0.003 0.014 
      Med School   14.48  
       F test (interactions) 
       p values  
  0.03  
Constant -0.292 2.23 -1.755 2.42 
No obs. 394  394  
R-square 0.187  .208  
Note: Dependent variable: (ln) growth of citations. *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 4-7 Absolute and conditional convergence in research funding 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coeff St. err. Coeff St. err 
(ln) pc research funding -0.074*** 0.015 -0.167*** 0.038 
PhD   0.002 0.001 
Age   1.810** 0.763 
Age squared   -0.161** 0.069 
Seniority   0.002 0.004 
Student/staff   -0.004 0.003 
Teaching only   -0.003** 0.001 
Med School   0.066** 0.03 
Constant 0.806*** 0.159 -3.418* 2.006 
No obs. 422  422  
R-square 0.09  0.15  
Note: Dependent variable: (ln) growth of research funding.  *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
Table 4-8. Absolute convergence of research funding by years 
 Β-coeff. St.err. Const R-sq. σ N 
1992  -0.143** 0.066 -1.39** 0.223 0.863 34 
1993 -0.013 0.056 0.291 0.004 0.814 34 
1994 -0.071*** 0.025 0.707*** 0.241 0.816 35 
1995 -0.060*** 0.019 0.655*** 0.097 0.808 35 
1996 -0.141** 0.060 1.48** 0.370 0.806 35 
1997 -0.090** 0.037 0.9198** 0.192 0.758 36 
1998 -0.127** 0.046 1.336*** 0.264 0.735 36 
1999 -0.106** 0.039 0.125*** 0.214 0.698 36 
2000 -0.061 0.047 0.673 0.082 0.663 36 
2001 -0.035 0.044 0.364 0.023 0.652 36 
2002 -0.024 0.026 -0.171 0.018 0.677 36 
2003 0.058 0.045 -0.562 0.029 0.690 36 
Note: Dependent variable: (ln) growth rate of research funding. *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
 
  
CHAPTER FIVE 
5. THE IMPACT OF RESEARCH MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
ON RESEARCH PRODUCTIVITY 
The capacity to generate new knowledge is nowadays widely recognized as an engine for 
economic growth and social development (OECD 1996, World Bank 2002). This recognition has 
put universities under great pressure and public scrutiny. Universities are one of the main 
institutions where new knowledge is produced and governments have therefore become 
significantly more involved in monitoring and steering university research in almost all advanced 
economies. Various government level mechanisms aim to encourage and support university 
research.   
In the last two decades the Australian government became considerably more involved in 
steering university research.  Research funding to universities is now based on research 
performance, a higher share of research funds is distributed via competitive grants, universities 
must present their research strategies to the government, and university research is regularly 
evaluated at the institutional and discipline level (Harman 1998, Wood and Meek 2002 and 
Chapter 1 above). Universities now face a more competitive research environment and stronger 
incentives to excel in research. The impact of these changes on research performance, however, 
depends on the extent to which universities actually respond to the new incentives, revise their 
internal procedures and organizational structures, and consequently change their research 
behavior. Burke and Minassians (2002), for example, conducted thorough research on 
performance-based (teaching) funding in the United States and concluded that, first of all, the 
policy had only a marginal effect on performance because the incentives were not reflected in 
organizational policies, and secondly, that most people in the organization were not even aware of 
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such incentives and consequently the policies had no effect on performance.   Internal policies in 
a university are thus a necessary link between the governmental research policy and actual 
research performance in the university. 
While research policies at the government level have received much attention in the 
academic literature, research management policies at the university level have not received 
equally thorough examination. Taylor (2006) discovered that university administrators in the US 
and UK often reject the notion that they ‘manage’ research, but nevertheless they have developed 
policies to steer research performance, either passively through market mechanisms or actively 
through direct control and support.  A recent OECD study conducted a thorough case study 
analysis on research management policies in eight selected universities from eight different 
countries (Connell 2004). The study found several common trends in research management 
practices. According to this study, universities establish research priorities and develop strategic 
plans, evaluate research performance both internally and externally, and have developed 
principles for ethical conduct of research. The case studies also revealed that research 
management has become more ‘professional’; i.e. universities appoint high-level academic and 
administrative staff responsible only for research, and universities nurture research careers in the 
institutions.  All these trends are characteristic of Australia as well. Universities in Australia 
created research leadership positions, developed strategic plans, and established ethical codes and 
intellectual property regulations.  Universities have also adopted other managerial tools, such as 
organizational benchmarking, performance-based funding, and internal performance assessment.  
While knowledge of general trends in research management practices is accumulating, 
evidence about the actual impact of these practices on research performance is still lacking.  
When universities are indeed “seeking ways to best manage research” (Connell 2004) it is the 
information on the effective practices, not merely the possible practices, that is crucial.  There is a 
lot of evidence from other sectors, both private and public, that management practices are often 
overenthusiastically adopted due to fad and fashion, or to ideology and belief (Staw and Epstein 
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2000).  In the light of recent calls for “evidence-based management” and “evidence-based policy” 
(Pfeffer and Sutton 2006; Heinrich 2007), empirical evidence on the effect of research 
management practices on performance is much needed.  This knowledge would be helpful not 
only in universities when designing appropriate management tools, but also for guiding national 
research policy.  Implementation of the national research policy goals at the university level is an 
important link in the chain from the national research policy to research performance. How 
research incentive structures and related policies influence or impact university-level research 
management practices can be an important contributor to policy outcomes. As Weimer and 
Vining (1999) point out, implementation research can make a significant contribution to policy 
design.  
This study aims to test the hypothesis that specific university level research management 
practices, adopted following the previously described Australian research policy reforms, 
contribute to better research performance in universities.  The effect of the practices on 
performance will be studied over the period of 1992-2003.  The paper makes several 
contributions to the literature on academic research management. First, it analyses the 
interrelationship of research management practices in universities and develops a systematic 
index of research management practices. Secondly it provides empirical evidence on the extent to 
which research management practices, jointly and individually, contribute to research 
performance.  
The study is structured as follows.  The next section will discuss the research 
management practices in Australian universities and the reasons for adopting the practices. 
Section 3 sketches theoretical arguments as to why we might expect such practices to improve 
research performance.  The following two sections discuss data and measurement issues and 
develop estimation models.  Section 6 presents the empirical results of the estimations and is 
followed by a discussion on the implications of the results and limitations of the study.  
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Background discussion  
The ways in which research is organized in Australian universities has been restructured 
in the last two decades. In early 1990s most universities revised their organizational structure and 
strengthened their research leadership. Universities established a new high-level administrative 
position that was entirely devoted to research, usually called Vice Chancellor (Research), if such 
a position did not exist before. Most universities also strengthened the role of the Dean in 
managing research in the academic units. As another important trend, inter-disciplinary research 
centers became a new locus for research activities, in parallel to traditional faculties and 
departments. In the experience of other countries, such organizational structure is an effective and 
flexible structure to facilitate and encourage research (Geiger 1990).   
Some research management practices are now uniformly adopted across the sector while 
others are implemented only in a few universities. Strategic planning has now become a regular 
management practice in all universities. With a stimulus from government, universities started to 
develop institution-wide research strategies already by the beginning of the 1990s. In later years 
the Research and Research Training Management Report, a report that describes present 
performance and future goals in research and post-graduate training, became a mandatory 
document and a starting point for budget negotiations with the government.  Research 
performance data has been collected in universities for more than ten years, ever since the 
government required universities to present data on publication numbers and on external grant 
funding. Universities have also specified their internal rules and regulations related to research – 
e.g. intellectual property rights and codes for ethical research conduct. These practices are 
common to all universities and were developed in a relatively early phase of the higher education 
reform.  
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Some other practices are less uniformly developed. In this study we will focus on these 
practices that are developed in universities to a different extent and therefore provide an 
opportunity for a systematic empirical analysis.  They include:  
 
- Regular school/faculty performance reviews; 
- Performance-based resource allocation; 
- Benchmarking; 
- Strategic priorities/concentration of research; 
- Research incentives for individual academic staff members;  
- Research training and support; 
- Upgrading staff qualifications.  
 
Before examining the practices in greater detail we should discuss the forces that 
triggered universities to advance their research management.  Institutional research management 
practices are first of all a reaction to a more aggressive research environment. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, research performance became significantly more important for universities’ financial 
health and sustainability. Performance based funding of universities and a competitive research 
grant system provides universities with incentives to improve their research performance. 
Government agencies also collect and publish data on research performance. This data is further 
distributed by several private actors in the form of university rankings that affect revenues from 
the student market.  Moreover, government has introduced several research review initiatives: e.g. 
the Australian Research Council reviewed research performance by disciplines, and the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (CTEC) instituted a series of disciplinary 
reviews of teaching and research. Differences in research performance between universities thus 
have become more visible. As a result of these government initiatives, universities now face 
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greater pressure to perform well and design organizational structures and practices that they 
believe will encourage and facilitate research.  
Managerial practices in Australian universities nevertheless are not entirely an 
autonomous reaction to new incentive structures. Government has prescribed in many ways how 
universities should manage their research.  Already one of the earliest Higher Education reform 
documents made explicit that the government expects a more ‘managerial’ approach to 
governance in universities (Dawkins 1987). Strategic planning became a common practice in 
Australian universities as a response to direct government action. The CTEC instituted a 
requirement that all universities must develop a research management plan, which in 1999 
became a mandatory document that had to be submitted to the government annually. The 
Committee for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (CQAHE) audited all universities in 1995 
and examined not only research outputs but also specific research management practices.  The 
audit reports for example specifically analyzed benchmarking, research concentration, and the use 
of performance indicators in universities.  Furthermore, universities that demonstrated good 
performance and sound practices in this audit were financially rewarded. Government policies 
thus directly pressured universities to strengthen their research management and to implement 
certain management practices.  
Such pressure from the Australian government is in line with more general trends in the 
public sector. The prevailing tendency of public governance in the 1980s was towards 
performance management (Moynihan and Pandey 2004). It was based on the belief that managers 
can significantly influence the performance of an organization and are expected to measurably 
improve organizational effectiveness. The central target of public governance was to develop 
effective practices that would then produce performance in an organization. This ‘managerial 
revolution’ in the public sector also entered universities in many countries (Amaral et al 2003).  
The practices that Australian universities adopted for research management are not unique to 
universities or to research. They are identical to new management practices in public agencies 
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more generally, as identified for example by Boyne (2003): they are related to leadership, 
performance oriented organizational culture, strategic planning, and human resource 
management.   
The third factor that shapes management practices in universities is related to mimetic 
tendencies. Management practices often spread not because of their clear effect, but because 
organizations imitate the practices of others (Pfeffer and Sutton 2006).  This is also the case with 
research management practices in Australia. Harman (1998) remarks that university practices 
were much more similar by the second round of the CQAHE audits in 1995, only two years after 
the first round, because universities studied the evaluations of other universities and adjusted their 
own teaching and research management practices. DiMaggio and Powell famously proposed the 
idea of mimetic forces that drive similarity across organizations (1983). Their argumentation well 
characterizes the Australian universities where a combination of coercive, mimetic and normative 
processes has contributed to developing specific practices.    
The forces that have driven research management practices in Australian universities are 
thus manifold. It is universities’ response to the new incentive structure, to ‘managerial’ 
expectations by the government, and to “peer pressure”. But all these forces are triggered by the 
belief that such practices promote research performance in universities.     
Theoretical perspectives  
The determinants of universities’ research performance have been repeatedly studied.  
Performance has been consistently linked to resources and input characteristics: staff 
qualification, age and seniority, the number of students per staff, and financial resources (Abbott 
and Doucouliagos 2004, Dundar and Lewis 1998, Ramsden 1999, Steven 2001).  The effect of 
organizational practices or managerial strategies on research performance is not studied in the 
context of universities production function, but many empirical studies offer valuable insights 
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into what environmental aspects characterize a productive research environment. A thorough 
literature review by Bland and Ruffin (1992) in the US context identifies the following 
characteristics at the research group level: clear goals that serve a coordinating function, research 
emphasis, distinctive culture, positive group climate, assertive participative governance, 
decentralized organization, frequent communications, accessible human resources, sufficient size, 
age and diversity of the research group, appropriate rewards, concentration on recruitment and 
selection, and leadership with research expertise and skills. 
The practices that will be examined in this study are quite different in their nature. They 
target different organizational levels:  schools and faculties, the organization overall, and 
individual academics. Their assumptions and mechanisms in terms of performance improvement 
are also different: incentives, rational planning, information, and facilitation. Theoretical 
understanding of research management practices and their effect on performance therefore must 
link different theoretical perspectives – from organizational sociology, economics, and 
management theories. A comprehensive theory of research management would be too ambitious a 
goal within the limits of this study. The discussion below only aims to clarify the main 
assumptions behind individual management practices and clarify the causal mechanism to 
potential performance improvement.   
An empirical rather than a theoretical orientation seems to be characteristic of studies that 
evaluate the effect of organizational practices on performance in the public sector. Boyne (2003: 
369) points out critically that “rigorous causal reasoning and integrated sets of precise 
propositions do not characterize the literature on organizational success in the public sector.” The 
focus of such research tends to be on empirical testing of whether practices affect performance. In 
recent years meta-analyses have emerged that try to aggregate the experience of individual 
practices and create a more comprehensive understanding of factors that affect organizational 
performance in the public sector (e.g. O’Toole and Meier 1999, Boyne 2003, Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2000). An empirical approach has its uses, keeping in mind however that management 
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practices are often proposed and implemented on the basis of simple assumptions and 
expectations about human nature and organizational behavior, not drawn from the complexity of 
organizational theory. Empirical studies test whether these practices have the expected effect and 
indirectly provide evidence on the validity of these assumptions. We will now discuss briefly the 
general assumptions associated with each of the seven research management practices, grouping 
them by the organizational level they target – faculties/schools, institutions as a whole, and 
individual academics. Some of the practices attempt to change the behavior of individual 
academics and thereby improve research performance at the institutional level; the others target 
more the organization as a whole, e.g. concentrating research on certain fields for maximum 
performance improvement, and do not aim at changing the behavior of individual researchers but 
at organizational policies in order to play out its strengths and comparative advantages. It is thus 
not only narrowly the productivity of individual academics that will aggregate for the 
performance at the institutional level, but also strategic choices that allow universities to, for 
example, concentrate on certain fields where the performance is the highest or to invest in those 
fields to improve the performance of the university as a whole.   
Faculty/school practices   
The practices that affect the level of faculties and schools are likely to be of key 
importance. Universities are known to have a unique organizational structure. Weick (1976) 
makes the well-known argument that universities are ‘loosely coupled systems’ – where sub-parts 
of the organization preserve their own identity and physical and logical separateness. Basic 
academic units – faculties and schools – are particularly crucial building blocks in universities. 
An academic unit is the organizational level where main professional values are shaped and 
transmitted (Trow 1976; Becher and Trowler 2001). Therefore any institutional practice or 
government policy that aims to affect research performance probably needs to interact at the level 
of faculties and schools. Burke and Minassians (2002) for example suggest that the reason why 
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performance-based funding to universities has had no effect on universities in the U.S. lies 
primarily in the failure to make these incentives known and tangible in the academic units.  
Regular school/faculty performance reviews focus attention on what each of the 
university’s research units has accomplished. Theorists advance quite different explanations for 
how regular performance reviews help management shape the behavior of others in the 
organization. One explanation focuses on the challenge that principals have in controlling their 
agents.  The attempts by the government to steer universities’ behavior are commonly explained 
within the framework of a principal-agent problem (Kivisto 2005, Liefner 2003, Ferris 1992).  
The public interests and the interests of universities are not necessarily aligned. Government 
cannot directly interfere with the everyday actions of a university, but it can provide rewards to 
universities in such a way as to align the interests. The principal-agent dilemma however is not 
limited to government-university relationships but extends as well to internal relationships within 
the university. The interests and incentives of the central administration of the university are not 
necessarily aligned with those of the academic units. A new incentive structure that government 
imposes on universities is not likely to be effective unless the incentives can be transmitted to 
lower level units. In most cases lower level units are better positioned to affect actual academic 
performance.  
Many universities have implemented regular formal faculty/school reviews. This is a 
thorough examination of performance outputs in research and teaching as well as an evaluation of 
resources and practices, usually every 4 or 5 years.  A more intense form of performance 
monitoring often accompanies these thorough reviews. Annual or biannual reviews of main 
quantifiable performance outputs are an increasingly common form of regular performance 
monitoring. The reviews are a direct reaction to the principal-agent problem. As Ingraham and 
Kneedler (2000: 238-9) point out, “After all, the central concern of the principal-agent theory is 
how principles can control the behavior of their agents.”  
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Performance review in itself does not improve performance, but some mechanism has to 
trigger performance improvement. Reviews and evaluations in universities are first of all a 
control mechanism and their purpose is to increase accountability in the academic units. 
Sanctions related to poor performance review are likely to encourage attention to performance. 
Also, performance improvement requires an adequate overview of present performance and 
information on weaknesses.  The mere existence of performance evaluation and performance 
indicators in particular may lead to higher achievement (Boyne and Chen 2006).  Behm (2003) 
sees the contribution of performance measurement, among other factors, in an organizational 
cultural aspect. Evaluations and performance measurement can be part of the rituals that tie 
people together, give them a sense of their individual and collective relevance, and motivate 
future efforts. Faculty reviews in Australian universities may thus improve the performance for a 
combination of reasons: the evaluation may provide information that is needed for performance 
improvement, it may encourage more effort in the fear of financial or moral sanctions, or it may 
help to consolidate academic staff for performance improvement.  
Performance-based money allocation is another reaction to the principal-agent type 
problem. Government uses a performance-based formula when allocating research funds to 
universities. This formula considers publication outputs, external funding, and doctoral degrees. 
Some universities have adopted a similar formula also for their internal money allocation from 
the central budget to schools and faculties. Some universities consider research performance in 
internal resource allocation but have not developed a clear formula for resource allocation, and 
the rest base internal money allocation primarily on the student load or other input related criteria. 
The arguments for performance-based funding are twofold. First, it is a mechanism that channels 
funds to the most productive units, and secondly, it provides direct financial incentives for 
academic units to improve their performance. This is thus the purest form of aligning the interests 
of the university and of the academic unit as conceptualized in the principal-agent framework. 
Internal performance-based money allocation is therefore expected to increase research 
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performance because it motivates faculties to increase their research output and it channels 
resources to where most output can be achieved. 
Institutional level practices 
The two institutional-level practices that we will examine are benchmarking and research 
concentration. The practices are quite different in nature but they both have to do with 
institutional level strategic decision-making. They are management tools that are expected to 
improve performance in a university.   
Benchmarking is a management tool associated with the Total Quality Management 
approach, in the context of both private and public organizations (Yasin 2002). In a 
benchmarking exercise organizations compare their performance outcomes and processes to the 
best practice in their sector.   To some extent all Australian universities compare their 
performance data with those of their competitors because performance data are made easily 
available by the government. However, benchmarking is a more systematic exercise than merely 
comparing outputs. Benchmarking is defined as “analyzing performance, practices, and processes 
within and between organizations and industries, to obtain information for self-improvement” 
(Alsete 1995:20). The extent to which Australian universities are engaged in such activities varies 
greatly.  
The Commonwealth government has strongly encouraged Australian universities to 
develop benchmarking practices. The government also initiated and funded the development of a 
detailed benchmarking manual for Australian universities (McKinnon et al 2000), which is a 
well-known and widely used source in universities.  By now universities with similar 
backgrounds have cooperated in sharing information that can be effectively compared. For 
example, the Group of 8 (i.e. research intensive universities) has made arrangements to exchange 
data that could be used for benchmarking exercises, and a similar initiative has been developed in 
universities with a technical profile. The extent to which the comparisons are systematic, examine 
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not only outputs but also processes, and are considered in the management system, varies across 
the sector.  In the time period that is analyzed in this study only a few universities had a mature 
benchmarking system: i.e. had identified important performance indicators, selected local and 
international peer institutions and compared the performance of each discipline with these peers.    
On the other hand, benchmarking has become a more common practice in universities over the 
years. 
The mechanism from benchmarking to improved research performance in universities is 
somewhat like a “black box”.  The hypothesis that benchmarking exercise improves performance 
in universities, as assumed by the government, is based on the idea that knowledge about “best 
practices” in the field would necessarily lead to more knowledge-based governance, reflection on 
one’s own performance, organizational learning, adjustment of organizational practices, and 
consequently to better management. Better management would then lead to better research 
performance. Benchmarking can also be seen as another accountability mechanism. When an 
institution benchmarks the research output of each faculty with respect to local or international 
competitors, then the mechanism functions as another monitoring mechanism for individual 
faculties.   
The causal link between benchmarking and actual university-level research performance 
remains here intentionally generic. Instead of trying to deconstruct how benchmarking affects 
performance – for example through adjustments in human resource policies, governance 
structures, or research management practices –, benchmarking is taken as a factor of its own. 
Universities may for example consider adjusting internal resource allocation, research 
infrastructure, internal research policies, division between teaching and research – all of which 
may affect research productivity in the institutions. A generic benchmarking measure tests the 
hypothesis that benchmarking as a management practice helps universities to identify the weakest 
aspects in organizational management or performance, whatever that might be in any given 
university, and address these weaknesses effectively.   
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Concentration of research activities in certain disciplines or study areas is another 
institutional-level policy that is expected to improve research performance. The government has 
encouraged universities to identify their areas of strength and concentrate resources to these areas, 
especially in the more recent documents.  Universities have developed the concentration to a 
varying degree. Some universities have clearly identified their research priorities and prioritize 
these areas when allocating resources or hiring new staff. Other universities have identified areas 
of strength but do not provide any additional resources or preferential treatment. Some 
universities use research centers as a bottom-up selection mechanism for research priorities. 
These universities have not chosen directly strategic fields but they have identified criteria when 
research groups qualify for an institutionally supported research center. These research centers 
then enjoy some preferential treatment.   
The assumptions as to why strategic research concentration would improve research 
performance in a university are twofold. First, concentration would allow universities to 
strengthen their competitive advantage, focus investments, create critical mass and high quality 
research infrastructure, and thereby improve performance in selected fields. The improvement in 
the selected fields would raise the overall performance of the university. Secondly, concentration 
would mean that scarce resources are used in areas of high performance - and thus give the 
highest return - and would be shifted away from weaker areas. A university would thus specialize 
and thereby increase its efficiency and performance.   
Research concentration is one aspect in strategic planning in universities.  It requires a 
decision from the university leaders about what fields would be strategically wise to concentrate. 
Strategic planning in general terms started to develop in Australian universities in the early phase 
of the reform at the end of 1980s and the practice has developed since then (Anderson et al 1997).  
By now all universities have a strategic plan and more detailed objectives are specified in 
operational plans. There is considerable evidence of the positive relationships between planning 
and performance in private firms (Miller and Cardinal 1994), but the relationship between 
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planning and public organizations is less clear (Boyne 2001). Strategic planning is likely to face 
particular complications in the academic sector.  Universities have a unique, fragmented nature 
where identities, loyalties and norms are often more linked to the faculty and disciplines than to 
the institution as a whole (Trow 1976). This is likely to complicate the strategic planning 
approach that often requires trade-offs between different academic units in the interest of the 
organization as a whole. Such decisions would be in conflict with the traditional collegial 
decision-making system in the academic sector, which is based on consensus and consideration of 
the interests of all. The collegial management style was explicitly criticized as ineffective by the 
Commonwealth government at the beginning of the reform cycle (Dawkins 1987).     
Research concentration would increase university level research performance if indeed 
specialization and “critical mass” in universities have positive benefits; it would have no effect if 
it could not be carried out, even when stated, because of organizational obstacles or if 
specialization would only shift resources away from other fields without a relatively bigger 
impact on the preference fields (i.e. that the losses for secondary fields would exceed the gains of 
priority fields); or it may have a negative effect if there are scope effects in universities where the 
balance of disciplines actually promotes performance.  
Human resource management 
Human resource practices are perhaps the most studied element of organizational 
management in the context of performance. The practices are widely studied in the private sectors 
and in most studies reveal a positive effect on performance (Huselid 1995, Black & Lynch 2001, 
etc.). Human resource practices differ in their approach toward how to achieve performance 
improvement. Legge  (1995) distinguishes hard and soft styles of Human Resource Management 
(HRM). The hard style of HRM sees staff as instruments that can be manipulated for better 
performance. This approach focuses on such practices as performance-pay, job security and other 
performance incentives. The soft style management concentrates more on personnel satisfaction, 
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needs, and motivation as a contributor to performance.   Human resource practices in Australian 
universities include both components.   
Individual incentives that reward research productivity have become more common in 
Australian universities. Universities have strengthened individual level accountability and 
monitoring measures in various ways. Regular staff appraisal, unknown 20 years ago, is 
becoming a widespread practice. Some universities have created direct incentives such as 
performance-based pay for individual academics or adjustments in teaching-load depending on 
research productivity.  Individual incentive practices are motivated again by the principle-agent 
logic. The practices assume that without external motivators researchers are not interested in 
maximizing their research output. Therefore agents’ activities must be either monitored (through 
performance monitoring) or encouraged with direct incentives (like salary benefits or adjustments 
in teaching load). The extent to which academics are responsive to external incentives is an 
intriguing issue.  Indirectly all academic staff now has incentives to perform well in research, as 
research excellence ensures prestige, recognition and opportunities for career mobility. There are 
thus strong incentives in place via career benefits. Moreover, in the academic profession the 
reason for choosing the profession may be more intrinsic (interest and enjoyment of research) and 
external incentives such as salary bonus may not really affect the actual incentive structure of 
researchers. Kreps (1997) moreover suggests that in the case of professions with strong intrinsic 
motivation extrinsic incentives may actually harm the motivation.  
Support structure that facilitates research activities may be an equally or even more 
effective way of encouraging research performance than external incentives. Many efforts in 
Australian universities in the area of HRM focus on support and staff development. Mentoring of 
early-career researchers, providing workshops on grant and publication activities, offering 
methodological help, providing near-miss grants and other funding opportunities – all these 
efforts create an environment that enables academic staff to become more productive.  
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Upgrading staff qualifications is another HRM measure that is likely to improve research 
productivity at the individual level. Lack of academic staff with adequate research qualifications 
was a significant problem in Australian universities, especially in early years. As a result of the 
unification of the higher education system, many universities lacked qualified research staff due 
to the fact that staff in former CAEs rarely had research training. Upgrading Staff Qualifications 
was an official government program in early 1990s. The program provided opportunities for 
academic staff, especially in the former CAE sector, to complete their PhD training. Universities’ 
commitment to the program varies however, especially since the completion of the unification. 
Universities that take this upgrading seriously have developed policies of time release and 
incentive schemes for the degree completion. This scheme is likely to increase research 
performance because not only does it provide necessary research qualifications but it also 
strengthens research culture within the organization. It may be the case that the measure has a 
more of a significant time lag than other measures.  
There are thus three human resource practices that will be analyzed in this paper: 
incentives (staff appraisal and performance rewards), support structure (workshops, mentoring, 
certain funding mechanisms), and upgrading research qualifications.  
The study will thus test the assumption that the seven research management practices 
have a positive effect on research performance. The next section will provide more clarity on how 
the practices are measured and made operational, and how the practices relate to each other.  
Research management practices: measurement and index  
The study estimates the effect of research management practices on research 
performance. The dependent variable is thus research output, which will be measured as the 
number of publications and citations in a university. The justification of the measures, their 
limitations and data sources, were discussed in Chapter 3.  The chapter also described the nature, 
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sources and descriptive statistics of control variables.  The measure of research management 
practices requires a more detailed discussion in this section.   
Data source for management practices 
Tracking management practices retroactively over a 15-year period could be a difficult 
task but Australian universities have gone through several cycles of institutional audits that record 
not only their performance but also their organizational practices. These audits provide 
comparable information on universities that is verified by external evaluators. We will use audit 
reports from two audit cycles: that conducted in 1995 by the CQAHE (Committee for Quality 
Assurance in Higher Education), and the one carried out in 2002-2007 by the AUQA (Australian 
Universities Quality Agency).  
The tradition of institutional audits goes back to early 1990s.  In 1991 the Minister of 
Employment, Education and Training announced a quality assurance program (Higher Education 
Quality and Diversity in the 1990’s) and subsequently established a Committee for Quality 
Assurance in Higher Education as a non-statutory ministerial advisory committee. The quality 
assurance program arguably was implemented primarily for political reasons. The Minister 
needed to demonstrate his commitment to assuring quality in the higher education sector in order 
to negotiate from the cabinet additional funding for the sector (Harman 1998).  The quality 
assurance program had a unique structure. It invited universities to participate in a regular review 
of their quality improvement policies and their research and teaching outcomes. Participation in 
the review process was voluntary for universities. Since participation was linked to additional 
funding, all universities chose to participate.  The program was also unique because it evaluated 
institutions rather than individual disciplines. The committee believed that such a holistic 
approach had the advantage of “involving much of the university in a process of self-analysis on a 
regular basis” and of evaluating “policy and commitment to the future rather than a ‘snapshot’ of 
current activities” (CQAHE 1995). As a result of the program, universities had an evaluation 
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round every year. In 1993 all aspects of universities’ activities were evaluated, while the 1994 
audit concentrated on teaching, and the 1995 audit focused on research, research training and 
community service.  
The 1995 audit cycle provides systematical information on internal research policies and 
is a good source for this study. The Committee and its team evaluated universities’ research 
activities and placed universities into three groups sorted by their research processes, research 
outcomes, and research improvement. All universities received a score for each of the 
components, which were then aggregated into an overall score. Based on the overall score the 
government awarded a financial bonus to universities. For the purpose of this study, the overall 
score is however too broad a measure. The score includes not only policies that support research 
productivity but also policies on doctoral training and community development.   Fortunately the 
narrative review reports provide detailed information on universities’ research management 
practices.   The individual reports are almost identical in their structure and comparable in depth. 
Guidelines of the audit exercise (CQAHE 1995) specified a list of organizational instruments that 
were under special attention – e.g. concentration of research, the use of performance indicators, 
benchmarking, and staff development – which enforces consistency in the evaluation reports.    
After the 1995 audit round the program was terminated because of high administrative 
costs. Instead of the regular external audits, all institutions were now required to present a quality 
assurance and improvement plans to the Ministry.  These plans are publicly available (see 
DETYA 1999), but their quality and format varies too much for a valid cross-institutional 
comparison. In 2000, the DEST established Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA) 
with one of its tasks being to conduct periodic quality audits in universities. The first universities 
were audited in 2002 and by 2007 all comprehensive universities had gone through the audit 
cycle. These audit reports are broader than the ones from 1995 because in addition to research 
they also evaluate teaching, community service, human resource management, governance and 
other factors. Therefore research management practices are often not discussed as fully as in the 
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1995 reports. Moreover, some practices that were examined in the 1995 report were ignored in 
the later report because they had become common and expected (e.g. internal performance-based 
money allocation). In order to avoid the bias against the later time period, an additional source 
was consulted. As part of the 1999 Knowledge and Innovation reforms   (Kemp 1999) in 
universities are now required to develop and submit a Research and Research Training 
Management Reports (RRTMP) to the DEST. These reports provide detailed information on 
internal research policies and help to fill the gaps that the audit reports may have had. In this 
study RRTMPs are used only to verify whether information in the audit reports is complete. Since 
RRTMPs are used in the funding negotiations with the government, they have a strong 
promotional character and are not always neutral and objective. Nevertheless, factual information, 
such as, for example, the internal mechanism for money allocation, is probably trustworthy in this 
source.    
Operationalization of research management practices 
The audit reports provide descriptive details on research management practices in 
universities but the information is in a narrative form and needs to be made operational for a 
quantitative analysis in this study. First each university’s audit reports of the 1995 and 2002/7 
audit cycle were collected and then the reports were analyzed with respect to the seven major 
clusters of research management practices identified earlier. Each university achieved a score 
from 0 to 2 for each of the seven policies, based on a scoring rubric (Table 5-1). A score zero 
indicates the absence of the practice or very weakly developed practice; the score two means that 
the practice is fully developed and functioning. The score one indicates that the practice has been 
applied and developed to a limited extent. In the later period practices had become more nuanced 
and on some occasions half-units were used to accurately capture differences between 
universities.  
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As seen from the rubric, the emphasis is on the functional presence of certain practices, 
not the evaluation team’s judgment of universities’ management practices. This is to avoid 
potential problems, such as different audit teams having different expectations that lead to 
assessments that are not comparable, or evaluation teams being subject to a ‘halo effect’ that 
inclines them to give higher scores to well-known universities.  The evaluation of the audit team 
is considered only when a practice is formally present but has not really been implemented and is 
functioning by the judgment of the evaluation team.   The nature of the data does not permit a 
more rigorous scale development for each management practice.   
Descriptive statistics (Table 5-2) show significant variance in management practices 
across universities.  It is also evident that on average all management practices were more 
developed in 2002/7 compared to 1995. The only exception to this rule is the practice that 
upgrades staff qualifications. This is an expected result since improvement of staff qualifications 
is strongly associated with the problems of the structural unification of the system. In the early 
1990s some universities were lacking qualified staff and had a very low share of academic staff 
with doctoral degrees. While most universities developed some policies in this area, including the 
highly performing universities that were often merged with former colleges, the importance of 
this activity faded with time. Although all practices are more developed in the second period there 
is still considerable variance across universities. All scores vary between 0 and 2 in the second 
period, with the exception of research concentration that is consistently above 1 in the second 
period. This probably reflects the strong pressure from government on universities to develop 
research concentration plans, even if these plans are not fully implemented.  
The correlations between the same research management practices in the first and the 
second period is not very high, varying between  0.009 and 0.497. Low correlation coefficients 
suggest that practices in the later period were not heavily influenced by earlier choices of 
universities. Universities that did not implement practices early on were capable to catch up 
easily in the later period. While correlation coefficients tend to be low, they are still all positive.   
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The correlations between individual management practices show some interesting 
patterns and mostly the patterns are consistent in the two periods. In general, correlations between 
management practices are not very high. Upgrading staff qualifications has a consistent negative 
correlation with other management practices. Upgrading staff qualifications is a priority in 
universities with lower research performance and these universities either do not have the 
resources, capacity, or do not see the need to develop other practices as soon, and focus on staff 
qualifications.  In the early period, performance-based budgeting has the strongest correlation 
with other practices and the correlation is mostly positive. The only exception is the staff 
upgrading, which has a strong negative correlation. This seems to suggest that performance-based 
funding is a fairly advanced management practice that is in place if other practices are in place. 
The relationship is much stronger in the first period than in the second period. Concentration is 
another management that shows some minor negative correlation with other practices. It may 
suggest that it is a strategy that focuses attention on certain fields, not on management practices in 
the institution as a whole.  Interestingly the correlation between the same practices in two time 
periods is not very high, indicating that management practices have been quite volatile.  
Research management index 
 The effect of the seven research management practices could be studied either 
individually or as an aggregated system of practices. Both approaches have their advantages. A 
technical problem of the management practices is that they are not independent. Some 
universities have been more active in developing the practices or developing them faster, and this 
initiative is reflected in most practices. The correlations between practices are not very high but 
clearly present (Table 5-2). This interdependence points to the weakness of studying only one or a 
few practices. A study that focuses only on one practice would attribute an effect on the single 
practice, ignoring that the specific practice is likely to me associated with other research 
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management practices. A statistical estimate for the individual practice would be thus biased 
upward. 
The practices could be included simultaneously in a study which would alleviate the bias. 
Alternatively the practices can be aggregated. This would lead not only to a more parsimonious 
model, but may also provide with more informative and conceptually more accurate results. An 
index implies that it is the single system of practices that is a strategic asset to the organization 
and drives performance (Becker and Huselid 1998). There may be multiple ways how universities 
can design their management practices. For example, a strong emphasis on one or two practices 
would have the same effect as more modest attention to a range of policies. An aggregated index 
would thus test the hypothesis that “more is better”.   The primary focus of this study is the extent 
to which universities with active research management practices demonstrate better performance 
and the aggregated approach is well suited for this purpose. In addition, an index has also a 
technical advantage. It makes the scale of research practices closer to an interval scale while 
individual practices are measured on an ordinal scale from 0 to 2 where a unit change in a score is 
arbitrary.  
 An aggregate measure of university’s research management system may be therefore 
conceptually more accurate. We would assume that it is a system of management practices that 
drives performance.  Such measure can be constructed in two different ways – either by a simple 
aggregation of individual practices (e.g. Koch and McGrath 1996 for sub-grouping HRM 
practices) or by a factor analysis (e.g. Huselid 1995).  Empirical literature on research 
management practices is basically absent and therefore cannot provide the assurance that it is 
theoretically appropriate to focus on a single comprehensive measure of research management 
system by aggregating individual scores. Therefore we have to depend on exploratory data 
analysis to verify the reliability of such uni-dimensional scale. Factor analysis may indicate for 
example that the practices represent more than one distinct dimension of the management system 
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and an arbitrary combination of multiple dimensions into one measure would create unnecessary 
reliability problems.   
Potentially universities can choose multiple strategies and adopt different sets of 
performance policies. The correlation table (Table 5-2) gives some preliminary insights on how 
the policies are interrelated, but a formal factor analysis can give a more systematic 
understanding for constructing an index. Considering the smallness of the sample size, the results 
should be taken as suggestive rather than definitive.  In order to discover the underlying factor 
structure associated with these practices, and not hypothesizing an underlying latent variable, the 
exploratory factor analysis using principal component extraction is used without rotation. The 
factor solutions are presented in Table 5-3.  
Policies are separately analyzed for the two periods. Two factors emerged in the first 
period and three in the second period when keeping the factors that have eigenvalue greater than 
one.   There is some difference in the structure of the practices in the two periods but the overall 
pattern is quite consistent. In the first period, most practices load unambiguously on the first 
factor, even though the loadings are not always very high. The exception is research 
concentration, which seems to be an independent dimension and constitutes the second factor.  
Benchmarking loads both to the first and the second factor, although with a negative sign on 
Factor 2. Upgrading staff qualification is a part of the first factor, but with a negative sign. In the 
second period again most management practices load on the first factor, except concentration, and 
upgrading staff qualifications. In general, loadings in the second period are much higher, 
suggesting that universities have become more segregated in terms of their management 
practices. The second period confirms the patterns of the first period. Research concentration and 
upgrading staff qualifications forms an independent dimension.  
To generalize from these results for the two time periods, five practices can be considered 
as one dimension of research management system: faculty reviews, performance based funding, 
benchmarking, incentives, and research support structure. The concentration of research seems to 
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be an independent dimension in research policies and should be treated separately. Upgrading 
qualifications is a somewhat problematic practice. It belongs to the aggregate scale of research 
management in 1995, but with a negative sign. In 2002/7 it loads to all factors, but most strongly 
comprises a factor on its own. Moreover, the qualifications upgrading is expected to loose its 
explanatory power when the model will explicitly include staff qualifications as a control 
variable, which presumably will mediate the effect. We will therefore treat this practice also 
separately.  In sum, the index of management practices consists in simple aggregation of the 
scores of the five management practices. The concentration and upgrading staff qualifications are 
both treated separately.  
The index used here is thus a simple aggregation of scores, not a scale that is based on 
factor loadings. The logic of using such aggregated score comes from a conceptual meaning of 
the index. The aggregated index is meant to test the hypothesis that more (and more intensive) 
research practices improve universities’ research performance. A scale that is based on factor 
loadings would have a different conceptual meaning. It would assume an unobserved 
commitment by the university to research management that expresses itself through various 
research management practices. The practices that have higher factor loadings would thus be 
better predictors of the unobserved commitment. With a measure like this we would be exploring 
the effect of such unobserved commitment on performance, not the effect of the practices itself.  
This is however not what is being assumed in this paper, but the scale measure is nevertheless 
used to check the robustness of the results.   
Time period  
We will combine the data of management practices from two points in time with annual 
data of research outputs and control measures over a 10 year period. It is reasonable to assume 
that policies do not change on yearly basis and their effect also evolves over years. The year 1995 
is the first point for the ‘snapshot’ of the research management practices in universities and 
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represents well the situation in early and mid 1990s. The 1993 audit described a somewhat 
chaotic era when universities were reacting to major policy changes but the 1995 audits give a 
clearer picture of what practices the organization had implemented and whether they were 
functioning.  The performance data that will be linked with the 1995 management ‘snapshot’ goes 
back to 1992. Organizational policies cannot have a retrospective effect on outcomes but it is 
reasonable to assume that policies – internal performance based funding, for example – take time 
before they are fully implemented and effectively functioning and must have been around in the 
institution for years. Also the planning phase itself – e.g. designing formula for internal resource 
allocation – is likely to trigger a response from subunits before the formal implementation of the 
policy. On the other hand, policies are not changing drastically from year to year and their effect 
can be expected to last also for the subsequent years. The 2002-2007 audit reports represent a 
more mature phase of universities’ policies. The effect of 2002-2007 policies also goes back to 
previous years, assuming that there is some consistency in policies.  The analysis is therefore 
separated into two time-periods, plus/minus three years from the point of measurement: 1992-
1998 and 1999-2002. The year 1999 is a valid break point also because of an important change in 
research policy. Among other reforms universities were obliged to submit Research and Research 
Training Management Report (RRTMR) to the Ministry where they must report not only on their 
performance but also on concentration and internal research management. The reports indirectly 
forced universities to revise their internal practices (Wood and Meek 2002) and thus it is more 
likely that universities changed their practices around this time.  The second period ends with 
2002 as the data series stops there.  
Models 
In order to study the effect of research management practices on research productivity we 
will augment the commonly used research productivity function with the measure(s) of research 
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management practices.  Research production function is usually an adaptation of a firm’s 
production function where a firm’s output is a function of its capital and labor inputs. The basic 
function can be further augmented to allow differences in technology or organizational practices 
(e.g. human resource management in Black and Lynch 2001). Research output can be approached 
in a similar way. Research output is a function of capital, such as research funding and 
infrastructure, and of quantity and quality of labor (e.g. Adams and Clemmons 2006, Johnes 
1988, Abbott and Doucouliagos 2004). The contribution of this study is to expand the commonly 
used production function and include also research management practices among the 
determinants of research productivity.   
 The dependent variable in this study is labor productivity in a university, i.e. the number 
of publications per academic staff member. The study hypothesizes that productivity is a function 
of research management practices, either in the form of the aggregated management index or 
individual policies. Productivity is influenced also by other characteristics as demonstrated by 
earlier research (see Chapter 2).  Academic staff characteristics influence productivity, such as 
the position and age of staff, research qualifications (measured with the share of staff with PhD 
degrees), and division between research and teaching functions. Research productivity is 
influenced by alternative time commitments, most importantly teaching load. The number of 
students per staff member is a measure of alternative time commitments that constrain research 
and publishing. Different disciplines have demonstrated different publishing practices. A dummy 
variable for universities that have a Medical School is expected to capture some of the 
disciplinary mix in universities that may affect research productivity.  
Including research capital in a labor productivity model is more controversial. Research 
funding is a widely used measure of research capital (Adams and Clemmons 2006, Abbott and 
Doucouliagos 2004). Research requires financial resources and research funding is important for 
research performance. The problem of including research funding in the productivity model is the 
direction of this relationship and causality between research output and financial resources.  The 
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main source of research funding is either competitive research grants or the performance based 
element in the operational grant. These funds are clearly dependent on research productivity. 
Research funds and research productivity are so closely related that research funding has often 
been used as a measure of research productivity (e.g.  Koshal and Koshal 1999). We will 
therefore omit research funding from the list of control variables.  Omitting research funding may 
be also conceptually more accurate.  Research funding is probably a mediating variable: i.e. well 
performing universities are successful in attracting research funding which then leads to good 
research output. If research funding is a mediator between university inputs/characteristics and 
performance then controlling the model for research funding would bias the estimates downward. 
The effect of management practices would not capture the entire effect of positive practices on 
research productivity, but only the effect on publishing activity with fixed research funding.  
However, research income is a widely used output measure because it has many advantages over 
bibliometric measures, such as reflecting the quantity and quality of ongoing research instead of 
completed research and  being based on rigorous peer evaluation, etc (see Chapter 3).   
In the literature on organizational performance, it is not uncommon to make inferences 
about the effectiveness of organizational practices based on the positive association between 
outputs and practices in a cross-sectional format (Koch and McGrath 1996, Huselid 1995, etc). 
The first estimation model is thus a pooled OLS model. 
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where y  is natural logarithm of the number of publications per academic staff members in the 
university; x signifies k control variables, and z signifies  management practices. Since we have 
the measurement of management practices from the two points in time, we will estimate Model 1 
also for two time-periods – 1992-1998 and 1999-2002 period. This is a reasonable compromise 
between having a sufficiently large number of years to obtain potential fixed effects and few 
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enough to assume that the management practices as measured in the one-time period is a valid 
generalization for the period as a whole. This division into two periods also gives a better insight 
to potentially different effects of management practices in different stages of policy reforms and 
organizational reforms.   
A pooled OLS is likely to have two problems in this particular case. First, the identified 
control variables are not likely to capture the variance in research productivity in an unbiased 
way. There is likely to be unobserved heterogeneity in the sample, causing a significant omitted 
variable bias in an OLS estimation of research productivity in Australian universities. While 
variables like staff composition may indicate to a significant effect on research productivity, it 
may be rather a certain type of university (with a strong research culture) that influences both the 
staff composition as well as research productivity. In a cross-sectional format, the coefficient of 
the staff composition would be consequently biased upward. Using panel data will alleviate the 
problem.  
With a fixed effect model we can control for the time-invariant omitted component and 
correct the coefficients. While fixed effects are likely to be a more accurate form for capturing the 
true effect of control variables, information on management practices, which is collected only 
from two time-points and is not fully time-variant, cannot be included directly. Conceptually it 
should not be a problem because practices tend to change slowly and need time to be 
implemented and to have an effect. Technically it is a problem though because the potential effect 
of management practices would be entangled in the time-invariant university specific component. 
Therefore a three-step Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) procedure is used, as 
described in Plümper and Troeger (2007). In the first step, a fixed effect model is run for 
obtaining unit effects. In the second step, the unit effects are decomposed into two parts: a part 
explained by time-invariant variables and the unexplained part (i.e. the residual). In the third step, 
the model is reestimated by pooled OLS, including time-variant variables, time-invariant 
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variables, and the error term in stage 2 (which counts for unexplained unit effect).  The estimation 
model is in the following form:  
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where ity  is natural logarithm of the number of publications per academic staff members in the 
university i and time period t; x signifies k time-variant control variables, z signifies time in-
variant management practices; u is time-invariant unit effect, and ε is random error. The 
estimation will be run for two time-periods separately. 
This three step procedure does not solve all the problems. The heterogeneity bias is a 
serious concern in performance models like this. A positive relationship between performance 
and practices does not mean necessarily the positive effect of such practices. Productive firms 
may have more resources and capacity to develop better human resource policies, for example, 
and the positive effect between human resource policies and performance is perhaps not causal. 
Universities are probably not equally likely to develop and adopt research management practices. 
It is likely that universities that have strong research performance and research culture have the 
capacity and motivation to develop such practices. A positive relationship between performance 
and management practices may actually indicate a reverse causality, from performance to 
management practices. It is therefore likely that the unexplained variance and the management 
practices are both still triggered by a common, unexplained variable. One solution to this problem 
is to examine the growth in research productivity, not the absolute productivity. Last 
chapterdeveloped a model for growth in research productivity. The model assumed that the rate 
of growth is the function of the distance between the actual level of research performance and the 
capacity limit as determined by the input quantity and quality measures. The input measures were 
identical to the control variables identified above. In this paper we will add the research 
management practices to the growth model. We will assume that effective management practices 
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raise the capacity limit and have thus a positive effect on the growth rate. The model would thus 
take the following form: 
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,    (Model 3)  
 
where ity  captures the logarithm of the growth rate in publication numbers, 1it
y  is research 
productivity in the previous year, and the other parameters are the same as above. Previous 
chapter demonstrated no significant clustering and omitted variable bias across the universities 
over time and therefore the model will be estimated with the OLS. 
The growth model alleviates the problem of selection bias, but there may be 
heterogeneity bias also in growth rates. The heterogeneity bias can be tested in this study because 
the policy data is available for two time periods, for the year 1995 and 2002-7. Policies can thus 
be treated also as time-variant measures. This permits us to analyze the effect of change in 
management practices to change in research productivity. The last model will thus be a full fixed 
effect model with time variant research management policies:   
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where t signifies the year 1995 or 2002.  
Huselid and Becker (1996) compare cross-sectional and panel method in studying the 
link between human resource policies and performance. They conclude that while traditional 
cross sectional estimates may be biased upwards due to the heterogeneity bias, panel estimates 
exacerbate the effect of the measurement error in management practices and bias the estimates 
downward. Therefore the results of both Model 1 and Model 3 should be analyzed and compared.  
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Results  
We will now analyze separately the results of the Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 
4 applied on publication numbers. After this analysis the results of a series of sensitivity analyses 
will be presented to check the robustness of the results to the choice of the dependent variable or 
the construction of the management index. The models will be thus rerun with citation numbers 
and research income as alternative measures of research performance and with a normalized scale 
based on factor loadings as an alternative index of management practices.   
Pooled OLS model 
The pooled OLS model (Model 1) demonstrates quite high explanatory power for both 
time periods, R-square being 0.87 and 0.92 respectively (Table 5-4).  All the control variables 
have an expected effect on research performance: PhD share and staff seniority have a positive 
effect, age has a positive but declining effect, students per staff have a negative (later period) or 
insignificant (earlier period) effect, and the medical school has a positive effect. The staff with 
only teaching responsibilities has a negative effect in the earlier period, but positive effect in the 
later period.  
Research management practices seem to have a somewhat different effect in the early and 
later period. RMI is not statistically significant in the early period. In the later period, RMI has a 
significant positive effect and one unit increase in the index improves research performance by 
2.2 per cent. In terms of individual practices, benchmarking and individual research incentives are 
associated with lower research performance in the earlier period, in the later period individual 
incentives keep the negative association but benchmarking and performance based budgeting 
have a significant positive association.   
The pooled OLS model is likely to suffer from an omitted variable bias and the effect of 
control variables in particular is likely to be overestimated in this model. Universities that have 
strong research focus are likely to be different in terms of their general profile. This profile may 
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also have an effect on the age structure, teaching load and other identified control variables. In 
this case the empirical effects of these variables that we observe may not reflect an actual causal 
link between the variables and research performance. An attempt to change one of those 
characteristics that the model identifies as significant would be futile because the effect may be 
entirely due to structural differences between universities. Not only the control variables are 
likely to be biased, but also the relationship between management practices and performance is 
likely to be not causal but due to the unobserved university profile.  The next model addresses the 
problem of the potential bias. 
 Fixed effect vector decomposition   
The results for the FEVD model (Model 2) are presented in Table 5-5. While the effects 
of the control variables are still to a large extent as expected, the size of the effects is in most 
cases smaller than in the OLS model. This indicates that indeed some of the effects are strongly 
associated with the differences between universities. The coefficients in the later period are quite 
expected: staff qualifications have a positive effect, the number of students and teaching-only 
staff have a negative effect, age has a positive but diminishing effect, but the proportion of senior 
staff seems to have no effect. The earlier period shows somewhat different results: again staff 
qualifications have a positive effect and teaching-only staff negative effect, but age has a negative 
but diminishing effect and most surprisingly the number of students has a positive effect.  
The latter is likely to reflect the simultaneous increase in student numbers and research 
performance over the period, and the variance in research performance is not entirely captured by 
other control variables. When comparing the results to the pooled OLS models, then the 
difference in results indicates some omitted variable bias.  In the fixed effect model, PhD share is 
in the same range, but staff seniority is not as important, teaching only staff has a clear negative 
effect, age has a much smaller effect. This means that many of those variables in the pooled OLS 
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model explained more of the differences between universities that are carried by some underlying 
characteristic of the university.   
The results of the FEVD model show that research management practices are clearly 
associated with the fixed effects. RMI is statistically significant and positive for both periods 
(Column 1 and 3). The effect is higher in the earlier period than in the second period. One point 
increase in the index raises research productivity by 9.1 per cent in the early period, compared to 
the 2.8 per cent in the later period.  This is likely to indicate that in the early years research 
management practices were more developed in universities with higher research orientation.  
When we analyze research management practices individually we see quite diverse 
effects. Three practices that have consistently positive effects are faculty reviews, benchmarking, 
and performance based funding.  A negative association between staff qualifications and research 
performance confirms the expectation that this practice was implemented in universities with 
lower research performance. Concentration has a minor or non-significant negative effect in both 
periods.  Interestingly individual incentives have a negative effect and the effect even seems to 
intensify in the second period. Support structures have a positive effect in early years but not in 
later years. This is an interesting result, suggesting that perhaps lower performing universities 
needed such kind of incentives and support more explicitly. Better performing universities had 
high research expectations to everybody which were implemented through recruitment and 
promotion and no external incentives or support were needed. A bolder interpretation would 
suggest that extrinsic incentives may be in conflict with internal incentives and eventually worsen 
research performance, in lines with Kreps (1997).    
 In general, management practices have thus a positive correlation with the time-invariant 
unit-effects in the research performance model. This suggests either that management practices 
indeed contribute to research productivity but considering that management practices started to 
develop rapidly only in early 1990s this may be a sign of heterogeneity bias, i.e. that practices are 
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more developed in universities with higher research capacity that is not entirely captured by the 
control variables.  
Growth model  
The third specification (Model 3) provides a further check on whether the positive effect 
of management practices is associated with the heterogeneity bias or whether we can be more 
confident in the causal link between management practices and performance. Instead of linking 
research management policies with research performance we examine whether universities with 
more developed research management policies grew faster over the years. Table 5-6 presents 
estimation results for the Model 3 where the growth rate rather than the performance itself is the 
dependent variable.  
The effects of the control variables are consistent to those in the previous chapter and 
were there discussed in detail. The effect on management practices is different in the earlier and 
in the later period. In the later period, RMI has a positive although a small effect. Increasing the 
index score by one unit would increase the log growth rate by 0.008, which is roughly 10 per cent 
of the standard deviation. In the earlier period the management practices do not have a significant 
effect on productivity improvement. The result may be indicating that productivity improvement 
in the earlier period is fast and driven by changes in the quantity and quality of resources. The 
effect of management practices is minor in this stage of development. In the later stage the 
productivity improvement is much slower, nuanced and organizational policies may start to 
matter.  
 When analyzing the effect of individual policies on research output the results call for 
some caution. In the later period performance budgeting and faculty reviews are statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent confidence level. Individual level incentives seem to have a negative 
effect and so does the concentration policy.  The worrisome issue about these results is the way 
they compare to the results of the earlier period. The results of the earlier period are exactly 
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opposite to the later period: individual level incentives have positive effect, faculty reviews 
negative, and concentration positive. It is conceivable that policies have different effect in 
different stages of development. Personal incentives may be an effective tool to introduce 
performance culture in the beginning of the reform cycle, but such incentives loose their effect in 
the later stage and may even hinder performance due to the loss of intrinsic motivation. Similar 
argument could be made for concentration or even faculty review. Considering how clearly the 
effects are opposite to each other in these two periods, it is hard to give up the suspicion that there 
may be also some heterogeneity bias in the growth rates. There may be systematic unexplained 
variance in growth rates that is correlated with the choice of management practices. The final, 
fully time-variant model should provide more light into this.  
Full panel model  
Model 4 is the most complete model because it targets heterogeneity bias directly. Since 
we have panel data also for policies we can see how the change in research management policies 
affects change in research productivity. The results are presented for an OLS, random effect and 
fixed effect model for comparison (Table 5-7). The model has quite high explanatory power, 
above 80 per cent of the variance explained. According to the Hausman test (F[35,29)=4.95 and 
p<0.001) the fixed effect estimates are the most accurate estimates, although coefficients are quite 
stable across all three specifications.   
According to the full panel model, research management practices are important for 
research performance. RMI has a significant positive effect – at around 3.3 per cent increase per 
one unit increase in the index. Individual practices are mostly statistically insignificant. 
Upgrading staff qualifications is most consistently and not surprisingly negative. The only other 
individual policy that has a small but significant effect is regular faculty reviews. Such modest 
results may be influenced also by technical problems. First of all, the full panel dataset is very 
small which may hide systematic effects. Secondly, as mentioned above, fixed effect model 
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exacerbates measurement errors and is likely to bias coefficients downwards. OLS and random 
effect models reveal similarly low associations though.  
 Sensitivity analyses   
In order to check the robustness of the results with respect to the choice of the dependent 
variable we will rerun the tests with the number of citations and research income as a dependent 
variable. Secondly, in order to test the sensitivity of the results to the construct of the 
management practices we will run the test also with a management practices scale that is based on 
factor loadings. 
 Citations 
One problem when using publication numbers as a measure of research output is the 
tradeoff between the quantity and the quality of research. The concerns have been articulated that 
the publication numbers are inflated because of the enormous pressure to publish.  The model 
with citation numbers has in general a somewhat lower explanatory power (Table 5-9). It may 
refer to the fact that citations are less predictable by these explanatory variables. But the lower 
explanatory power may be influenced also by the fact that citation numbers are noisier because 
they are not real but year-adjusted.  
The results using citation numbers are quite consistent with those applied to the number 
of publications.  The control variables are quite expected, and even more so than with publication 
numbers. Student numbers have a consistent negative effect, suggesting that while publication 
years over years increased rapidly, the citation numbers did not quite follow the same trend.  
Teaching only staff has again positive effect in the later period, indicating that perhaps separation 
of teaching and research staff may be efficient for high quality research. RMI does not pass the 
threshold for a two-tailed significance test in the early period, but does so in later years in Model 
1. FEVD model indicates that there is a very strong correlation between time-invariant university 
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fixed effect and RMI: stronger than in the case of publication numbers and slightly stronger in the 
early period than in later period. In terms of growth, RMI has again positive effect on growth in 
the later period but not in the earlier period. In the difference model again RMI has a positive 
effect. While in the case of publications one unit increase in RMI increases publication 
productivity by 2.8-3.3 per cent, a similar change increases citation numbers by 6.6 per cent.   
In general, citation numbers give a similar picture and confirm the results of the 
publication numbers.   
Competitive research funding  
Competitive research funding is another measure that is often used to reflect research 
performance. The dependent variable is a deflated per capita research funding. While publication 
and citation numbers show relatively similar results, research income gives a somewhat different 
picture (Table 5-10). In the OLS model, RMI is associated with better performance in the earlier 
period, but not in the later period – exactly opposite to the publication results. In the FEVD 
model, the fixed effect and RMI are also correlated in the earlier years but not in the later years.   
Relationship between practices and growth in research funding is non-existent and the model as a 
whole has a very low explanatory power. Difference-in-difference model confirms the effect of 
RMI on research funding.   
Research management scale  
Using the research management scale (RM scale) that is based on factor loadings rather 
than a simple aggregated index does not change significantly the results. In the OLS model, the 
RM scale has a positive effect in the later period, but not in the earlier period; it is positively 
related to the fixed effect; and it explains growth in the later period but not in the earlier period. 
All these results are identical to using aggregated index and show that the results presented above 
are not sensitive to the specifics of aggregating management practices.   
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Discussion 
Research management practices have developed significantly in Australian universities 
over the last two decades. In this paper we identified seven main practices that target different 
organizational levels: institution, faculty, and academic staff.  As demonstrated by the factor 
analysis, most of the practices form one dimension in the larger management system and can be 
most effectively analyzed together. Two practices: concentration of research and upgrading the 
research capacity of academic staff  are not part of this dimension.  
The empirical analysis confirms that Australian universities have been able to improve 
their research performance in last two decades, which to a large extent can be associated with 
changes in inputs. Changes in staff qualifications, age structure, teaching load and teaching-
research nexus significantly affect research performance. The analysis also demonstrates that not 
only the quantity and quality of inputs affects productivity but also research management in a 
university matters. Research management practices indeed have a positive effect on research 
productivity. Research management index, which aggregates institutional, school and individual 
level practices, is consistently positive and the result is robust to different model specifications. 
Universities with higher research management index demonstrate higher performance and their 
research productivity improves faster.   
The effect of research management on performance seems to vary in different stages of 
the reform. In the early period (1992-1998) research management index has a strong association 
with the performance, but its effect on performance improvement is low. On the contrary in the 
later period (1999-2003) the association between practices and performances is lower but 
practices seem to have a bigger effect on productivity improvement. This evidence indicates that 
universities with high research performance are probably more apt to implement advanced 
research management practices and do it fast. This advantage and learning curve is probably 
equalizing over time. Although the association between performance and management is partly 
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due to the heterogeneity bias there is still evidence that universities with better management 
improve their research performance faster. This is true for the later period when universities are in 
a more stable and systematic phase of development, while in the earlier phase the growth rate is 
likely to be more chaotic and a function of major structural changes in the higher education 
system. We also saw that even when we control for the original status of research management 
practices, universities that developed management system also improved their performance.  
Research management practices thus matter. The effects are not large but consistent in a more 
stable stage in research environment. 
When analyzing individual practices then some interesting patterns emerge. First of all, 
we saw that research concentration is a practice that stands alone from other management 
practices. There is also no evidence that universities with clear research concentration strategies 
have actually significantly improved their research performance and the coefficient for the 
concentration is more often negative. There may be multiple reasons for this. It may be that the 
benefits of such concentration reveal itself only after many years and therefore do not reflect in 
the results. It may be the case that universities with such strategy indeed suffer from a temporary 
backlash because the funding and other support has been retrieved from many other units and 
invested into new units, which do not produce benefits yet. It may be the case that universities 
presently suffer from the concentration of resources, which may or may not be overcome in the 
long run.   
Interestingly the most consistently positive effect is related to the faculty level practices. 
Faculty performance reviews and performance based funding has a positive effect in most 
models. This result suggests that perhaps faculty level pressure for research productivity is the 
most effective form of research management. This confirms the hypothesis that academic units 
are a crucial organizational level for individual identity and socialization. Moreover, academic 
units are usually responsible for recruiting, promoting and rewarding its academic staff. The 
academic unit therefore is not only closer to individual academics but has more instruments to 
129 
affect academic staff. The faculty/department level may be therefore a more effective 
organizational level to be targeted by management practices and more so than the institutional 
(i.e. university as a whole) or even the individual level. Even though institutions strengthen their 
central role and develop their institutional identity, practices that influence the identities and 
incentives of faculties and schools still seem to keep their importance.   
Individual level research practices demonstrate most inconsistent effects. Especially 
individual level incentives have either a negative or an insignificant effect. Research support 
structures are in most cases statistically insignificant. Why individual level incentives and support 
structures do not have a desired effect is an intriguing issue. One of the important components in 
the incentive structure is the annual performance appraisal. According to the evaluation reports, 
the staff was in general very satisfied with this procedure which was seen as supportive and 
helped to clarify goals and expectations. The other elements included financial rewards, 
recognition, teaching load adjustments. It may be the case that academics have a strong internal 
motivation and the external motivators do not add significantly to performance. It may be also 
related to some heterogeneity bias. It is likely that universities where staff is less research-
oriented and has lower internal motivation are inclined towards such external incentive 
mechanisms. Finally, it may also be the case that these practices are more ambiguous, their 
measurement is not as precise and therefore their effect is underestimated.  
 Limitations  
While the analysis provides some interesting insights on the potential effect of research 
management practices on research performance, the study is constrained by certain assumptions, 
technical limitations and the nature of the data.  
One of the limitations is the nature of the time period that is studied in the paper that may 
significantly affect the reliability of the results. The 1990s was a turbulent era on the Australian 
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higher education landscape and everything was in transformation – national policies, institutional 
governance and practices, the structure of the system, employee relationships etc. Since 
everything changes at the same time and all the changes are interrelated then it is often difficult to 
decompose what affects what and what changes are only coincidental. Most of the changes have 
been only in one direction – the number of publications increased, staff qualifications improved, 
and student numbers went up. The very small sample size that is limited by the number of 
universities in the country makes the problem also more severe from a technical standpoint.  
The time-period may be a problem also for measuring management practices. In the 1995 
cycle all universities are measured in the same year. In the later audit cycle universities were 
evaluated over a five year period – between 2002 and 2007. While in general research 
management practices do not change quickly, practices may develop significantly over a 5-year 
period. Universities that were evaluated later may therefore score higher with respect to 
management practices. There is no clear pattern in when universities were evaluated that could 
systematically bias the results. The problem may however introduce more random noise in the 
data.  
As discussed above, when practices are interrelated, as they often are, then focusing on 
one policy without controlling for others necessarily biases the estimates. Therefore in this study 
we tried to identify all major management practices that showed some variance across time and 
between universities and could explain the variance in research performance between universities. 
The set of practices however only includes practices that are regulated at the university level. 
Some universities may have chosen a different strategy and delegate the decision-making on 
research management to the faculty and school level. As an illustration, Maquarie university 
keeps all research funding at the institutional level and allocates directly to individuals and 
research groups as competitive grants and other support mechanisms while University of New 
England allocates research funding to faculties who then handle most of the financial support 
(like research startups, support for preparing grant applications, etc) (AUQA audit report). This 
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choice may be partly explained by the size of the university, but it may also be a deliberately 
chosen management strategy in a particular university. The research question in this study is 
about institutional level practices, but if university level and faculty level practices are 
supplements of each other then the  results may be again biased. The problem is probably not 
very severe. In many occasions universities delegate the implementation of some practices to 
schools (like staff appraisal), but since it is required at the central level, it is still considered as an 
institutional level policy in this study. Moreover the problem may occur to a limited extent only 
to the practices that target individual academics, but not the other instruments (such as  
performance-based funding, faculty reviews, and concentration, with the exception of 
benchmarking that could be conceivably implemented only at a school level.) This may be 
however partly a reason why individual level policies showed very weak and inconsistent results 
in the analysis. If information could be collected on faculty level practices then a multi-level 
analysis would provide most precise picture on the effect of all different practices. 
We assumed in this study that all universities react to these practices in a similar way. 
The competition among Australian universities on equal grounds is interestingly leading to the 
realization that universities are different and perhaps should be treated differently by the 
government. Perhaps they should be also differently governed and managed – depending on their 
size, mission, and organizational structure. Perhaps some universities would gain more from a 
support structure and the others from incentives. This needs further exploration in future studies. 
The number of universities in the dataset sets a limit on tools that can be used for analyzing the 
effect of organizational practices on performance. Even some of the analysis above should be 
taken as suggestive rather than conclusive due to the limit. Larger dataset would not only make 
the results more reliable, but it would allow analyzing the bundles of practices and potential 
synergies between policies.  
In spite of the limitations, the study provided some insights on the extent to which 
research management practices matter for research productivity. Heterogeneity bias is a serious 
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threat in such studies – that organizations with better performance are also more likely to adopt 
advanced management practices. In order to alleviate the problem we used three different models 
that address the same question from a different angle. Comparing the results from the different 
models gives a more nuanced picture about the relationship between research management 
practices  and research productivity.  
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TABLES 
Table 5-1: Rubric for scoring organizational research management practices 
  0  1 2  
Faculty/school level practices  
       
Regular faculty and 
department reviews 
 
 
None   Regular review of faculties 
in a 5 year or longer 
interval. Review of 
research centers. 
Regular review of 
faculties and/or 
departments.  
 
 
Performance based 
budgeting 
 None  Adjustments to budgets are 
based on performance, but 
no clear formula.  
A clear proportion of the 
operational funds is based 
on research performance. 
 
 
 
Institutional level policies       
       
Concentration of research  None   Designated priorities and 
criteria for choosing areas 
of strength but no clear 
preferential treatment OR 
Channeling research 
funding through centers 
Clearly identified 
research priorities;   
priorities are supported 
with research funding  
and infrastructure 
allocations 
 
Benchmarking  None OR performance 
data is collected but 
not compared with 
other institutions 
 Performance data is 
regularly collected and 
analyzed, performance 
indicators clearly identified 
and some comparison with  
other  institutions.  
Peer institutions 
identified both locally 
and internationally for 
each discipline 
 
Individual level policies       
       
Upgrading research 
qualifications  
 Non-existent or 
minimal effort to 
support PhD degrees 
among staff  
 
 
 
Policies like time release.  A systematic effort to 
increase the proportion of 
staff with PhD degrees 
 
Developing research skills  Grants for early career 
researchers; ARC 
small research grants 
 
 
 
Workshops on grants and 
publications  
(plus previous)  
Active feedback 
mechanism, internal 
evaluation, seed grants, 
near miss grants, research 
skill seminars, 
methodological help etc 
(plus previous)  
 
Individual research 
incentives 
 None  Informal performance 
targets and research 
expectations; opportunities 
for study leave and reduced 
teaching load 
Regular appraisal of 
academic staff,  funding 
based on individual 
performance, teaching 
load reduction, awards 
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Table 5-3. Factor structure of research management practices, 1995 and 2002/7 
 1995 2002/7 
Management 
practice Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Faculty performance 
reviews 0.3533 0.1097 0.6957 -0.1347 -0.2639 
Performance based 
budgeting 0.5274 0.0945 0.6776 0.3779 0.0835 
Benchmarking 0.3614 -0.4571* 0.7178 0.1992 -0.015 
Concentration 0.0514 0.8152 0.0937 -0.4691 0.7842 
Individual incentives 0.396 0.2597 0.6525 0.4009 0.2517 
Support structure 0.2329 -0.1892 0.5698 -0.4011 0.2553 
Upgrading 
qualifications -0.5026* 0.0479 -0.4865 0.6051 0.5044 
Alpha 0.60 (1.0) 0.69 (1.0) (1.0) 
Eigenvalue 2.41 1.16 2.45 1.10 1.07 
Proportion of 
variance accounted 
for  
34.5 16.6 35.06 15.8 15.3 
Note: The highest loadings in bold. * Omitted from the scale (and from Cronbach alpha calculation).   
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Table 5-4 The effect of research management practices on research performance, pooled OLS 
 1992-1998 1999-2003 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
 Coef St. err Coef St. err Coef St. err Coef St. err 
Management  
practices 
        
RMI -.009 .010   0.022*** 0.008   
Faculty performance 
reviews   -.031 .027   0.007 0.026 
Performance based 
budgeting   .050 .034   0.097** 0.027 
Benchmarking   -.108*** .037   0.085*** 0.035 
Concentration .013 .024 -.021 .026 -0.006 0.037 0.021 0.037 
Individual 
incentives   -.050* .027   -0.079** 0.034 
Support structure   .041 .031   -0.035 0.030 
Upgrading 
qualifications .0001 .031 .034 .037 0.078** 0.037 0.043 0.040 
Control  
variables                 
PhD  .037*** .002 0.041*** 0.003 0.024*** 0.002 0.022*** 0.002 
Age 11.14*** 2.36 10.344*** 2.382 11.251*** 1.454 8.237*** 1.561 
Age-sq -1.04*** .219 -0.969*** 0.220 -1.009*** 0.125 -0.745*** 0.135 
Senior staff .023*** .008 0.024*** 0.008 0.035*** 0.005 0.035*** 0.005 
Student/staff -.006 .006 -0.001 0.006 -0.021*** 0.004 -0.026*** 0.004 
Teaching only -.009*** .002 -0.009*** 0.002 0.006** 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Med School  .375*** .057 0.394*** 0.057 0.383*** 0.050 0.298*** 0.053 
Constant -32.701 6.410 -30.909 6.438 -33.682 4.205 -24.826 4.534 
Adj. R-sq .893  0.897  0.918  0.925  
N 250  250  180  180  
Note: Dependent variable: (ln) per capita publications. *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 5-5  The effect of management practices on research performance, FEVD  
 1992-1998 1999-2003 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
 Coef St. err Coef St err Coef St. err Coef St err 
Management 
practices         
RMI 0.091*** 0.007   0.028*** 0.004   
Faculty 
performance 
reviews 
  0.147 0.017   0.029** 0.014 
Performance 
based 
budgeting 
  0.034* 0.018   0.157*** 0.014 
Benchmarking   0.096*** 0.022   0.090*** 0.018 
Concentration 0.000 0.013 -0.009*** 0.014 0.000 0.018 -0.003 0.019 
Individual 
incentives   -0.051*** 0.015   -0.144*** 0.018 
Support    0.094*** 0.017   -0.037** 0.016 
Upgrading 
qualifications 0.000 0.017 -0.188*** 0.022 0.000 0.018 -0.084*** 0.022 
Control  
variables 
        
PhD  0.028*** 0.001 0.028*** 0.001 0.029*** 0.001 0.029*** 0.001 
Age -4.817*** 1.380 -4.817*** 1.422 2.801*** 0.805 2.801*** 0.858 
Age-sq 0.543*** 0.130 0.543*** 0.134 -0.220*** 0.070 -0.220*** 0.075 
Senior staff -0.008* 0.005 -0.008* 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
Student/staff 0.023*** 0.003 0.023*** 0.003 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 
Teaching only -0.004*** 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.006*** 0.001 -0.006*** 0.001 
Med School 0.881*** 0.036 0.799*** 0.035 0.520*** 0.026 0.422*** 0.028 
Constant 6.958* 3.67 7.278* 3.797 -11.021*** 2.296 -10.926*** 2.470 
Eta 1.000** 0.038 1.000** 0.040 1.000*** 0.0348 1.000 0.046 
Adj. R-sq 0.971  0.970  0.979  0.979  
N 250  250  180  180  
Note: Dependent variable: (ln) per capita publications. *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 5-6 The effect of management practices on growth in research performance, OLS  
 1992-1998 1999-2003 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
 Coef St. err Coef St err Coef St. err Coef St err 
Management 
practices         
RMI -0.002 0.002   0.008* 0.004   
Incentives   0.012* 0.006   -0.057*** 0.016 
Support    -0.003 0.009   0.020 0.012 
Upgrading 
qualify. 0.006 0.008 0.015 0.010 -0.015 0.019 -0.019 0.019 
Faculty reviews   -0.017*** 0.007   0.019* 0.011 
Concentration 0.017** 0.008 0.016* 0.009 -0.030** 0.014 -0.034** 0.014 
Benchmarking   -0.010 0.008   0.014 0.015 
Performance 
budgeting   0.004 0.010   0.042*** 0.014 
Control 
variables         
ln pc public -0.168**** 0.027 -0.169*** 0.028 -0.039*** -5.520 -0.239*** 0.038 
PhD 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Age 2.725*** 0.682 2.439*** 0.710 2.331*** 0.766 1.393* 0.716 
Age-sq -0.260*** 0.064 -0.235*** 0.067 -0.220*** 0.068 -0.139** 0.063 
Senior staff 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004* 0.002 0.004 0.002 
Students 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.011*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 
Teaching only 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Med School 0.073*** 0.014 0.068*** 0.015 0.019 0.025 -0.013 0.024 
 Constant -7.509*** 1.856 -6.733*** 1.931 -6.163*** 2.224 -3.317 2.073 
R-sq 0.44  0.45  0.387  0.46  
N 250  250  180  180  
 Note: Dependent variable: (ln) growth in per capita publication numbers. *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
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Table 5-7 The effect of research management index on research performance, 1995 and 2002, OLS, RE and FE.  
 OLS RE FE 
 Coef Robust St error Coef St. err   Coef  St. err 
Management 
practices       
RMI  0.028* 0.017 0.032** 0.015 0.033** 0.018 
Concentration       
Upgrading 
qualifications       
Control variables       
PhD 0.033*** 0.004 0.037*** 0.004 0.042*** 0.006 
Age 8.836*** 3.129 7.389*** 2.755 7.021** 3.313 
Age-sq -0.776*** 0.276 -0.644*** 0.242 -0.615** 0.289 
Senior staff 0.021* 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.007 0.018 
Students -0.013 0.009 -0.007 0.008 -0.002 0.013 
Teaching only -0.006* 0.004 -0.007** 0.003 -0.008** 0.003 
Med school 0.401*** 0.110 0.386*** 0.125 (dropped)  
Constant -27.867*** 8.837 -24.068*** 7.769 -23.052** 9.356 
R-sq  0.867      
within   0.8714  0.8769  
between   0.8813  0.8268  
overall   0.8778  0.8351  
rho   0.529  0.745  
N 72  72/36  72/36  
Note: Dependent variable: (ln) per capita publications. *** p<.01; **p<.05, *p<.10. 
 
  
 
140 
T
ab
le
 5
-8
 T
he
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ra
ct
ic
es
 (n
or
m
al
iz
ed
 sc
al
e)
 o
n 
re
se
ar
ch
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 (M
od
el
 1
-4
), 
19
92
-2
00
3 
 
 
19
92
-1
99
8 
19
99
-2
00
3 
 
 
 
M
od
el
 1
 
M
od
el
 2
 
M
od
el
 3
 
M
od
el
 1
 
M
od
el
 2
 
M
od
el
 3
 
M
od
el
 4
 
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
 e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
 e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
M
Sc
al
e 
-0
.0
19
 
0.
01
7 
0.
15
9*
**
 
0.
01
1 
-0
.0
03
 
0.
00
5 
0.
03
5*
* 
0.
01
4 
0.
04
9*
**
 
0.
00
7 
0.
01
2*
 
0.
00
7 
0.
05
0*
 
0.
02
9 
C
on
tro
l 
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ln
 p
c 
pu
bl
ic
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.1
67
**
* 
0.
02
8 
 
 
 
 
-0
.2
14
**
* 
0.
03
8 
 
 
Ph
D
  
0.
03
7*
**
 
0.
00
2 
0.
02
8*
**
 
0.
00
1 
0.
00
3*
**
 
0.
00
1 
0.
02
3*
**
 
0.
00
2 
0.
02
9*
**
 
0.
00
1 
0.
00
2 
0.
00
1 
0.
03
3*
**
 
0.
00
3 
A
ge
 
11
.2
01
**
* 
2.
35
5 
-4
.8
17
**
* 
1.
37
4 
2.
72
7*
**
 
0.
69
5 
10
.8
24
**
* 
1.
43
3 
2.
80
1*
**
 
0.
77
6 
2.
20
1*
**
 
0.
74
0 
8.
81
2*
**
 
2.
90
3 
A
ge
-s
q 
-1
.0
49
**
* 
0.
21
8 
0.
54
3*
**
 
0.
12
9 
-0
.2
60
**
* 
0.
06
5 
-0
.9
70
**
* 
0.
12
3 
-0
.2
20
**
* 
0.
06
8 
-0
.2
09
**
* 
0.
06
5 
-0
.7
74
**
* 
0.
25
6 
Se
ni
or
 st
af
f 
0.
02
4*
**
 
0.
00
8 
-0
.0
08
* 
0.
00
5 
0.
00
5 
0.
00
3 
0.
03
2*
**
 
0.
00
4 
0.
00
2 
0.
00
2 
0.
00
7*
**
 
0.
00
2 
0.
02
2 
0.
01
6 
St
ud
en
t/s
ta
ff
 
-0
.0
06
 
0.
00
6 
0.
02
3*
**
 
0.
00
3 
0.
00
1 
0.
00
2 
-0
.0
22
**
* 
0.
00
4 
-0
.0
13
**
* 
0.
00
2 
-0
.0
10
**
* 
0.
00
2 
-0
.0
13
 
0.
01
4 
Te
ac
hi
ng
 o
nl
y 
-0
.0
10
**
* 
0.
00
2 
-0
.0
04
**
* 
0.
00
1 
0.
00
0 
0.
00
1 
0.
00
5*
* 
0.
00
2 
-0
.0
06
**
* 
0.
00
1 
0.
00
1 
0.
00
1 
-0
.0
06
 
0.
00
6 
M
ed
 S
ch
oo
l 
0.
37
1*
**
 
0.
05
6 
0.
87
3*
**
 
0.
03
5 
0.
06
6*
**
 
0.
01
5 
0.
36
9*
**
 
0.
04
9 
0.
51
9*
**
 
0.
02
5 
0.
03
1 
0.
02
5 
0.
39
8*
**
 
0.
06
7 
C
on
st
an
t 
-3
2.
85
9*
**
 
6.
37
8 
7.
40
9*
* 
3.
66
9 
-7
.4
69
 
1.
90
3 
-3
2.
31
5*
**
 
4.
15
1 
-1
0.
88
7 
2.
21
6 
-5
.8
60
**
* 
2.
14
5 
-2
7.
64
3*
**
 
8.
02
3 
 e
ta
 
 
 
1.
00
0*
**
 
0.
03
8 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
0*
**
 
0.
04
2 
 
 
 
 
 R
-s
q 
0.
89
3 
 
0.
97
1 
 
0.
42
9 
 
 
 
0.
98
0 
 
0.
36
8 
 
0.
88
2 
 
N
ot
e:
 D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 (l
n)
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 p
ub
lic
at
io
n 
nu
m
be
rs
. *
**
 p
<.
01
; *
*p
<.
05
, *
p<
.1
0.
 
  
 
141 
T
ab
le
 5
-9
 T
he
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ra
ct
ic
es
 o
n 
ci
ta
tio
n 
nu
m
be
rs
  (
M
od
el
 1
-4
), 
19
92
-2
00
3 
 
 
19
92
-1
99
8 
19
99
-2
00
3 
 
 
 
M
od
el
 1
 
M
od
el
 2
 
M
od
el
 3
 
M
od
el
 1
 
M
od
el
 2
 
M
od
el
 3
 
M
od
el
 4
 
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
 e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
 e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
M
I 
0.
02
3 
0.
01
8 
0.
17
3*
**
 
0.
01
0 
-0
.0
02
 
0.
00
4 
0.
05
4*
* 
0.
02
1 
0.
11
3*
**
 
0.
01
1 
0.
02
4*
* 
0.
00
9 
0.
06
6*
* 
0.
02
8 
C
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
0.
07
1*
 
0.
04
2 
0.
00
0 
0.
02
1 
0.
01
6 
0.
01
1 
0.
08
6 
0.
09
4 
0.
00
0 
0.
04
6 
-0
.0
37
 
0.
04
8 
 
 
Q
ua
lif
ic
at
io
n 
0.
03
6 
0.
05
3 
0.
00
0 
0.
02
7 
-0
.0
16
 
0.
01
6 
-0
.0
94
 
0.
09
3 
0.
00
0 
0.
04
6 
-0
.0
41
 
0.
03
4 
 
 
C
on
tro
l  
va
ria
bl
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ln
 p
c 
ci
ta
tio
ns
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.1
13
**
* 
0.
02
3 
 
 
 
 
0.
04
0 
-0
.1
70
 
 
 
Ph
D
  
0.
02
9*
**
 
0.
00
4 
0.
02
4*
**
 
0.
00
2 
0.
00
0 
0.
00
1 
0.
02
6*
**
 
0.
00
4 
0.
00
6*
* 
0.
00
2 
-0
.0
02
 
0.
00
2 
0.
03
4*
**
 
0.
00
7 
A
ge
 
13
.6
46
**
* 
3.
95
0 
-1
1.
02
4*
**
 
2.
16
6 
1.
80
2 
1.
01
2 
10
.8
79
**
*  
3.
69
7 
-4
.9
08
**
 
1.
94
4 
-2
.4
76
 
1.
62
1 
8.
48
1 
7.
42
4 
A
ge
-s
q 
-1
.2
93
**
* 
0.
36
6 
1.
14
0*
**
 
0.
20
3 
-0
.1
71
* 
0.
09
5 
-1
.0
04
**
* 
0.
31
7 
0.
44
7*
**
 
0.
16
8 
0.
20
9 
0.
14
3 
-0
.7
62
 
0.
66
9 
Se
ni
or
 st
af
f 
0.
03
8*
**
 
0.
01
4 
-0
.0
20
**
* 
0.
00
7 
0.
00
5 
0.
00
4 
0.
03
3*
* 
0.
01
3 
-0
.0
50
**
* 
0.
00
7 
-0
.0
02
 
0.
00
6 
0.
00
3 
0.
02
7 
St
ud
en
t/s
ta
ff
 
-0
.0
28
**
* 
0.
00
9 
0.
02
0*
**
 
0.
00
5 
-0
.0
02
 
0.
00
3 
-0
.0
51
**
* 
0.
00
9 
-0
.0
30
**
* 
0.
00
5 
-0
.0
11
**
* 
0.
00
4 
-0
.0
46
**
 
0.
02
3 
Te
ac
hi
ng
 o
nl
y 
-0
.0
22
**
* 
0.
00
3 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
0.
00
1 
-0
.0
01
 
0.
00
1 
0.
01
2*
* 
0.
00
6 
-0
.0
12
**
* 
0.
00
3 
0.
00
2 
0.
00
3 
-0
.0
16
 
0.
01
1 
M
ed
 S
ch
oo
l 
0.
52
9*
**
 
0.
09
5 
1.
16
3*
**
 
0.
05
3 
0.
07
8*
**
 
0.
02
2 
0.
07
0 
0.
12
8 
0.
71
8*
**
 
0.
06
9 
-0
.2
15
**
* 
0.
06
3 
0.
17
2 
0.
15
8 
C
on
st
an
t 
-3
5.
94
1*
**
 
10
.6
95
 
25
.6
13
**
* 
5.
78
9 
-4
.4
98
* 
2.
70
4 
- 29
.0
80
**
* 
10
.6
93
 
15
.5
73
**
* 
5.
60
8 
7.
61
7*
 
4.
53
6 
-2
3.
06
9 
20
.4
77
 
et
a 
 
 
1.
00
0*
**
 
0.
03
6 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
0*
**
 
0.
04
2 
 
 
  
  
 R
-s
q 
0.
81
5 
 
0.
95
3 
 
0.
28
1 
 
0.
72
1 
 
.9
32
 
 
0.
17
0 
 
0.
73
3 
 
N
ot
e:
 D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 (l
n)
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 c
ita
tio
n 
nu
m
be
rs
. *
**
 p
<.
01
; *
*p
<.
05
, *
p<
.1
0.
 
  
 
142 
T
ab
le
 5
-1
0 
T
he
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ra
ct
ic
es
 o
n 
re
se
ar
ch
 in
co
m
e,
 M
od
el
 1
-4
 
 
19
92
-1
99
8 
19
99
-2
00
3 
 
 
 
M
od
el
 1
 
 
M
od
el
 2
 
 
M
od
el
 3
 
 
M
od
el
 1
 
 
M
od
el
 2
 
 
M
od
el
 3
  
 
M
od
el
 4
 
 
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
 e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
 e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
C
oe
f 
St
. e
rr
 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
M
I 
0.
05
4*
**
 
0.
01
6 
0.
09
7*
**
 
0.
01
0 
0.
00
6 
0.
00
8 
-0
.0
03
 
0.
01
3 
0.
00
6 
0.
00
6 
0.
01
1 
0.
00
7 
0.
05
1*
 
0.
02
8 
C
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
0.
10
3*
**
 
0.
03
6 
0.
15
7*
* 
0.
02
2 
0.
03
9*
* 
0.
01
9 
-0
.0
68
 
0.
05
8 
-0
.1
00
**
* 
0.
02
8 
-0
.0
15
 
0.
02
6 
0.
14
9*
 
0.
08
2 
Q
ua
lif
ic
at
io
ns
 
0.
01
6 
0.
04
6 
-0
.0
12
**
 
0.
02
8 
-0
.0
05
 
0.
02
1 
-0
.0
82
 
0.
05
7 
-0
.2
11
**
* 
0.
02
8 
-0
.0
10
 
0.
03
3 
-0
.1
32
 
0.
09
6 
C
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ln
 re
se
ar
ch
 
in
co
m
e 
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.2
60
**
* 
0.
04
7 
 
 
 
 
-0
.1
53
**
 
0.
06
7 
 
 
Ph
D
  
0.
02
7*
**
 
0.
00
3 
0.
03
9*
**
 
0.
00
2 
0.
00
5*
 
0.
00
3 
0.
01
8*
**
 
0.
00
3 
0.
03
3*
**
 
0.
00
1 
0.
00
0 
0.
00
2 
0.
02
8*
**
 
0.
00
6 
A
ge
 
12
.3
73
**
* 
3.
43
8 
-7
.0
24
**
* 
2.
24
7 
2.
32
5 
1.
77
6 
7.
64
2*
**
 
2.
28
4 
3.
11
5*
**
 
1.
10
8 
1.
95
7*
 
0.
99
4 
2.
32
8 
4.
63
8 
A
ge
-s
q 
-1
.1
83
**
* 
0.
31
9 
0.
70
2*
**
 
0.
21
0 
-0
.2
20
 
0.
16
7 
-0
.6
91
**
* 
0.
19
6 
-0
.2
29
**
 
0.
09
6 
-0
.1
81
**
 
0.
08
7 
-0
.2
13
 
0.
40
9 
Se
ni
or
 st
af
f 
0.
06
4*
**
 
0.
01
3 
0.
01
5*
 
0.
00
8 
0.
01
3*
 
0.
00
8 
0.
02
9*
**
 
0.
00
8 
-0
.0
13
**
* 
0.
00
4 
-0
.0
04
 
0.
00
5 
0.
01
1 
0.
01
8 
St
ud
en
t/s
ta
ff
 
-0
.0
34
**
* 
0.
00
8 
0.
01
0*
 
0.
00
5 
-0
.0
02
 
0.
00
5 
-0
.0
30
**
* 
0.
00
6 
0.
00
5 
0.
00
3 
-0
.0
14
**
* 
0.
00
4 
-0
.0
34
**
* 
0.
01
3 
Te
ac
hi
ng
 o
nl
y 
-0
.0
13
**
* 
0.
00
2 
-0
.0
02
* 
0.
00
1 
-0
.0
04
**
 
0.
00
2 
0.
00
3 
0.
00
4 
-0
.0
03
 
0.
00
2 
-0
.0
01
 
0.
00
2 
-0
.0
18
**
* 
0.
00
5 
M
ed
 S
ch
oo
l 
0.
25
5*
**
 
0.
09
2 
0.
53
1*
**
 
0.
05
7 
0.
10
5*
* 
0.
04
1 
0.
39
3*
**
 
0.
08
1 
0.
68
9*
**
 
0.
04
0 
-0
.0
29
 
0.
04
9 
 
 
C
on
st
an
t 
-2
4.
56
3*
**
 
9.
30
8 
24
.0
90
**
* 
6.
01
3 
-3
.9
59
 
4.
58
8 
-1
1.
98
9*
 
6.
60
9 
-1
.9
57
 
3.
18
6 
-3
.3
44
 
2.
72
8 
2.
31
6 
13
.0
31
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 e
ta
 
 
 
1.
00
0*
**
 
0.
04
7 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
0*
**
 
0.
04
1 
 
 
 
 
 R
-s
q 
0.
81
5 
 
.9
34
 
 
0.
25
5 
 
0.
80
1 
 
.9
54
 
 
0.
17
1 
 
0.
75
7 
 
N
ot
e:
 D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 (l
n)
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 re
se
ar
ch
 fu
nd
in
g.
 *
**
 p
<.
01
; *
*p
<.
05
; *
p<
.1
.  
  
 
CHAPTER SIX 
6. MARKET-BASED REFORMS AND EFFICIENCY CHANGE 
IN THE AUSTRALIAN HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR 
Introduction 
The drive for efficiency and accountability has characterized higher education reforms in 
Australia since the end of 1980s. As in most other countries, the higher education sector started to 
expand rapidly in the mid-1980s, which imposed additional burdens on public funds. Increasing 
costs in higher education brought up questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of the sector 
(Meek 2002). The spread of the New Public Management ideas in the public sector strengthened 
the attention to accountability even further and pointed to potential inefficiencies in government 
funded universities. As a response to the new pressures, government implemented a series of 
quasi-market mechanisms. The 1987-88 reform was triggered by the idea that competition 
between universities is a source for greater efficiency and quality improvement in the system 
(Dawkins 1987). The reform also emphasized the idea that more “managerial” type of 
governance, in contrast to traditional collegial governance, makes universities more efficient, 
dynamic, and responsive to the environment (Ibid.).   
The emphasis on competition and efficiency materialized in a cycle of changes – 
concerning teaching, research, and university governance, and the structure of the sector more 
generally.  The 1987/88 reforms established a unified system, which resulted in numerous merges 
and amalgamations. Related to teaching, the reform reintroduced tuition fees (HECS), 
emphasizing not only the idea of cost sharing but also of students as customers. In subsequent 
years universities became competitors for full-fee-paying domestic and international students.   
 144 
The 1996 budget cuts strengthened the competition for student funding and other external funding 
opportunities even further.  Although government allocations to institutions were not made 
dependent on teaching performance, the performance was monitored through quality audits and 
government mandated graduate surveys.  Market mechanisms entered even more powerfully the 
research sector. The reform introduced the principle of performance based research funding 
through Research Quantum, awarding money based on publication output, success in attracting 
external funding, and completed research degrees. The funding increasingly shifted from 
institutional research grants to competitive research grants and contracts allocated by the 
Research Council or other funding bodies.  The government policies also directly influenced 
internal university management and governance. Quality audits in the early 1990s assessed not 
only success in terms of performance and outputs, but also managerial aspects such as strategic 
planning, internal incentives to manage performance in the organization, and internal quality 
policies.   
Through the various incentive and monitoring mechanisms the government hoped to 
make the Australian higher education sector perform better and become more efficient.   This 
study will examine the extent to which this goal was really achieved. The paper will concentrate 
primarily on the idea of technical efficiency, i.e. whether universities have increased their output 
relative to the resources used for producing the output. Efficiency change in Australian 
universities has been studied before.  Worthington and Lee (2005) study universities over a five 
year period (1998-2003) and observe that universities have indeed become more efficient over the 
period. This study hopes to contribute two elements to the existing evidence. First, it observes 
efficiency changes over a longer 12 year period (1992-2004) in order to get a clearer 
understanding about the efficiency since the early years of the reform cycle.  Secondly, the study 
specifies different input sets and attempts to clarify the source of efficiency improvement.   
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Market-based higher education policies and efficiency of the sector  
Market provision of goods and services is seen as superior to public provision from an 
efficiency point of view; and public sector reforms that introduce market elements into the sector 
– so called quasi-market reforms (Le Grand 1991) – aim to achieve the efficiency gains of the 
free market. Markets are perceived more efficient because of inherent incentives for cost-
reduction, securing thus the technical and allocative efficiency in the system. Whether market-
based reforms increase efficiency in Australian higher education depends on several assumptions 
about universities’ behavior. 
Ferris (1991) identifies four main forces that influence production costs and that are 
affected by choosing either a more market or public organizational model. The four forces are 
managerial incentives, managerial flexibility, scale economies, and market conditions. The extent 
to which the goal of cost-efficiency is achieved in an organization is influenced by the strengths 
of incentives that managers have to work towards the goal. This is the issue of X-inefficiency 
(Frantz 1988). X-inefficiency arises from an agency type of a problem, when the “owners” and 
managers diverge in their objectives and managers deviate from the overall objective of the cost-
minimization.  X-inefficiency is a potential problem both in the private and public sector, but the 
public sector is more vulnerable to the X-inefficiency on several reasons. Most importantly, in a 
non-competitive environment where funds are granted despite the performance and cost-
efficiency organizations do not face the ultimate market test – they are not driven out of the 
market in case they fail to perform efficiently. Organizations in a non-competitive environment 
therefore also face weaker incentives not only to perform efficiently but also to be innovative in 
their production and management (Weimer and Vining 1999, Dixit 2002, Vining and Weimer 
1990).  
Secondly, public organizations tend to have higher constraints on managerial flexibility. 
The itemized organizational budgets, for example, restrict managerial discretion and forbid 
 146 
shifting resources between capital investments and operational expenditure. The government may 
also specify and limit academic salaries.  All such constraints limit managerial freedom to acquire 
the desired input mix and increase efficiency in the organization.  Assuming that managers have 
an incentive to increase the efficiency of the organization and that they are better informed for 
such decisions, greater managerial flexibility is thus likely to improve efficiency.  
Thirdly, scale efficiencies may be enforced either by government action or market 
processes. Consolidation of the higher education system in the end of the 1980s was forced by the 
government with the aim to increase efficiency. The optimal size of universities, and distribution 
between, for example, teaching and research output affects the overall efficiency of a university. 
Finally, the extent of the competition between universities influences the gains from more 
market-oriented approach to higher education.  
From a production cost perspective, government provision of higher education is likely to 
increase the costs. The system lacks the necessary incentives for cost-minimization and constrains 
managerial freedom to achieve greater flexibility. This generalization, however, ignores several 
important characteristics of the higher education sector. It is difficult to adequately measure and 
price the outputs of universities that make it difficult to observe whether a university is actually 
performing efficiently or not. Quasi-markets may even increase costs in various ways (Le Grand 
1991). There are costs related to setting up a contractual relationship between a university and 
government, and monitoring and enforcing the contracts. Competing organizations also use their 
resources on advertising and other ways of increasing their market share that do not add directly 
to the quality of the output. Investments into prestige and status, instead of quality and 
performance, may significantly increase the costs of higher education provision (Brewer et al. 
2002). In the sectors where the quality of the product is often hard to measure and demonstrate, 
organizations may choose to invest into inputs that symbolize performance rather than actually 
making a real impact on performance, such as hiring “star scientists”. Often the costs also go up 
due to short term political pressures. In order to gain support to the changes by providers, the 
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government increases salaries or provides extra resources to the sector.  Quasi-markets may also 
increase labor costs that otherwise may have been suppressed by the government using its 
monopolistic position. Moreover, the argument of self-selection has been used to justify the role 
of the non-profit sector. Non-profits are seen as less costly in terms of transaction costs of 
monitoring because they have no incentives to sacrifice quality for profit purpose. Introducing 
competition and profit-assumptions may shake the underlying incentives of non-profit providers.  
In sum, market-based higher education reforms in Australia strengthened the incentives 
to perform better, increased managerial flexibility, and enforced performance monitoring by the 
government. Before analyzing the change in efficiency empirically, it would be helpful to 
illustrate changes in the main outputs and inputs in Australian universities over the 1992-2003 
period.    
General trends in teaching, research, and universities’ finances   
The number of students has consistently increased in Australia since the 1960s (see 
Figure 6.1). The growth in student numbers also continues over the 1992-2003 period, but the 
source of the growth is different from the earlier periods. The number of publicly funded students 
increased very modestly until the mid-1990s, but the policy reform of 1995 froze the numbers for 
the following years.  The total student number has continued to increase due to fee-paying post-
graduate students and international students (Figure 6.2). The number of international and fee-
paying students started to increase considerably in 1995. This reflects the impact of the budget 
cuts in 1995, which put universities under a serious cost pressure and made them to search for 
alternative revenue sources. As a result, fee-paying students, both domestic and international, 
became an important revenue source and universities started to actively recruit the students. In 
1998 universities also started to enroll fee-paying undergraduate students, but they constitute only 
a marginal proportion of the overall student body.  
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Figure 6.1. Total student enrollment Figure 6.2. Changes in different student types   
  
Source: DEST Time Series data Data source: DEST Student Collection 
Roughly two thirds of students in Australia are undergraduate students. The proportion of 
undergraduate students has however slightly decreased over the period.  The fastest growth has 
been among course-based postgraduate degrees (on average 6.8 per cent annually) and among 
non-degree students (10 per cent annually).  The number of research-based students has increased 
on average 4.7 per cent annually.  While the number of undergraduate students has been growing 
at the slowest rate, only 2.3 per cent annually, in absolute terms the increase has contributed the 
most to the total student numbers.   
Research output has also grown rapidly over the period.  As illustrated in Chapter 1, 
publication numbers started to increase significantly in the early 1990s (Figure 1.2). While this 
trend is characteristic also to many other OECD countries, the trend in Australia is steeper than in 
other countries (Butler 2001). There are some concerns that the publication numbers may be 
inflated and do not reflect changes in actual research performance. The higher number of 
publications may be achieved by lowering the quality of the publications.  Academics may have 
developed a preference to publish in ISI cited journal because of greater legitimacy. The increase 
in publication numbers may thus not be attributable to more research but to changed publishing 
preferences. Evidence on  research quality and impact indicators is inconclusive (see Chapter 1).  
Universities have thus increased their teaching and research output over the period, but 
changes in the output do not mean necessarily changes in the productivity. While universities 
produce more undergraduate and graduate students and do more research, they also use more 
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resources for their activities. As shown in Figure 6.3, universities’ operational expenditure 
follows roughly the same trend as changes in outputs. Universities’ revenue has grown roughly 
proportionally to research outcome; it has grown more than the number of undergraduate students 
and research-based postgraduate students, but less than the number of course-based postgraduate 
and other, non-degree students.   
Figure 6.3. Growth of university outputs and financial 
resources in 1992-2003  
Figure 6.4. Growth of university outputs and 
academic staff  in 1992-2003  
Data source: DEST Higher Education Statistics Collection. 
Year 2003=1. 
 
Data source: DEST Higher Education Statistics 
Collection  Year 2003=1.  
While universities’ revenue has increased consistently, the composition of the revenue 
sources has changed drastically. The biggest change is the share of the government funding in 
universities’ total revenue. The funding from Commonwealth Government Grants includes 
institutional grants, grants from the Australian Research Council, Research Financial Assistance, 
and various other grants. The amount of funding from these sources has remained roughly the 
same but its share in universities’ total revenue declined rapidly. While in 1995 the 
Commonwealth Government Grants covered 57 per cent from universities’ expenses, by 2002 the 
proportion had dropped to 40 per cent (Table 6-1).  The proportion of government grants and 
HECS funding together has dropped from 69 to 56 per cent.  The main gains in revenue are from 
fees and charges, a majority of which comes from international students. Consultancy and 
contract research contributes to the total revenue to a modest extent.    In spite of conscious 
efforts, including the CRC (Cooperative Research Centers) program, the private industry still 
contributes relatively little to universities’ revenue.   
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Higher education has thus become relatively cheaper for the government but this does not 
mean that the sector has become more efficient. It only refers to the fact that some of the costs of 
the higher education have been shifted to other partners – mostly to students. The efficiency 
analysis in this chapter seeks to understand whether universities have responded positively to the 
cost-pressures in 1990s and been able to improve their performance and cost-efficiency.    
While the outputs have significantly changed, it is curious to see the changes in the main 
input – academic staff. While the finances have kept pace with the increase in outputs, the 
number of academic staff has not gone through equal change (Figure 6.4). On the other hand, the 
composition of the staff has changed. The number of senior staff, at the associate and full 
professor level has increased while the proportion of lower level staff has remained the same or 
declined (DEST).   
Studying efficiency in the higher education sector 
In the economics literature, the production process in universities is approached similarly 
to other industries. Universities are multi-product organizations: they produce teaching, research, 
and potentially other services (see Hanushek 1987).  In this production process universities apply 
inputs – like academic staff, non-academic staff, technology, capital etc. Technical efficiency in 
universities indicates how efficiently universities produce their outputs relative to their inputs.  
Measuring universities’ efficiency is however quite complicated because universities are different 
from many traditional industries: universities produce multiple products from multiple inputs, and 
output and input prices can often not be identified. Moreover universities are not profit-
maximizers. These limitations require special treatment in efficiency studies.  
Universities efficiency has been analyzed with traditional production or cost 
minimization models.  Early studies used single output cost models (e.g.  Brinkman 1981, 
Hoenack et al. 1986). Developments in the field of economics in the 1980s introduced more 
advanced models and permitted cost model specifications for multi-product firms (Dundar and 
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Lewis 1995).  Multi-product cost minimization models have been used extensively in higher 
education research (e.g. Cohn et al. 1989; Koshal and Koshal 1999; Glasset al. 1995; de Groot et 
al. 1991).  The cost function approach has been applied also on Australian universities (Lloyd 
1994, Lloyed et al. 1993, Thorsby 1986). These cost-minimization studies are primarily 
concerned with the scale and scope effect in higher education, and most of them indeed 
demonstrate the positive effect of scale and scope in the sector. However, these studies assume 
that all universities function at the maximum possible efficiency and assign productivity 
differences to scale and scope effects (or some other observable characteristic). The assumption 
that universities indeed produce at the technology frontier is highly questionable. Recent public 
policies attempt to target potential inefficiencies in the system and attempt to make universities to 
function more efficiently. The efficiency assumption in the cost models has become less 
convincing and new methods have been adopted in order to study inefficiencies in the system.  
As the interest in efficiency differences across universities has increased, also new, and 
more appropriate techniques have been developed for studying efficiency.  The efficiency in 
higher education is now primarily approached with a frontier analysis.  This technique constructs 
empirically a frontier of maximum efficiency – the frontier of “best practices” – and the distance 
of each university from the frontier signifies its inefficiency. There are two ways of constructing 
the frontier: parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis and non-parametric Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA).  Both approaches have been applied to the higher education sector. Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis has been successfully used for example in Stevens (2001) and Izadi et al. 
(2002), but the Data Envelopment approach has become more popular in the field. The advantage 
of the non-parametric model over parametric models lies in the specific nature of the higher 
education production process. The stochastic (statistical) approach assumes implicitly that all 
universities share an identical cost structure. For the DEA there is no need for this assumption or 
any assumption about universities’ behavior (e.g. cost-minimizing or profit maximizing). 
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The first DEA studies in the field of higher education were conducted in the US, in order 
to study efficiency differences between private and public universities (Ahn et al 1988; Ahn et al 
1989).  In the late 1980s and 1990s, efficiency became a concern in many countries in Europe and 
elsewhere, and the DEA technique has now been extensively used to contribute to the efficiency 
discussions.  The DEA has been used for studying efficiency in the UK, the US, Australia,  
Canada, South Africa and other countries. Table 6-2 lists major empirical studies in the field. In 
addition to institutional level analysis, DEA has been used also at the departmental level (e.g. 
Beasley (1990) on chemistry and physics and Johnes (1995) on economics) or for one specific 
research output (e.g. Ng and Li (2000) on research performance). 
In the recent years the DEA has been further developed to incorporate time dynamics in 
panel data. The productivity change in British universities has been studied in the UK by Johnes 
(2006a), Flegg et al. (2004) and Glass et al. (1998).  The last study observes that on average 
productivity declined by 4 per cent in the UK universities over the 1989-1992 period; the first two 
studies observe a 1.5 per cent (1996-2002) and 3.5  per cent (1980-1992) annual increase in 
productivity respectively.  In Australia, Worthington and Lee (2005) have found a 3.3 per cent 
(1998-2003) annual increase in productivity and Carrington et al. (2004) found a 1.8 per cent 
(1996-2000) increase.  
DEA has thus become a dominant technique for studying efficiency in the higher 
education sector. The method addresses the specific characteristics of the higher education sector 
that make traditional efficiency measurement difficult: absence of input and output prices, 
multiplicity of inputs and outputs, and ambiguous objective function. A brief description of the 
methodology will be provided next.  
Data Envelopment Analysis: description of the methodology  
The DEA methodology was developed for estimating efficiency in the outputs and inputs 
of not-for-profit entities (Charnes et al. 1978). Since these organizations do not follow general 
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behavioral assumptions like profit maximization or cost minimization, the standard efficiency 
techniques are not useful. DEA is useful in situations when efficiency cannot be estimated with 
direct market results, i.e. profitability.  The technique was inspired by the work of Farrell (1957), 
but the real impetus for using DEA in the efficiency studies came from Charnes et al. (1978). 
Since then the method has been used in different settings and it has been further advanced to 
incorporate variable return to scale, panel data and other specificities. 
DEA is a non-parametric programming technique to measure the efficiency of one 
organization relative to other similar organizations. The technique constructs a technology 
frontier- i.e. the maximum output that can be produced with given inputs or outputs. The frontier 
is constructed entirely from empirical data, without any assumptions about the production process 
or behavior.  The general logic of the method is illustrated in Figure 6.5. 
Figure 6.5  Diagrammatic representation of an 
output-oriented DEA 
Figure 6.6 Efficiency, technology and productivity 
changes 
 
Adapted from Coelli et al.  (2005) and Johnes (2006) Adapted from Coelli et al. (2005); Worthington & Lee (2005) 
The technique defines efficiency as a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs and the 
weight structure is calculated by mathematical programming. The organization on the frontier (A, 
B, or C) is defined as fully efficient and get a score of 1. Other organizations (E) get an efficiency 
score between 0 and 1, depending on their distance from the production frontier (E-E’).  Charnes 
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et al. (1995) present further details.  For the empirical estimation in this study, the program by 
Coelli et al. (2005) has been used. 
DEA also gives an insight in the source of inefficiency. Technical efficiency 
demonstrates the extent to which the organization is successful in maximizing output from 
existing inputs. Allocative efficiency measures the extent to which inputs are used in optimal 
proportions. Allocative efficiency is rarely examined in the higher education sector because the 
optimal balance between inputs depends on their relative price, but input prices are often not 
easily available in the sector.   
Scale efficiency is another form of potential efficiency. Universities may be technically 
efficient but they may provide too much or too little output for maximum efficiency. On the other 
hand, universities are often not flexible in adjusting the scale. The size of the university is to a 
large extent under the control of the central administration that makes decisions about the number 
of publicly funded students and allocates institutional grants. Therefore, the DEA model must 
allow varying rates of return for meaningful results. On the other hand, information on scale 
efficiency may give valuable insights about the potential efficiency loss because of sub-optimal 
distribution of resources between universities. 
The Malmquist index has been adapted for the panel data and it allows the DEA to 
explore productivity change more specifically. The Malmquist index decomposes changes in the 
technical efficiency into two parts: pure technical efficiency and technological change. This 
means that the productivity change over time may be explained either by the movement relative 
to the frontier, or by the shift of the frontier itself.   The idea is illustrated in Figure 6.6. The 
frontier F represents the efficient level of output (y) that can be produced from a given level of 
input (x). The frontier may shift in time (from tF  to 1tF ), which indicates technological change. 
When a university operates in point tz  (using inputs of tx  and producing ty outputs), the 
university operates below the production frontier. With the available technology it could produce 
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outputs at the level ay .  In the next period the university shifts to the point 1tz , which is again 
inefficient, but with respect to the new higher production frontier. The Malmquist index attempts 
to decompose the change in the output/input ratio into two components: technical efficiency 
change (moving closer to the frontier) and technological change (the shift of the frontier). 
Technical efficiency change is further decomposed into scale efficiency change and pure 
technical change. 
While DEA has proven to be a helpful tool in the economics of higher education, the 
technique has limitations. Most importantly, the measure only captures relative efficiency. The 
best performing organizations are assumed to be fully efficient and are assigned the maximum 
score of 1. The efficiency of other organization is measured relative to the best performing 
organizations. The measure, however, does not say how efficient the best performing 
organizations actually are. The final result would demonstrate high average efficiency when all 
organizations are performing relatively poorly, but are homogenous in their poor performance.   
Secondly, there is no test of statistical significance of efficiency scores and inferences are based 
on geometrical averages.    
Finally, the quality of the DEA results depends on the quality of data. The model requires 
that all relevant outputs and inputs are specified.  Often, however, all output variables (or input 
variables) are not easily measurable.  Furthermore, even when the output is quantifiable, the 
quality differences of the output cannot be measured. These imperfections may bias the results 
considerably.  Since the choice of output and input measures are critically important for DEA 
results, the next section discusses the measures in detail.   
Output and input measures  
Defining universities’ outputs, inputs, and performance measures more generally, is a 
difficult task and the strengths and weaknesses of different measures have been discussed in 
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length (Cave et al. 1997, Meyerson and Massy 1994). The consensus about outputs and inputs in 
higher education has been achieved only in very general terms. Universities’ outputs include 
education, research, and public service; inputs are a combination of academic and non-academic 
staff and capital (Hopkins 1990).  Operationalization of these measures in empirical studies varies 
considerably. The variation in measures is partly explained by the country of study and 
availability of data, but there are also some more philosophical differences about the measures.   
Output measures 
Table 6-2 provides a concise overview about the measures used in existing DEA studies on 
higher education. The output measures use various combinations of teaching and research 
outputs.  
Teaching 
Education is clearly one main output of universities, but a search for the best measures 
for the quantity and quality of the education output has led to different results. The main 
disagreement about the student measure is between using the number of graduates vs. using the 
number of students. The proponents of the former see the degree as the final outcome of the 
educational process (e.g. Worthington and Lee 2005, Johnes 2006). Such a definition raises a 
question as to what extent education is itself a valuable outcome, even when the studies do not 
lead to the completed degree. From a human capital perspective, the skills and abilities are 
developed throughout the educational process. The rate-of-return studies demonstrate that each 
year in a university has a positive effect on individual income, even though the effect of the 
degree is disproportionally higher (Borland et al. 2000). According to this evidence, also a year at 
school should be considered as a positive output, not only the degree.   
The studies that define educational output in terms of degrees also tend to include 
enrolled students as inputs in the educational process. This approach may have clear advantages. 
If data is available on the quality of the entering students, such as entrance exam scores, then 
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comparing final student output and the quality of student input is the most accurate measure of 
the “value added” of the education (e.g. Johnes 2006). When the quality of incoming students is 
not available and student enrollment is compared with degrees (Flegg et al, 2004; Worthington 
and Lee 1996) then the measure is likely to be strongly biased. Such comparison would indicate a 
drop-out rate, which is strongly correlated with student characteristics (Cave et al. 1997). 
Focusing on degrees only would thus punish those universities that attract non-traditional and 
academically less advanced students that are more likely to drop out of university, independent of 
their effort and performance. 
Because of these reasons, the full-time equivalent student load, rather than degrees, is 
included as an output measure in this study. The student load is also a more precise measure for a 
time-series study because degrees have a long time-lag. The number of degrees does not reflect 
the teaching that is actually done in the year of interest, and using the resources of that year.  
Since education on different study levels is likely to require different set of resources, three 
categories are used: undergraduate students, course-based postgraduate students, and research-
based postgraduate students. Student data from the early 1990s does not allow differentiation 
between doctoral and master level students. 
Both graduate numbers and student load ignore the issue of quality of the education 
output. If the quality of education is ignored, universities that provide a higher quality but more 
expensive education may be discriminated against. Moreover, concerns have been articulated that 
the pressure for efficiency and the focus on research performance has hindered the quality in 
teaching (Marginson 2001). The quality of education is difficult to measure.  Australia is 
relatively progressive in collecting data from university graduates. The Course Experience 
Questionnaire surveys graduate satisfaction with the program and the Graduate Destination 
Survey collects data on labor market outcomes. These data sources however, are not valid for the 
purposes of this study. Job market outcome cannot be meaningfully used as a measure of 
educational quality in a time series study. Yearly changes in labor market outcomes would hardly 
 158 
reflect changes in educational quality, but rather reflect changes in economic environment. 
Moreover, it would be unrealistic to assume that employers can accurately estimate yearly 
changes in the “market value” of new graduates. Secondly, labor market outcomes could be used 
only if the quality of incoming students is effectively controlled for and differences across fields 
of study are taken into account.  Otherwise the income differences would to a large extent reflect 
the selectivity barriers of the university, not the quality of education.  
The Course Experience Questionnaire could be a valuable source for teaching quality. 
However, evidence demonstrates that student satisfaction varies primarily across fields of study 
and depends primarily on student characteristics (Ramdsden 2003). Differences between 
institutions are virtually non-existent and all institutions demonstrate a marginal improvement in 
quality each year. Based on the existing evidence of student surveys, it seems more justified to 
assume equal teaching quality between institutions than significant quality differences across 
universities. 
Research 
Research output has also been operationalized in different ways. The three main options 
are a bibliometric measure, research income, or some form of peer evaluation of research (Table 
6-2). Research income has become the most commonly used measure. Since competitive grants 
go through peer evaluation, the measure effectively combines both the quality and the quantity of 
research. It has been demonstrated that competitive research income has a high correlation with 
other research quality measures (Koshel and Koshel 1999).  Another advantage of the measure is 
that it reflects current, on-going research, not already completed research. Easy availability of the 
data is also likely to have contributed to the popularity of the measure.    
Research income has also significant weaknesses. First, it does not take into account 
cross disciplinary differences. Some disciplines require less financial resources for research (e.g. 
humanities) and distribution of funding across disciplines may be a strategic decision (Carrington 
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2004).  Most importantly, however, it is a measure of research input (Carrington 2004) that would 
enter the production function both as an input and as an output.  Yet the efficiency of using 
resources is the question that we are trying to answer.  
Because of the weaknesses of the research income measure, this study uses the 
commonly used bibliometric measure: total number of publications in the ISI database. Since 
publication of research results takes time and does not reflect ongoing research, the measure is 
used with a one-year lag.  The number of publications in ISI journals is not without weaknesses. 
The number of publications is likely to vary across fields; some fields may rely more on other 
types of publications than ISI cited journal articles. Harris and Kaine (1994) has also pointed out 
that Australian researchers publish in journals that are not cited in common indices.   
Education and research are the two outputs that are commonly used in educational 
production functions. The “third mission” of universities, such as contribution to society and 
knowledge commercialization, are increasingly valued outputs of universities’ activities. Current 
research increasingly includes the number of patents as one of the university output measures. 
This reflects an overall trend toward greater cooperation between universities and industry, and 
the role of universities in the national innovation system. The number of patents would help to 
correct for a potential bias against universities that do more applied work and do not publish as 
much in scientific journals. Reliable information on patents exists only since a few years and 
unfortunately cannot be used for this study. Omitting patent information may bias the results 
against universities that have a more technical focus. On the other hand, evidence shows that 
patents tend to coincide with publications and it is not clear to what extent they are joint products 
and to what extents they are competing for time and resources (Agrawal and Henderson 2002).  
Input measures 
Input measures in the education production function are equally difficult to 
operationalize.  The research and teaching process is some combination of academic staff, 
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support staff, and support structure (buildings, equipment, libraries, laboratories etc). While staff 
numbers are usually easily obtainable, the value of capital is often non-existent even in 
universities’ own accounting systems. Empirical studies have used the measure of aggregate non-
staff operational expenditure, expenditure on libraries and other academic services, or some other 
operational expenditure as a proxy for capital measure. Measuring non-staff inputs with 
operational expenditures has become a standard solution in the literature (see Table 6-2).  
An alternative way to analyze efficiency would be not to identify individual inputs (such 
as academic staff and non-staff expenditure), but instead include universities’ operational budget 
as a single input. This approach would directly estimate the cost-efficiency of universities 
(Carrington 2004, Athanassapoulos and Shale 1997). Separating academic staff as an input 
without considering the quality differences and costs of the input is likely to bias results toward 
research-intensive universities. A university that is primarily oriented to teaching may be more 
efficient when focused on relatively cheaper but less research-oriented staff. Including the 
quantity of staff, but ignoring the differences in the price and the quality of the input, is likely to 
bias the results. Due to this reason, Ahn et al. (1988) prefer faculty salaries (i.e. instructional 
costs) to faculty head count, assuming that faculty ranks and abilities are reflected in their 
salaries. On the other hand, salary differences do not fully reflect productivity differences among 
Australian academics, even though in time they may indeed increasingly reflect performance 
differences. Until 1993, the operation of a national higher education award system provided 
uniform remuneration across institutions. Since the introduction of enterprise bargaining, 
dispersion of salaries across institutions has proceeded and loadings and remuneration have led to 
the emergence of merit and performance based pay (Horsley and Woodburne 2005). Yet data 
exist only on salaries specified with enterprise agreements, not on actual paid salaries.  
The main model in this study distinguishes three inputs: academic staff, non-academic 
staff, and non-staff (operational) expenditures. Operational expenditures include expenditures on 
academic infrastructure (libraries and support services), non-staff administrative expenditures, 
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student services, and capital and buildings. These expenditures are aggregated together because 
they could conceivably be exchanged for each other. Operational expenditure is deflated for the 
2000 real value. One of the limitations of the study is that it includes only operational 
expenditures as costs and ignores the value of the capital investments for the future. Higher 
education experts have articulated a concern that efficiency orientation hinders long-term 
investments and has actually contributed to the depreciation of the research infrastructure in 
Australia (Marginson 2001). The second specification therefore explicitly analyses cost efficiency 
and uses total operational revenue as the only input measure. Finally, the productivity trend of the 
academic staff is examined, and academic staff is further decomposed as professors (professors 
and associate professors), lecturers (senior lecturer and lecturer) and below lecturers.  
Output orientation and input orientation 
In DEA, efficiency can be modeled in two ways: as an input-oriented or as an output-
oriented model.  Output-oriented technical efficiency poses the question as follows: how much 
can output quantities be increased without changing input quantities? Input-orientation asks the 
question of how much can input quantities be reduced without changing the output? Choosing 
one over the other is a conceptual decision. What characterizes better the choices that universities 
actually face? Efficiency models assume that units can exercise control over their inputs and/or 
over their outputs and can obtain the maximum possible efficiency level if they wish. Do 
universities have a greater freedom to manipulate their outputs or to choose inputs?   
Australian universities are relatively constrained in their decisions about the production 
process. Even though institutional autonomy has been greatly enhanced over the period, the 
government still has substantial power in determining both the outputs and inputs in a university. 
Student enrollment in universities is a combination of government allocated student places and 
fee-paying domestic and international students. Universities have freedom in relation to the fee-
paying and international student numbers, but not in setting the number of government allocated 
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students.   Also, the number of fee-paying students is not unrestricted. The restriction set by the 
Commonwealth is that the number of fee-paying students cannot exceed 25 per cent of the HECS 
students (35 per cent since 2005), and all places for HECS students have to be filled before fee-
paying students can be admitted. Non-research degree programs (like MBA programs) have no 
restrictions on tuition or student numbers and the expansion in these programs is also noticeable 
in Australia. The tuition and number of international students is not restricted. The number of 
international students has increased significantly. Universities thus have a limited freedom over 
student numbers. In terms of research output, universities can choose the “amount” of research 
they produce. The restrictions on research output come from “market demand”, i.e. the ability to 
attract necessary research funding from the research councils.   
In terms of inputs, universities also have limited discretion. In terms of academic staff, in 
the short run universities are restricted by tenure contracts, but they can choose an appropriate 
mix of junior or senior staff, and adjunct staff. Universities can also change the distribution of 
work load between research only, teaching only, and combined personnel. How much 
administrative staff to hire, to substitute some of the time of the academic staff or technologies, is 
another potential strategic choice.  
The main source of revenue is the operational grant by the government. In accordance to 
the Higher Education Act, the operational grant to universities is allocated on the basis of 
negotiations between the university and the DEST. The negotiation process is built on a 
university profile that presents a mission statement, strategic plans, quality assurance policies, 
and various performance and input characteristics (student numbers, staff numbers etc). The size 
of the operational grant depends primarily on the targeted number of students in each discipline 
and the level of the course. 
Research funding is more dependent on actual performance outcomes. Universities’ 
research budgets come from two main sources: performance based (RQ) grants to universities and 
the research councils’ funding to research projects. Some funding also comes from other 
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agencies, the state government, and private sources. The total amount of science funding is 
primarily a function of political decisions and political priorities, but the allocation to universities 
is based on the performance of the university.  
It is not unambiguously clear whether universities should be analyzed as input-oriented or 
output-oriented units. In this study we made a choice for the output-oriented approach on several 
reasons. The primary restriction on universities is the operational grant, which is outside of the 
discretion of individual universities and sets serious limits for down-sizing or up-sizing in the 
short run. Moreover, the rhetoric by the government and in the universities is about increasing 
performance and productivity. As Massy (1996) points out, in academia productivity is perceived 
as doing more with given inputs, rather than doing the same with fewer resources. It therefore is 
more in line with the currents policies, incentives, and pressures to ask if universities could 
produce more with given inputs rather than to ask whether universities could produce the same 
outputs with fewer resources. 
Empirical evidence 
General efficiency 
The first specification includes four output measures and five input measures. The 
outputs include the number of publications, undergraduate/non-degree students, course-based 
postgraduate students, and research-based postgraduate students. The inputs include the FTE total 
academic staff, FTE administrative staff, and non-staff expenditures. The DEA results are 
presented in Table 6-3 and the results break the productivity growth down into individual 
components. ‘Total factor productivity change’ in the last column indicates the overall change in 
productivity which aggregates all individual components. ‘Technological change’ refers to the 
shift of the possible production frontier. ‘Technical efficiency change’ refers to “catching up” 
with the frontier, which can be either due to scale effects (‘scale efficiency change’) or just 
efficiency improvement (‘pure efficiency change’).     
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As shown in the last column in Table 6-3, universities’ productivity has increased on 
average 4.5 per cent annually. This improvement can be almost entirely assigned to the outward 
shift of the frontier, i.e. technological progress (3.9 per cent). The scale efficiency contributes to 
the change 0.4 per cent and the scale efficiency only a marginal 0.1 per cent. The efficiency gain 
in the sector has thus been due to the expansion in the frontier relating inputs to outputs. There is 
no significant increase in efficiency.  It should be pointed out that in general universities are very 
efficient with respect to each other.  The geometrical mean of the constant-return-to-scale 
efficiency scores varies only between 0.90 and 0.95 over the years. High relative efficiency seems 
to be common to the higher education sector: very high efficiency has been observed also in the 
UK (Johnes 2006), the US (Salerno, 2002) and by other studies in Australia (Abbot and 
Doucouliagos 2003). A small sample size and large number of input-output variables explains 
partly why many universities are defined as being on the frontier. It is also likely that input/output 
ratio is quite homogenous across the sector. Since the efficiency of universities is already high 
(i.e. they are already close to the frontier), it can be expected that efficiency can be changed only 
by shifting the production possibility frontier. However, it is remarkable that all universities seem 
to have been able to keep up with the shifting frontier.  
While the system as a whole demonstrates quite clearly a frontier shift, there are some 
differences between universities.  All universities have improved their productivity, but Sydney 
University of Technology (9.4 per cent), Ballarat (8.4 per cent), Charles Darwin University (8.3 
per cent) have experienced very high productivity increases. In the first case, the productivity 
increase is entirely due to the shift in the production frontier. Charles Darwin University is an 
interesting case that demonstrates the highest gain from the scale increase – 4.7 per cent.  It is a 
university that was given a university status in 1989 as a result of the abolishment of the binary 
system and the university has grown ever since.  Ballarat university has had the most balanced 
efficiency improvement where the frontier shift contributes 4 per cent, scale efficiencies 1.7 per 
cent and pure technical efficiency 2.5 per cent. In general, scale efficiency improvements have 
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been very low, with a few exceptions over 1 per cent. Four universities have had very minor loss 
in scale efficiency (University of Canberra, The University of New England, The University of 
New South Wales, Flinders University).  
In sum, while there are some minor differences in the sector, there is no consistent trend 
that universities either move closer or further from the frontier in time. There is also no evidence 
of some universities strengthening their market position and developing higher unit costs. If some 
universities have been able to accumulate more resources they have also increased their outputs 
correspondingly. However, the procedure of decomposing inputs into academic staff, 
administrative staff and non-staff expenditures, hides one important aspect of efficiency. 
Academic staff is not identical across the sector, especially in terms of research capacity. These 
differences are increasingly reflected also in the remuneration packages of academic staff 
(Horsley and Woodburne 2005). Separating academic staff as an input, ignoring its different 
costs, may give a biased estimate on the efficiency in the system. While it points to the 
productivity in terms of main inputs, it does not provide the answer to whether the system 
operates more efficiently from a pure cost-efficiency viewpoint.  
 Cost-efficiency 
The cost-efficiency model includes the same four output measures (3 teaching outputs, 
and 1 research output) and total operational revenue as a single input measure. This specification 
links outputs only with total costs of production and thus provides information on cost-efficiency 
most directly (Athanassapoulos and Shale 1997).  
The results show relatively high efficiency across the sector, between 86 per cent and 94 
per cent for the constant return to scale and 93 per cent and 98 per cent for the variable rate of 
return (Table 6-4). Figure 6.7 illustrates changes in relative efficiency. It should be reminded that 
the figure does not demonstrate changes in efficiency, but only changes in relative efficiency 
between universities in each time period. The peaks are years when efficiency differences 
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between universities were the smallest.  The graph points out two peaks: 1995 and 2000, which 
could be explained by the policy changes. As discussed in Chapter 1, the years 1996 and 1999 
were the years of big changes in higher education and the peaks may potentially be an effect of 
the policy changes. Since 1996 the government imposed serious budget cuts for the university. As 
discussed earlier, since then universities started more actively to attract fee-paying students and 
search for external funding. It is likely that some universities were able to replace the missing 
funds more quickly. Since outputs (like student enrollments) cannot be easily manipulated 
annually, universities were forced to maintain their output levels with fewer resources. In 1999, 
the government announced a plan of revising the research funding system and linked the funding 
more towards performance. As a result of the policy change, it is likely that universities again had 
a different time to cope with the reform. According to this explanation, policy reforms shake the 
system and increase output/input ratio differences across the sector.  
Figure 6.7. Average efficiency score, 1992-2003.  
 
 
The analysis of different types of universities may give an insight how different 
universities react to the policy changes. Based on a typology by Margisnon (1997), Australian 
universities are divided by their main characteristics into four clusters: traditional research-
intensive Sandstone universities; universities who aspire to become research intensive 
comprehensive universities, the so called “Wannabe Sandstone universities”; “Technical 
universities” that focus on technological study areas; and “New universities” that were created 
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with or after the 1987/88 unification reform. As shown in Table 6-4, Sandstone universities have 
the highest average efficiency score, which is quite a surprising result. Research intensive 
universities are characterized by low student-staff ratio and high costs on research infrastructure 
(Ramsden 1999), but according to this evidence these universities also manage to deliver the 
results to justify their costs. Technical universities have the lowest mean score, but do not 
demonstrate a consistently lowest efficiency score over the years. Their relative inefficiency can 
be expected due to the higher costs of technological programs. Relatively inefficient are also 
the“Wannabe” Sandstone universities.  The last column in the table shows that the efficiency gap 
between Sandstones and Wannabe Sandstones is increasing.  This gap may suggest that the 
wannabe sandstone universities may need to invest resources into building up research prestige 
and to position themselves on the market, but the investments are not yet actualized through 
improved outputs. The gap may be also due to productivity differences of academic staff in these 
two types of universities, which is not fully balanced by salary differences.   
There is no considerable change in universities’ cost-efficiency over the period 1992-
2004 (Table 6-5). Total productivity has improved 0.6 per cent and the change fluctuates between 
-3.1 per cent and 4.8 per cent. There is also no clear time-trend in efficiency changes.  Both the 
scale efficiency and the pure technical efficiency have no change (0 per cent). There is not much 
change in scale efficiency. In 2002 as a model year, the scale inefficiency was 9 per cent. Quite a 
few universities have scale inefficiencies larger that 10 per cent: some universities seem to be too 
large (University of Sydney, Deakin, Monash, RMIT, University of Melbourne, University of 
Queensland) and some too small (Ballarat, Canberra).  
This evidence suggests that while the total output of universities has increased over the 
period, the total revenue of universities has increased proportionally.  There has thus been no 
efficiency gain in the system, despite strong government action such as severe budget cuts, 
efficiency pressures, and output control. However, a more optimistic interpretation is also 
possible.  Universities could still be performing more efficiently if the prices of the inputs in the 
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higher education have grown faster than consumer prices, yet the universities are able to produce 
at the same cost-level. Cost-escalation in the higher education sector has received a lot of 
attention in the US and several factors contribute to the cost increase (Ehrenberg 2000). Most 
importantly, higher education is a relatively labor intensive industry and the growth in wages, 
especially among highly skilled labor, has a substantial impact on overall costs in the sector.    
The growth in the price of labor has indeed surpassed the growth of consumer prices in 
Australia;  on average 0.7 per cent annually over the period (ABS 2007). However, a time-series 
study of Australian academic salaries indicates that the real salaries in academia have constantly 
declined since the end of the 1970s, especially those of the more senior academics (Horsley and 
Woodburne 2005). Academic salaries rather seem to be an instrument to keep the costs in 
universities down, similarly to the US during the growth period in 1970s (Froomkin 1990). 
Table 6-6 illustrates the dynamics of the total salary costs in Australian universities over 
the 1992-2003 period. Total real staff costs have increased on average 2.4 per cent annually.  As 
seen in the last column, however, the proportion of academic salaries in universities’ total 
expenditure has constantly decreased. Salaries and salary related costs have dropped consistently 
from 34.5 per cent of all academic expenditures in 1992 to 29.0 per cent  per cent in 2003. These 
developments indicate changes in the cost structure of Australian universities.    
Similar changes in the cost structure have also been observed elsewhere. Rhoades and 
Sporn (2002) explore the growing importance of administrative and other non-academic services 
over direct academic activities in the US and in Europe. They have associated the changes with 
changes in the environment: universities have now greater independence, which also means 
greater responsibilities, such as quality control, seeking external revenue, admitting different 
types of students. These trends have changed the structure of professional labor. They observe as 
a general trend in the US a movement toward a matrix model of production, i.e. where production 
is less a function of isolated professors’ activities than of the interrelated activities of professors 
and various managerial professionals. Academic salaries are consequently becoming a smaller 
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proportion of universities’ budgets. Other researchers have more explicitly associated the changes 
with the rise in the administrative sector and bureaucratization in universities (Kogan 1999, 
Gornitzka et al. 1998, Leslie and Rhoades 1995). Increasing administrative costs may thus be a 
price for greater autonomy of Australian universities and for new responsibilities associated with 
this autonomy. The other costs compared to salary costs started to increase since 1996, when the 
market pressures in universities were intensified with budget cuts. 
The changes in the cost structure inspire deeper analysis of academic labor productivity 
as a driving force behind productivity change. As Mahoney (1988) points out, a simplified 
analysis of partial-factor productivity, which links outputs only to one input, can be more 
informative for understanding performance differences in complex organizations.   
Labor productivity  
When focusing only on labor productivity, universities have become significantly more 
productive. On average, the total factor productivity increases 4.9 per cent annually (Table 6-7). It 
is almost entirely attributable to technological change (4.4 per cent)  – i.e. the possibility frontier 
is moving outward.  Scale efficiencies contribute 0.5 per cent of the productivity improvement.   
At the same time, universities in general are able to keep up with the trend and the distance from 
the frontier is not expanding.  A small 0.5 per cent increase is due to the change in pure technical 
efficiency, but scale efficiency has no effect.  Changes across universities are quite different. The 
biggest change has occurred in Charles Darwin University (8.4 per cent), Ballarat University (8.3 
per cent), and University of Technology Sydney (UTS) (8.9 per cent). With the exception of the 
UTS, in general, productivity seems to increase more in universities that have a low average 
productivity.  Sandstone universities demonstrate high productivity, over 0.9 per cent. This 
indicates that there is some catching up in productivity between universities.  When labor inputs 
are divided into three categories – professors, lecturer and others – the results do not change 
much (see row 2b in Table 6-8) 
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How does increase in labor productivity affect the overall cost-efficiency? This depends 
firstly on the extent to which salary payments have compensated the productivity increase.  
Considering that real salaries have been constants or even slightly diminishing, the salaries have 
not kept up with the productivity increase (5 per cent) and labor productivity increase must have a 
positive effect on overall cost-efficiency. 
On the other hand, academic labor cannot be analyzed separately from other inputs. 
Labor productivity may have increased because it has been substituted with other inputs. The 
productivity of academic staff may increases due to information technology and e-learning 
(Johnes 2006). Technological developments can make information more easily accessible to 
users, may cause changes in teaching, and make administration more efficient. Communication 
technology may also facilitate collaborative research.  Labor productivity change would therefore 
suggest that technology may successfully substitute some of the labor, or at least make it more 
productive. The explanation of technology change may however be much more prosaic. Surveys 
of Australian academics demonstrate that all the policy changes (especially the increase in 
enrolments and falling funding levels) have considerably increased the work pressure of 
academics (Harman 2006). In quantitative terms, a survey of academic staff shows that in 20 
years, academic faculty works on average 5 hours more each week.  Surprisingly, the biggest 
increase in the time commitment is not related to teaching responsibilities, as could be 
hypothesized based on increased students-per-staff ratio, but to the administrative commitments. 
Australian academics perceive a significant decline in their working conditions and career 
prospects, and job satisfaction has consequently dropped from 67 to 51 per cent (McInnis 1999).  
At the same time the average working hours have increased only from 47.7 to 49.2 between 1993 
and 1999.   
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Discussion  
In this paper we examined whether the reforms since the end of 1980s have made 
Australian higher education more efficient. Comparing three specifications of the DEA analyses 
provides some interesting insight about the changes in the sector and helps to answer the question 
whether the system has become more efficient over time. For a better overview, Table 6-8 
compares the main outcomes of the models discussed above.  
First, there is no unambiguous answer to the question of whether the higher education 
sector performs more efficiently. Existing DEA studies on Australian universities (Worthington 
and Lee 2005) point to the increase in productivity. The first model specification that separates 
academic staff, non-academic staff and non-staff expenditures confirms the result – universities 
have improved their productivity by 4.5 per cent. On the other hand, from a pure cost-efficiency 
standpoint, universities are not more efficient – there has been only a marginal 0.6 per cent 
change.  The change in the productivity that is claimed in the studies seems to be entirely the 
function of academic staff productivity.   
We hypothesized that market reforms contribute to efficiency in several ways. Budget 
constraints, competition and autonomy for input and output use are likely to provide incentives 
for decreasing technical inefficiencies in the system, to choose the appropriate scale level, to 
design incentives that encourage academics to deliver more. On the other hand, competition may 
bring also additional costs on evaluation, monitoring, seeking external funding, branding and 
marketing.   
Based on this analysis, academics in universities have become much more productive. 
This may be the result of policies that encourage primarily research productivity. Also budget 
pressures force universities to increase student numbers without a proportional increase in staff 
numbers. Academic staff thus work harder and deliver more. The cost-efficiency however does 
not increase in spite of the productivity increase of the academic staff. Australian universities are 
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experiencing changes in the cost structure, where academic staff salaries and the academic sector 
as a whole receives a diminishing part of universities’ revenues. The explanation here can be 
twofold.  First, although the productivity of academic staff increases, the system requires more 
administrative and other kind of support, such as marketing, prestige building, and coping with 
the government evaluation and quality control requirements etc. Secondly, academic productivity 
may have increased due to changes in “technology”, such as computerization, information 
technology and electronic resources for research. Technology alone does not however explain the 
productivity increase. As shown above, Australian productivity increase has surpassed that of 
other countries while there is no evidence that the technology in Australia has been adopted to a 
greater degree or at a faster speed. However, educational technologies add to non-staff 
expenditures in universities and this may be one factor that increases non-staff costs in the sector. 
The increase in academic staff productivity may have been achieved also by deteriorating 
working conditions and increasing work load or by sacrificing other duties such as teaching.   
When we examine how different universities develop over time, there are no patterns that 
show that some universities develop market dominance and increase higher than average unit 
costs. Most prestigious research intensive universities are among the most productive ones in all 
specifications, i.e. by cost-efficiency, academic productivity and mixed input models. Even 
though it may be true that research-intensive universities are able to attract more resources in the 
market environment and pay higher salary premiums to their staff, their outputs compensate the 
increase in the resources. On the other hand, universities that have the lowest productivity 
(primarily “wannabe sandstones” and technological universities) seem to increase their efficiency 
fastest and thus catch up with the most efficient universities.  Yet the shift even in these 
universities is rather due to technological change, indicating the outward shift in total productivity 
frontier in these universities, rather than catching up with the frontier.  
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Conclusion 
The Australian government implemented a cycle of reforms in the higher education 
sector since the end of the 1980s and strengthened the market mechanisms both in teaching and 
research areas. The reforms were triggered by the idea that markets encourage competition, which 
provides universities with necessary incentives for performance improvement and cost-efficiency.  
This study shows that Australian universities have not become significantly more cost-efficient 
over time. Increase in research and teaching outputs have been balanced by the increase in 
operational expenditures, producing 0.6 per cent annual efficiency gain.  On the other hand, the 
ability to maintain the cost level over the 12 year period may be quite an achievement considering 
increasing income levels in the country and potentially increasing research costs. The 
productivity of academic staff has considerably increased over time.   
The evidence also shows that the level of efficiency in Australian universities is high. 
There is no sign of increasing cost-differences across universities which could be expected 
because strong universities are able to secure more resources on the market and thereby 
strengthen their market position. On the contrary, the gap between research intensive universities 
and aspiring research intensive universities seems to increase. This may indicate the ability to 
attract better qualified staff and increase the productivity in the research intensive universities. 
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TABLES  
Table 6-1. The operational revenue of Australian universities by categories, 1995-2002  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Commonwealth 
Government Grants 
(HEFA and other 
grants)  
4,308,070 4,566,307 4,420,183 4,294,818 4,190,836 4,218,886 4,470,211 4,655,949 
HECS 902,046 932,780 1,209,560 1,450,988 1,662,425 1,675,697 1,771,162 1,833,589 
Fees and Charges 880,403 1,078,011 1,226,822 1,355,833 1,546,589 1,697,446 2,020,661 2,462,155 
Investment Income 305,042 298,211 326,375 289,613 275,726 320,929 302,641 208,058 
Donations and 
Bequests 85,304 84,247 102,531 114,556 111,550    
Royalties, 
Trademarks and 
Licenses 
     14,593 20,932 18,082 
Consultancy and 
contract research      467,422 494,455 458,956 
Other Sources 951,146 981,654 839,840 860,348 853,127 789,143 944,057 1,415,878 
TOTAL 7,535,721 8,051,582 8,217,649 8,455,692 8,733,748 9,327,668 10,202,101 11,518,498 
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Table 6-3. Geometric mean changes in technical efficiency and technology by year and university, 1992-2003 
 Mean 
efficiency 
score CRS 
Technical 
efficiency 
change 
Technol
ogical 
change 
Pure 
efficiency 
change 
Scale 
efficiency 
change 
Total factor 
productivity 
change 
Average  1.006 1.039 1.001 1.004 1.045 
1992 0.900      
1993 0.936 1.044 0.974 1.024 1.020 1.018 
1994 0.901 0.958 1.064 0.977 0.981 1.020 
1995 0.907 1.010 1.038 0.995 1.015 1.048 
1996 0.918 1.012 1.006 1.007 1.005 1.018 
1997 0.933 1.003 1.085 0.998 1.004 1.087 
1998 0.919 1.015 1.013 0.994 1.021 1.028 
1999 0.929 0.993 1.082 0.999 0.995 1.074 
2000 0.956 1.035 1.100 1.019 1.015 1.138 
2001 0.941 0.983 1.068 0.992 0.991 1.050 
2002 0.946 1.005 1.040 1.000 1.005 1.046 
2003 0.954 1.010 0.966 1.012 0.998 0.976 
Charles Sturt University   6.6   6.6 
Macquarie University   5.9   5.9 
The University of New England  -1.0 3.6 -0.6 -0.3 2.6 
The University of New South Wales  -0.3 4.0  -0.3 3.8 
The University of Newcastle  0.8 3.8 0.3 0.4 4.6 
The University of Sydney   3.9   3.9 
University of Technology, Sydney   9.4   9.4 
University of Western Sydney  0.1 3.1  0.1 3.2 
University of Wollongong   6.2   6.2 
Deakin University  1.0 3.5  1.0 4.5 
La Trobe University   0.4 -0.8 0.8 0.3 
Monash University  0.5 2.4  0.5 2.9 
RMIT University  1.4 4.7 0.8 0.6 6.1 
Swinburne University of  Techn  0.3 5.1 -0.4 0.7 5.4 
University of Ballarat  4.2 4.0 2.5 1.7 8.4 
The University of Melbourne  0.6 3.1  0.6 3.7 
Victoria University  1.6 3.4 1.4 0.2 5.1 
Central Queensland University   2.2   2.2 
Griffith University  0.8 2.5 0.2 0.6 3.4 
James Cook University  0.6 1.4 0.7  2.0 
Queensland University of Techn  1.8 4.0  1.8 5.8 
The University of Queensland  0.2 3.9  0.2 4.2 
University of Southern Queensland  -2.0 5.1 -2.0  3.0 
Curtin University of Technology  1.4 3.3 0.5 0.8 4.7 
Edith Cowan University  0.3 3.2 -0.3 0.6 3.5 
Murdoch University  -0.2 3.7 -0.1  3.6 
The University of Western Australia   3.4   3.4 
Flinders University  0.2 3.9 0.4 -0.2 4.1 
The University of Adelaide  0.6 2.2 0.5 0.1 2.8 
University of South Australia  2.7 4.3 1.5 1.2 7.2 
University of Tasmania  2.1 0.5 2.1  2.6 
Charles Darwin University  4.7 3.4  4.7 8.3 
Australian National University   4.3   4.3 
University of Canberra  -2.1 5.6 -1.5 -0.6 3.4 
Australian Catholic University  0.6 6.2  0.6 6.8 
Note: Efficiency change for individual universities in percentages.  
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Table 6-4. Cost-efficiency in different types of universities 
 Total CRS Total VRS Sandstone Technical Wannabe 
sandstone 
New Sandstone-
Wannabe 
1992 0.893 0.939 0.940 0.810 0.930 0.850 0.087 
1993 0.866 0.938 0.844 0.869 0.855 0.894 -0.049 
1994 0.921 0.967 0.935 0.927 0.908 0.921 0.014 
1995 0.944 0.984 0.959 0.933 0.926 0.954 0.005 
1996 0.939 0.979 0.948 0.962 0.912 0.944 0.004 
1997 0.904 0.968 0.937 0.881 0.887 0.903 0.034 
1998 0.881 0.947 0.896 0.905 0.870 0.869 0.027 
1999 0.921 0.956 0.972 0.897 0.890 0.919 0.053 
2000 0.919 0.965 0.970 0.895 0.879 0.925 0.044 
2001 0.921 0.960 0.977 0.884 0.901 0.912 0.065 
2002 0.859 0.941 0.950 0.755 0.811 0.876 0.074 
2003 0.886 0.938 0.976 0.781 0.843 0.900 0.077 
Average 0.905 0.957 0.942 0.875 0.884 0.905 0.036 
Note: Arithmetic means; CRC unless otherwise specified.   
 
Table 6-5. Changes in cost-efficiency: geometric mean changes in technical efficiency, technology, pure efficiency 
and scale efficiency 
 Technical 
efficiency change 
Technological 
change 
 Pure efficiency 
change 
Scale efficiency 
change 
Total factor 
productivity 
change 
1993 0.974 1.052 1.002 0.972 1.024 
1994 1.066 0.933 1.034 1.031 0.994 
1995 1.029 0.985 1.018 1.01 1.013 
1996 0.994 1.003 0.994 1.000 0.997 
1997 0.961 1.091 0.989 0.972 1.048 
1998 0.974 1.079 0.976 0.998 1.052 
1999 1.047 0.936 1.011 1.036 0.981 
2000 0.997 1.015 1.01 0.987 1.012 
2001 1.003 1 0.994 1.009 1.004 
2002 0.924 1.048 0.976 0.947 0.969 
2003 1.025 0.955 0.997 1.028 1.978 
Average 0.999 1.008 1 0.999  1.006 
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Table 6-6.  Academic salaries and salary-related costs  in 1992-2003 
 Nominal (‘000) 
CPI Deflated 
(base yr 2000) 
Growth  % 
% from total 
operational 
expenditure 
1992 2 012 902 2449435  34.5 
1994 2 242 665 2610478 3,3 35.0 
1995 2 351 766 2605796 3,2 33.1 
1996 2 610 956 2849697 -0,2 34.4 
1997 2.553 064 2793478 9,4 33.0 
1998 2 584 864 2784189 -2,0 32.1 
1999 2.677.024 2832339 -0,3 31.8 
2000 2 859 430 2859430 1,7 31.7 
2001 3 029 962 2938213 1,0 31.2 
2002 3 265 727 3073763 2,8 29.4 
2003 3 431 560 3155209 4,6 29.0 
  
 
Table 6-7. Changes in academic labor productivity: geometric mean changes in technical efficiency, technology, 
pure efficiency and scale efficiency 
 
Mean 
efficiency 
score CRS 
Technical 
efficiency 
change 
Technolo
gical 
change 
Pure 
efficiency 
change 
Scale efficiency 
change 
Total factor 
productivity 
change 
Average  1.005 1.044 1.000 1.005 1.049 
1992 0.869      
1993 0.881 1.015 1.011 1.025 0.990 1.025 
1994 0.866 0.98 1.066 0.993 0.987 1.044 
1995 0.870 1.009 1.032 0.979 1.030 1.041 
1996 0.880 1.012 1.004 1.013 0.998 1.016 
1997 0.864 0.978 1.098 0.963 1.015 1.074 
1998 0.900 1.043 0.994 1.019 1.023 1.036 
1999 0.902 0.999 1.051 1.004 0.994 1.05 
2000 0.901 1.008 1.176 1.005 1.002 1.185 
2001 0.897 0.999 1.039 0.996 1.003 1.038 
2002 0.911 0.996 1.054 0.989 1.007 1.049 
2003 0.869 1.018 0.974 1.014 1.004 0.991 
Charles Sturt University 0.983 0.3 7.1  0.3 7.4 
Macquarie University 0.986  5.2   5.2 
The University of New England 0.964 -1.4 4.2 -1.2 -0.2 2.7 
The University of New South Wales 0.939 -0.7 4.6  -0.7 3.8 
The University of Newcastle 0.906 0.6 3.9 0.2 0.5 4.6 
The University of Sydney 0.973 0.5 3.8  0.5 4.4 
University of Technology, Sydney 0.973 0.6 8.2  0.6 8.9 
University of Western Sydney 0.890 0.8 3.8 -0.1 0.9 4.6 
University of Wollongong 0.957  4.3   4.3 
Deakin University 0.912 0.6 4.5 -0.9 1.6 5.1 
La Trobe University 0.774 -0.1 3.5 -1.1 1.1 3.5 
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Monash University 0.763 -0.4 4.0 0.0 -0.4 3.5 
RMIT University 0.946 1.5 4.0 0.8 0.7 5.6 
Swinburne University of  Techn 0.849 0.5 4.7 0.5  5.3 
University of Ballarat 0.772 4.0 4.2 3.8 0.2 8.3 
The University of Melbourne 0.915 0.6 3.3  0.6 3.9 
Victoria University 0.820 1.0 4.7 0.3 0.7 5.8 
Central Queensland University 0.934  5.9   5.9 
Griffith University 0.911 0.7 3.8 -0.3 1.0 4.5 
James Cook University 0.874 -0.2 3.8  -0.2 3.7 
Queensland University of Techn 0.924 1.9 4.6  1.9 6.5 
The University of Queensland 0.966 0.3 3.8 0.1 0.2 4.2 
University of Southern Queensland 0.903 -2.8 4.4 -2.7 -0.1 1.5 
Curtin University of Technology 0.823 1.4 4.0 0.3 1.1 5.4 
Edith Cowan University 0.820 2.1 3.3 0.6 1.5 5.5 
Murdoch University 0.959 -0.4 4.0 -0.3 -0.1 3.6 
The University of Western Australia 0.998  3.7   3.7 
Flinders University 0.799  3.8 0.1 -0.1 3.8 
The University of Adelaide 0.970 0.1 3.9 0.1  4.0 
University of South Australia 0.774 2.4 4.2 0.4 2.0 6.8 
University of Tasmania 0.876 1.2 3.5 1.2  4.8 
Charles Darwin University 0.613 4.1 4.2  4.1 8.4 
Australian National University 0.996 -0.1 3.2  -0.1 3.1 
University of Canberra 0.858 -2.6 4.9 -2.5 -0.1 2.2 
Australian Catholic University 0.712 0.4 6.9 0.5 -0.1 7.3 
Note: Efficiency change for universities in percentages. 
 
Table 6-8. DEA results for four model specifications (geometrical means) 
 
Outputs  
Technical 
efficiency 
change 
 
Technological 
change 
Pure 
technical 
efficiency 
change 
Scale 
efficiency 
change 
Total factor 
productivity 
change 
Total operating expenditure 
 
0.999 1.008 1.000 0.999 1.006 
Academic labor productivity 
2a. Aggregate 
2b. By groups 
 
1.005 
1.006 
 
1.044 
1.039 
 
1.000 
1.002 
 
1.005 
1.004 
 
1.049 
1.045 
Full model (academic staff, 
administrative staff, non-staff 
expenditure) 
1.006 1.039 1.001 1.004 1.045 
Note: All models have the same set of inputs.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The higher education reforms in the last two decades have changed the Australian higher 
education system considerably. Driven by the objectives of greater efficiency and better 
performance, the government strengthened the role of market mechanisms in the system. The 
universities were made to compete with each other for resources; they have more managerial 
flexibility to reach optimal resource and performance levels; and they are made accountable to the 
government via various monitoring mechanisms. All this expresses a more substantial change in 
the approach: the government does not fund and provide higher education and research, but 
“purchases” and subsidized education and research services from universities. The effect of such 
market-based policies on the higher education system, particularly on research performance, is 
the focus of this dissertation. Markets are expected to provide necessary incentives and flexibility 
for performance improvement and cost-efficiency. On the other hand, the higher education sector 
has many peculiarities that make the effect of such market-based policies unpredictable. Unlike 
organizations in traditional markets, universities are not profit-maximizers; they have multiple 
goals and principals; they have strongly developed professional values; and their outputs are not 
easily measurable. Moreover, the higher education sector is often seen as a winner-take-all 
market where status and prestige rather than price and cost-efficiency determine the market 
position.  
According to the results of this dissertation, Australian universities reacted to the reforms 
quickly and vigorously. This has affected both the fabric of the higher education sector as well as 
the behavior in individual universities. One of the worries with respect to market mechanisms in 
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the higher education sector is the concentration and stratification of the system. When resources 
are allocated to universities based on their performance, the universities that already perform well 
will attract more resources, improve their performance even faster, and thereby widen the gap 
with other universities. The results in this study, on the contrary, indicate that universities have 
become more similar in their research productivity and the gap in research performance between 
universities is declining over time. The convergence models indicate that universities are not so 
much “catching up” with each other as maximizing their individual research potential.  
Universities have different constraints in terms of resources and staff qualifications and the 
reform cycle has encouraged universities to maximize their research potential with given inputs. 
The evidence also demonstrates that universities that had originally low research performance had 
more of the “unused” potential and therefore improved their performance faster. We can therefore 
summarize that market based policies have not increased the performance gap between 
universities. More importantly, market-based policies seem to achieve the intended goal: they set 
up incentives that make universities maximize the productivity of their inputs.   
One factor that contributes to the improvement in research performance is internal 
research management in universities. Since the early 1990s universities have considerably revised 
and strengthened organizational practices in order to support their research activities. According 
to the empirical analysis in this dissertation, the practices indeed contribute to better research 
performance. Such policies are not equally developed across the sector. Research intensive 
universities seem to have responded to the new incentive structure sooner and implemented 
advanced research management practices before others. However, even considering the 
selectivity bias, the practices still demonstrate a positive effect on research performance. The 
effect, however, varies in different phases of the reform. In the early period (1992-1998) research 
management practices have a strong association with the performance, but their effect on 
performance improvement is low. In the later period (1999-2003), on the contrary, the association 
between the practices and performance is lower but their effect on productivity improvement is 
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larger. This indicates that research management practices demonstrate an effect in a more stable 
environment; and in the turbulent times immediately after the reforms performance improvement 
is more chaotic and due to general restructuring.   
Internal research practices that target faculties and departments demonstrate most 
consistently a positive effect. Faculty performance reviews and internal performance-based 
funding has a positive effect in different model specifications. This result confirms the traditional 
idea that in universities academic units are a crucial organizational level where individual 
identities are formed and professional norms shaped. The faculty/department level therefore 
seems to be the most effective organizational level to be targeted by management practices, more 
so than the institutional (university) or individual level. Even though market environment 
strengthens the autonomy and identity of the university as whole, in the organization internally 
academic units maintain their importance in shaping the behavior of individual academics.   
Australian academics have become considerably more productive over the years, as was 
also confirmed by the Data Envelopment Analysis. The productivity increase characterizes the 
entire sector and there are no significant efficiency differences between universities when 
considering both research and teaching output. The extent to which the Australian higher 
education sector performs more efficiently is however more difficult to specify. In terms of cost-
efficiency, Australian universities have maintained their existing cost-level over the years. From a 
skeptical perspective, this may mean that productivity increase of academic staff is 
counterbalanced by increase in internal bureaucracy, prestige building, and the costs of 
technology. From an optimistic viewpoint, considering increasing labor prices and research costs 
the ability to maintain existing cost levels in universities may be interpreted as a positive 
achievement. There are also no signs of some universities abusing their strong market position 
and developing higher unit costs. While universities have different resource levels, the difference 
in resources is reflected also in different output levels.  
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It is evident from the analysis that market-based policies have a sudden shock effect 
which over time declines and finally, the system stabilizes. The period of rapid adjustment to the 
new environment seems to last roughly ten years. In the 1990s lower performing universities 
were moving closer to research intensive universities with respect to their research performance, 
but the trend fades away by the year 2000. Differences are noticeable also in responses to internal 
research management practices. While in the early period research performance was increasing 
rapidly, the growth seems to be independent of internal research management practices. In the 
later period, when the system becomes more stabilized, internal practices start to matter. This 
indicates that market-based policies have a deep effect on the higher education system and the 
behavior of universities, but the effect does not last over time. On the other hand, universities 
improve their performance as a result of the policies and maintain the higher performance level 
also in the more stable phase.  
In sum, market-based policies had a considerable effect on Australian universities.  
Universities all across the higher education sector improved their research performance. The 
government policies have also encouraged universities to implement internal research 
management practices and the effect of these practices outlives the immediate shock reactions. 
Although the policies may have also unintended effects, the policies seem to have achieved their 
primary goal of providing incentives for productivity improvement.   
Some important questions remained unaddressed in this dissertation. While the empirical 
analysis provided evidence on the research concentration trend, the issue of whether 
concentration is good or bad for the higher education system was not examined. Public criticism 
of research concentration is usually driven by an assumption that concentration creates unjustified 
inequity in the higher education system (Nadin 1997). The effect of research concentration is 
however a complex issue. Concentration of research may be indeed negative. This would be so if 
research funding has a diminishing marginal utility. If a university with less research funding 
could produce more research output with a certain amount of research funds than a university that 
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has a lot of research funds then the concentration is likely to be negative. Secondly, concentration 
may lead to the market power that creates inefficiency in the market. Universities with a strong 
market position may charge higher tuition fees without necessarily providing higher quality 
education and lead to cost-escalation.  On the other hand, research concentration may be a 
positive phenomenon and research policy in several countries rather encourages such 
concentration. “Excellence” initiative in Germany, the core principles of “mass and focus” in 
research funding in the Netherlands, and call for research excellence in selected European 
universities at the European level are an expression of the assumption that research concentration 
may actually be beneficial for the country.  Whether concentration improves the performance of 
the system is an empirical matter and requires further research. There is a lack of evidence either 
to criticize or promote research concentration and such evidence could help inform current 
research policy.   
Another issue that was ignored in this study is the unintended consequences of the rapid 
increase in research productivity. This issue has several aspects. Some questions arise due to 
measurement. The incentives that are studied in this dissertation do not target directly research 
performance but certain proxies that aim to capture research performance, such as publications 
and research grants. It is likely that some of the observed increase is not due to actual 
performance improvement but due to the gaming of the system by the university.   Besides the 
measurement issue, the increase in research productivity can be achieved at the expense of other 
duties, most importantly at the expense of teaching. While the empirical evidence does not 
suggest that Australian academics spend less time on teaching and course experience 
questionnaires show rather improvement if any change at all, teaching-research nexus in 
Australian universities is worth further analysis.  
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While this research leaves many important questions unanswered, it does provide some 
evidence on how universities respond to the market-based reforms and how such reforms affect 
the higher education system as a whole.  
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